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Abstract
Proof of causation in toxic torts has presented persistent
problems for the legal system, because the probabilities that
science can know fit poorly with the demands for particularistic
proof imposed by the law’s deterministic model of causation. Some
scholars have hoped that genomic and molecular information will
at last provide scientific certainty—definitive, individualized proof
of toxic causation.
This Article argues that the opposite is true. Scientific
research will increasingly elucidate the ways in which
environmental exposures and human genes interact to produce
disease, but this deeper knowledge will extend rather than resolve
the problem of causal indeterminacy in toxic torts. Genomic and
molecular understanding, instead of sounding the death knell for
proposals to reform toxic tort causation law, will strengthen the
argument for those reforms.
This Article proposes a probabilistic causal contribution
model to replace the model of deterministic causation in toxic
torts, building on earlier scholarly proposals and the creativity of
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Newark. This
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Levitian, Brian Matthews, Olivia Pomann, and Caitlin Stephens; librarian
Susan Lyons; and volunteer motivators and editors Jenny Aley and Sylviane
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a handful of courts. The Article explores how the model would
work and argues that it is superior to present doctrine when
assessed against the goals of the tort system.
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I. Introduction
Forty years after a jury first found that several asbestos
product manufacturers each had caused someone’s asbestosis and
pleural mesothelioma,1 sick people continue to come to court
seeking compensation for illnesses that they allege were caused
by exposure to various toxins. The defendants sued for making,
selling, using, or disposing of the allegedly toxic products
continue to protest that something else—dumb luck, bad genes,
someone else’s similar product, some entirely different toxin, or
mother nature—is what really made the plaintiffs sick, and, more
important, that the plaintiffs cannot prove otherwise.
Proof of toxic tort claims conforms poorly to the traditional
deterministic legal model of but-for causation, because toxic
injuries almost never involve an observable chain of physical
events allowing easy inference of a causal relation between a
particular defendant’s conduct and a particular plaintiff’s harm.
Courts turn to science to replace causal intuition, but a
disjunction remains between the probabilities that science can
know and the determined result that the law wants proven. The
resulting problem has produced hundreds of court opinions and
numerous calls for doctrinal reforms in recognition of the
difficulties that toxic causation presents. Yet, despite decades of
thoughtful jurisprudence and scholarship, the core legal
conception of toxic causation has hardly changed at all.
Science has changed, however, quickly and at an accelerating
pace. The ability to peer into the genome heralds new insights
into human susceptibility to toxic substances. Molecular
technologies provide glimpses of previously inaccessible toxic
mechanisms. Computing power allows this research to be
conducted on a scale and at a rate never before possible.
1. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1094 (5th Cir.
1973) (holding that “the jury could find that each defendant was the cause in
fact of some injury to Borel” although “it is impossible, as a practical matter, to
determine with absolute certainty which particular exposure to asbestos dust
resulted in injury”); see PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT 39–70 (1985)
(describing the Borel trial); Joseph Sanders, Risky Business: Causation in
Asbestos Cancer Cases (and Beyond?), in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 11, 15–17
(Richard Goldberg ed., 2011) (describing the indivisible injury causation
rationale of the Borel decision).
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The law looks to this new science, hoping that its increased
resolving power will at last build a bridge from probability to
certainty. The dream is that genomic knowledge will lead to
deterministic proof of the existence or absence of causal
mechanism in individual cases. That “holy grail” of particularistic
evidence would at last eliminate much of the indeterminacy that
has plagued proof of specific causation in toxic tort claims;2 it also
could fatally undermine arguments for exceptional judicial
treatment of toxic tort claims, restoring to tort law a universally
applicable deterministic model of but-for causation.
This Article argues that the predominant reality is more
likely to be exactly the opposite: at the highest magnifications,
certainty will dissolve into probability. Scientific research will
increasingly elucidate the ways in which environmental
exposures and human genes interact to produce disease, but for
the legal system, this deeper knowledge will extend rather than
resolve the causal indeterminacy problem in toxic torts—and will
therefore increase the justification for doctrinal adjustments to
address that problem.3
Part II describes the traditional deterministic model of
causation and how it fails in many toxic tort cases. Part III
explains why it is likely that scientific success will exacerbate
rather than solve that failure. Part IV proposes an alternative
vision based on a probabilistic causal contribution model of
causation. Part V assesses the proposal against goals of tort law.

2. See Joseph Sanders, Apportionment and Proof in Toxic Injury Cases, 10
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 200, 202 (2000) (“Specific causation evidence seems to be
the holy grail of toxic torts.”). “Specific causation” refers to causation of the
individual plaintiff’s case of disease, in contrast to the exposure-disease link
that is often referred to as “general causation.” See infra notes 20–25 and
accompanying text.
3. This Article develops an argument and solution briefly suggested in an
earlier Article, Steve C. Gold, The More We Know, the Less Intelligent We Are?—
How Genomic Information Should, and Should Not, Change Toxic Tort
Causation Doctrine, 34 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 421–22 (2010).

WHEN CERTAINTY DISSOLVES INTO PROBABILITY

241

II. The Persistent Problem: Toxic Injury and the Traditional,
Deterministic Model of Causation
A. The Traditional, Deterministic Model of Causation
Some notion of causation inheres in the most elementary
formulation of a tort claim. The claim that “defendant wronged
plaintiff” implies a relation between the parties that is
distinguishable from plaintiff’s relation with persons other than
the defendant. To further say that the wrong was more than
abstract—that “defendant harmed plaintiff”—is to connect
defendant’s conduct and plaintiff’s injury via a causal relation
that is distinguishable from the vagaries of a universe in which
people just get injured sometimes. The concept is so intuitive that
torts casebooks typically apply it well before they get around to
expressing it.4 Yet articulating the meaning of causation is
sufficiently difficult that the effort has long occupied
philosophers, scientists, legal scholars, and judges.5
Part of that effort involved disentangling the factual from the
normative in everyday assessments of causal responsibility. We
have come a long way from the legal fiction that any given event
has a single objective cause,6 but the frank acknowledgment that
the doctrine of proximate cause invokes policy choices did not
extinguish the law’s reliance on the idea that events have
4. See, e.g., MARC A. FRANKLIN ET AL., TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES
MATERIALS 333 (9th ed. 2011) (introducing cause-in-fact by noting that
“[f]rom the outset of the book we have implicitly accepted the notion that a
defendant . . . should not have to compensate an injured plaintiff unless the
plaintiff’s injury is causally connected to the defendant’s negligent conduct”); cf.
Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation in Liberal Political
Theory, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 579, 587–88 (1987) (arguing that dissociating
causation from standard of care is irrational under efficiency theories).
5. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed.
1985); Carl F. Cranor, Genetic Causation, in ARE GENES US? 125, 127–30 (Carl
F. Cranor ed., 1994) (discussing common sense, scientific, and legal notions of
causation, and noting that causal ascriptions depend on context and on interests
of ascribing person); Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk,
Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof: Pruning the Bramble Bush by
Clarifying the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1018–39 (1988).
6. See Morton J. Horowitz, The Rise and Early Progressive Critique of
Objective Causation, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 471, 479–
80 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
AND
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determinate factual causes.7 Having shooed policy preferences
into the back room of proximate cause, standard tort doctrine
continues to insist that cause-in-fact reflects an objectively
knowable reality—albeit knowable, ex post, only by
counterfactual inference.
Causation-in-fact has traditionally been proven by
persuading the fact finder that the familiar but-for test is
satisfied: “Conduct is a factual cause of harm when the harm
would not have occurred absent the conduct.”8 The first two
restatements of the law of torts framed the required causal
connection as a requirement that a cause be “a substantial factor
in bringing about the harm.”9 They explained “substantial factor”
as a limiting additional requirement distinguishing, from among
all but-for causes, those that were legally cognizable.10 The Third
Restatement of Torts, opining that this use of “substantial factor”
led to inchoate results, abandoned the term entirely,11 completing
7. Id. at 479–85 (describing the legal realist assault on the doctrine of
objective causation and the rise of the distinction between “actual” and “legal”
cause).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 (2010).
9. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 431 (1965).
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1934) (“[T]hat the harm would not
have occurred had the actor not been negligent . . . is necessary but . . . is not of
itself sufficient [to establish that negligence was a legal cause of harm].”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 cmt. a (1965) (same); id. § 433 (listing
considerations important to determining whether an act is a “substantial
factor”); see Mahoney v. Beatman, 147 A. 762, 766–67 (Conn. 1929) (adopting
this view of “substantial factor”); but see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. j & reporters’ note (2010) (describing
varied applications of “substantial factor”). Before publication of the First
Restatement, some courts used “substantial factor” to justify the intuitively
correct outcome in cases of multiple sufficient causes, in which a literal
application of the “but-for” test would exonerate both causes. See Anderson v.
Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 179 N.W. 45, 49 (Minn. 1920)
(classic “two fires” case); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) (1965)
(stating that in such circumstances “the actor’s negligence may be found to be a
substantial factor” in bringing about harm); Joseph Sanders et al., The
Insubstantiality of the “Substantial Factor” Test for Causation, 73 MO. L. REV.
399, 416–17 (2008) (describing this use of “substantial factor”).
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. j, reporters’ note (2010) (noting that the term “substantial
factor” seemed “to be doing scope-of-liability (proximate-cause) duty” in addition
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(as asserted in the commentary) the conceptual separation of
normatively driven proximate cause from (presumably objective)
cause-in-fact.12
The Third Restatement modeled a but-for factual cause as
any necessary element of a set of causes that, together, are
sufficient to bring about the result.13 This reflects an entirely
deterministic conception of cause.14 Its philosophic underpinning
is the theory that causal laws connect fully specified sets of
causes to effects in an invariant, rather than probabilistic, way.
Take away a true cause, in this model, and the effect always
disappears, unless the effect is overdetermined—that is, unless
some other sufficient causal set exists that does not include this
cause. Leave the cause in existence, and the effect is inevitable,
unless some other necessary element of the causal set is removed.
It may be impossible ever to fully specify a likely infinite set of
causal antecedents, but this model of causation posits that we can
nevertheless make generalizations about the element of a set of
antecedents that is of interest, e.g., the one alleged to be the
cause of harm in a given tort case.15 Such a generalization reflects
an experience-based imputation of a causal role ex ante that is
applied ex post to make inferences about the antecedent’s
determined causal role in the actual event.

“to provid[ing] the standard for determining factual causation,” and was
sometimes used to stiffen and sometimes to relax causation standards).
12. Id. § 29 cmt. g. Although this separation is familiar to every American
law student who has completed the first-year torts course, a distinguished
British jurist recently questioned the use of cause-in-fact “as a kind of filter
which you have to get through in order to qualify for the final round of being
selected as legal causation.” Lord Hoffmann, Causation, in PERSPECTIVES ON
CAUSATION, supra note 1, at 3, 4–6 (2011).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 26 cmt. g (2010). As the Third Restatement explains, this model is generally
consistent with the “NESS” (Necessary Element of a Sufficient Set) test. Id. § 26
cmt. c, reporters’ note; see also Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73
CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1788–1803 (1985) (explaining the NESS test). As Wright
noted, however, but-for cause taken alone is not equivalent to the NESS test.
Wright, supra note 5, at 1021–22 nn.109–11.
14. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. c (2010).
15. See Wright, supra note 5, at 1045.

244

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013)

This model also treats causation as a dichotomous, yes-or-no
proposition: it either existed in a given case or it did not. Such
treatment is not unique to causation, of course. In an adversarial
truth-seeking system designed to choose between competing
versions of events, many elements of claims or defenses are
treated that way. But in today’s doctrine some of these elements,
dichotomous as they are, nevertheless are commonly aligned on a
continuous quantitative scale rather than being limited to
quantum values of zero or one. Many jurisdictions, for example,
ask fact-finders to apportion fault or, more broadly,
“responsibility.”16 Causation, however, has proven mostly
resistant to treatment as a continuous variable.17
B. The Lack of Fit in Toxic Injury Cases
A toxic tort plaintiff claims that exposure to some chemical,
radiological, or biological agent caused a disease. A fundamental
difficulty in proving such a claim is that exposure and disease
usually do not correlate perfectly: some people get sick without
exposure, and some people receive exposure without getting
sick.18 In marked contrast to traumatic injury cases, the disease
process itself is unobserved and unobservable as it occurs, and
inscrutable afterward.19 What evidence then will permit an
16. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.
(2010) (describing comparative fault and comparative responsibility regimes).
17. See id. § 26 cmt. a (limiting apportionment based on causation to
“separately caused” damages); id. § 26 cmt. c (prescribing that “the factfinder
divides divisible damages into their indivisible component parts”); id. § 26 cmt. f
(listing circumstances in which damages can be divided by causation); see also,
e.g., James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898, 909 (N.J. 1998) (noting
that despite legal scholarship advocating reforms, “courts have been resistant to
novel models of causation”); Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 15
S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (“Causation in fact is an all-or-nothing
proposition.”).
18. If disease only appeared after exposure, causation might still be
inferred, even if exposure frequently occurred without disease. Austin Bradford
Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?, 58 PROC. ROYAL
SOC’Y MED. 295, 296 (1965) (giving examples).
19. See Richard W. Wright, Proving Causation: Probability Versus Belief, in
PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 1, at 195, 205–06 (distinguishing cases
of alleged toxic injury from “bash-crash-slash” situations).

WHEN CERTAINTY DISSOLVES INTO PROBABILITY

245

inference that a plaintiff’s illness would not have occurred but for
the exposure, to establish deterministically modeled causation-infact?
Courts initially demand proof of “general causation,” asking
whether the exposure in question is ever a sine qua non for the
plaintiff’s disease, or whether the existence of cases of disease
after exposure is merely coincidental.20 To prove general
causation, plaintiffs have attempted to rely on toxicology studies
(either in vitro or in vivo in experimental animals), evidence of
toxins’ biological mechanisms of action, simple inference from
exposure dose and chronology, and epidemiologic studies (which
investigate the relative risk of disease that is associated with
exposure in samples of human populations). Many courts have
insisted on the primacy of epidemiology for proof of general
causation, in part because of situations in which many claims
were brought despite large bodies of powerful epidemiologic
studies that failed to find any association between the exposure
and the disease the exposure allegedly caused.21
Even strong proof of general causation may be unavailing,
however. The existence of disease without exposure leads courts
to further demand proof of “specific causation,” asking whether
this plaintiff’s case of disease is one that would not have occurred
but for the exposure.22 The difficulty lies in determining what if
any additional proof a plaintiff must, may, or can adduce to prove
specific causation.

20. General causation is sometimes expressed as whether an agent “is
capable of” causing a disease, but more than theoretical capability is implied.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28
cmt. c (2010); Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1158
(E.D. Wash. 2009); cf. Joseph Sanders, Proof of Individual Causation in Toxic
Tort and Forensic Cases, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1367, 1375 (2010) (“The general
causation question is whether a substance . . . has been shown to harm any
individuals.”).
21. See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223,
1231 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff’d, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[E]pidemiological
studies . . . are the only useful studies having any bearing on causation.”);
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717–18 (Tex. 1997)
(requiring a statistically significant epidemiologic result of relative risk greater
than two).
22. E.g., Henricksen, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1155.

246

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013)

For some courts, epidemiology may—or must—serve that
function, but only if the epidemiologic studies find that exposure
more than doubles the risk of disease, which would imply that
exposure accounted for more than one-half of the incidence of the
disease. From this statistic based on the incidence of disease in
exposed and unexposed populations, courts have reasoned that it
is “more likely than not” that an individual plaintiff’s disease is a
case associated with the exposure.23 Some commentators view
this “doubling+” requirement24 as too stringent. James Robins
and Sander Greenland, for example, showed that if the inference
of general causation is accepted, then in most circumstances the
epidemiologic relative risk is a lower bound of the probability that
a given individual who has both exposure and illness is a case of
“true” causation.25
On the other hand, others have argued that because relative
risk is undeniably a property of samples and populations, but
specific causation is a property of an individual case,
epidemiologic data cannot support inferences about specific
causation at all.26 Some courts have effectively demanded that a
plaintiff produce particularistic evidence—proof of some fact that
will distinguish a plaintiff’s case of disease from the cases that
would have occurred even absent exposure.27 To try to satisfy
23. E.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 781
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff’d, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Estate of George v. Vt.
League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 375 (Vt. 2010).
24. Richard Wright seems to have coined this elegant shorthand for the
“relative risk must exceed two” rule. Richard W. Wright, Liability for Possible
Wrongs: Causation, Statistical Probability, and the Burden of Proof, 41 LOYOLA
L.A. L. REV. 1295, 1318 (2008).
25. James M. Robins & Sander Greenland, The Probability of Causation
Under a Stochastic Model for Individual Risk, 45 BIOMETRICS 1125, 1129–32
(1989); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. c(4) (2010) (“[A]ny judicial requirement that
plaintiffs must show a threshold increase in risk or a doubling in incidence in a
group study in order to satisfy the burden of proof of specific causation is
usually inappropriate.”).
26. See Wright, supra note 5, at 1054 (“[P]articularistic evidence is
necessary for causal explanation . . . .”); Wright, supra note 24, at 1318 (arguing
that epidemiologic data provide no evidence that toxic exposure “actually
caused” harm in individual case); Sienkiewicz v. Greif, [2011] UKSC 10, 157
(Lord Rodger), 170 (Lady Hale), 190–91 (Lord Mance).
27. See, e.g., Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1162–
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such demands, some plaintiffs have turned to medical experts
who try to rule out other plausible causes, a method called
differential diagnosis or differential etiology. Some plaintiffs have
tried to rely on epidemiologic studies coupled with analysis of the
plaintiff’s individual characteristics that put the plaintiff at a
particularly heightened risk.28
The interaction of population-derived relative risk data and
proof of specific causation under the traditional deterministic and
dichotomous causation model received unusually explicit
attention in two cases decided by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In each case, a group of plaintiffs
alleged tortious exposure to radiation from uranium mining and
milling.
In June v. Union Carbide Corp.,29 twenty-seven former
residents of Uravan, Colorado, alleged that radioactive
contamination from uranium and vanadium mining and milling
operations in the company town had caused their thyroid disease
or non-thyroid cancer. General causation was not in dispute: the
defendants had to concede that ionizing radiation in general is
capable of causing cancer, and that products of uranium and
vanadium radioactive decay, such as iodine-131, cause thyroid
cancer in particular. In an attempt to prove specific causation,
plaintiffs relied on experts who estimated each plaintiff’s
radiation dose and opined that such exposure was a “substantial
factor” contributing to their various diseases.30 The defendants
argued, and the district and appellate courts agreed, that such
testimony could not suffice to prove causation because it did not
assert that any plaintiff’s illness would not have occurred but for
exposure to the Uravan radiation.
The Tenth Circuit panel analyzed the description of factual
causation in both the Second Restatement of Torts, which used
63, 1177 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (noting that plaintiff could not distinguish his case
of leukemia from one that would have occurred without chemical exposure).
28. See, e.g., Estate of George, 993 A.2d at 384 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting)
(discussing the argument that a firefighter’s individual risk of contracting
lymphoma from inhaled chemicals was higher than the average risk reported in
epidemiologic studies).
29. June v. Union Carbide Corp, 577 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009).
30. Id. at 1237.
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the “substantial factor” formulation, and the Third Restatement,
which consciously deleted reference to “substantial factor.” The
court concluded that despite the difference in language, the two
restatements equivalently established but-for as the sine qua non
for factual causation.31 The restatements admitted only one
exception—situations involving multiple sufficient causes—and
the court reasoned that even in such situations, proof of causation
requires a showing that the alleged cause would have been a butfor cause in the hypothetical absence of the other sufficient
cause(s).
In support of that reasoning, the court cited several
illustrations given in the Third Restatement, including “the one
most pertinent to the case before us,” a hypothetical product
liability case in which a plaintiff whose daughter has a birth
defect alleges that a drug manufacturer failed to warn of the
drug’s teratogenicity.32 The plaintiff claims the drug caused the
birth defect; the manufacturer claims that an independent
genetic condition caused it. The Tenth Circuit noted that
according to the Restatement, the plaintiff must show that the
drug, acting alone, would have caused the birth defect, not
merely that the drug could have caused the defect.33 This
formulation echoes the distinction typically made between
general causation and specific causation.34
The majority held that the plaintiffs had “failed to present to
the [district] court evidence, or even an argument” that radiation
released by defendants constituted “either a but-for cause of . . .
31. Id. at 1241.
32. Id. at 1244 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. e, illus. 2 (2010)).
33. Id. Actually, the illustration was not particularly pertinent to June,
because it illustrated the rule for multiple sufficient causes and therefore
necessarily assumed that both the parents and the drug company presented
sufficient evidence that either the genetic condition or the drug alone would
have caused the injury. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL
& EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 (2010). The real question lurking in June is whether
demanding such evidence can be realistic in a case like June, and how to
respond if it is not.
34. Many courts have said that general causation requires proof that an
exposure can cause the plaintiff’s condition, and specific causation requires
proof that the plaintiff’s exposure did cause the plaintiff’s individual case. E.g.,
Kilpatrick v. Breg, Inc., 613 F.3d 1329, 1334 n.4 (11th Cir. 2010).
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or . . . a necessary component of a causal set that would probably
have caused” any of the plaintiffs’ medical conditions.35 Judge
Holloway dissented in part, arguing that for those plaintiffs with
thyroid disease, the testimony of one of plaintiff’s experts created
a material issue of disputed fact with respect to but-for
causation.36 Judge Holloway did not question the majority’s
explication of “but-for” as the sole test for causation.37
In Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co.,38 three plaintiffs alleged
that their cancers had been caused by radiation exposure from
another uranium mill in New Mexico. They submitted evidence
similar to the plaintiffs’ evidence in June,39 but argued that New
Mexico law, unlike Colorado law as interpreted in June, would
permit a finding of causation based on the “substantial factor”
test.40 The district judge dismissed the action on summary
judgment. A Tenth Circuit panel that included none of the June
judges unanimously affirmed—but in three separate opinions.
Judges Lucero and McKay agreed—often verbatim—with
June’s embrace of mechanistic “but-for” causation as the only
valid interpretation of causation-in-fact. They held that New
Mexico law allowed for substantial factor causation in lieu of butfor causation only in two exceptional cases. Regarding the first
exception, multiple sufficient causes, the court followed June,
holding that “[o]nly a substance that would have actually (that is,
probably) caused the cancer can be a factual cause without being
a but-for cause.”41 Regarding the second, alternative liability, the
court saw no “basis for alternative liability where only one

35. June, 577 F.3d at 1245 (10th Cir. 2009).
36. Id. at 1253–54 (Holloway, J., dissenting). The majority refused on
procedural grounds to consider the plaintiffs’ arguments that persuaded Judge
Holloway. Id.
37. Id. at 1252–54.
38. Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2010).
39. See id. at 1170–71 (Lucero, J., concurring) (describing testimony of
plaintiffs’ experts, including one who testified in June, regarding the “assigned
share” of risk and the lack of other known significant risk factors).
40. Id. at 1167.
41. Id. at 1168 (quoting June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1243
(10th Cir. 2009)).
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potential wrongdoer has been identified and the injury may
simply have resulted from natural causes.”42
Judge Lucero nevertheless disagreed with Judge McKay’s—
and the June majority’s—application of the but-for standard.
Judge Lucero embraced Judge Holloway’s partial dissent in June,
but found the factual presentation in Wilcox insufficient to prove
but-for causation, by contrast with June.43
Of the six judges on the two panels, only Judge Holmes
seemed willing to contemplate the possibility that “the but-for
standard of causation” ought not apply to cases like June and
Wilcox.44 But Judge Holmes did not decide that any other
standard should or would apply, opining instead that plaintiffs
had waived any argument for a different standard.45 Judge
Holmes agreed that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the but-for
test.46
It is easy to understand the uneasiness reflected in the
opinions of Judges Holloway, Lucero, and Holmes. In applying a
deterministic model of causation, the Tenth Circuit effectively
reinforced the specific causation requirement for toxic tort
plaintiffs. The court demanded proof that each individual
plaintiff would not have developed cancer absent exposure to the
radiation released by the defendants in the respective cases. How
could any plaintiff possibly do this?
The majorities, in very similar terms, denied that they had
set the plaintiffs an impossible task.47 They rooted their
42. Id. at 1167. The court stated that alternative liability applies when
“two or more defendants engage in simultaneous or nearly identical negligent
acts but only one of these acts causes the injury complained of, thus making it
difficult or impossible for the plaintiff to prove which defendant caused the
harm” and distinguished asbestos cases in which “it is clear the plaintiff’s injury
was caused by asbestos” but the defendant that caused the harm could not be
specified. Id.
43. Id. at 1170–73 (Lucero, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 1173 (Holmes, J., concurring).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1169 (“[W]e are not persuaded this requirement is so
insurmountable . . . .”); June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th
Cir. 2009) (stating that in holding that plaintiffs did not attempt to prove but-for
causation, the court was “not being hypertechnical”).
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explanations in the preponderance of the evidence standard:
although a plaintiff must show that she or he “actually” would
not have become ill absent a defendant’s tortious exposure of the
plaintiff to a toxic substance,48 the plaintiff need not prove this to
an “absolute certainty.”49 “Actually” actually means “probably”50
or “likely,”51 the majorities stated.
This question-begging explanation still leaves one to ponder
what type of evidence might have satisfied the plaintiff’s burden.
How could a plaintiff show it was “likely” that the defendants’
radiation releases “actually” caused his or her disease? Neither
majority opinion says. Their discussions of but-for causation,
however, are so mechanistic as to give the impression that only
particularistic evidence—something about plaintiff’s disease that
betrayed its origin, like the ballistics marks on a bullet—could
suffice. Perhaps—the opinions don’t say—a sufficiently large
population-based relative risk estimate derived from an
epidemiologic study could also have satisfied the majorities.
Neither of those options was available to the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs in each of these cases did prove, however, that
the defendants exposed them to radiation. The defendants did not
deny that such exposure increased the likelihood that a person
would develop the diseases from which the plaintiffs suffered.
That increased risk is known partly because of an understanding
of what ionizing radiation does to DNA, but also because of the
observation that more disease is found in populations exposed to
additional radiation than in populations not exposed.52
Nevertheless, even though the defendants had exposed the

48. June, 577 F.3d at 1243.
49. Wilcox v. Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165, 1169 (10th Cir. 2010).
50. June, 577 F.3d at 1243.
51. See Wilcox, 619 F.3d at 1167 (characterizing plaintiffs’ position as an
argument that causation could be proven “without regard to whether the
injuries would likely have occurred in the absence of defendant’s action”); id. at
1169 (stating that a toxic tort plaintiff must demonstrate but-for causation “only
to a reasonable degree of medical probability—not a certainty”).
52. See Samuel D. Estep, Radiation Injuries and Statistics: The Need for a
New Approach to Injury Litigation, 59 MICH. L. REV. 259, 266–67 (1960) (noting
that the causal connection between radiation and cancer “can be measured only
by a statistical increase in the incidence of the disease”).
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plaintiffs to known risk factors for their diseases, no plaintiff
could obtain any recovery.
Ex hypothesi, the defendants’ conduct was tortious—perhaps
because reasonable precautions were available that would have
avoided the haphazard broadcast of radionuclides in the
community. The plaintiffs’ evidence fairly supported the inference
that someone got sick who, if the mine and mill operators had
behaved differently, would not have been sick. Yet the
deterministic concept of causation demands that this plaintiff
show that he or she is the “someone” whose disease would not
have occurred absent the defendants’ wrongful conduct. In many
cases, as in June and Wilcox, this will be impossible, resulting in
denial of all recoveries against defendants who nevertheless
wrongfully made people sick.
III. Solutions Illusory and Real: The False—and True—Promise
of Genomics
The deterministic model of causation has performed poorly
when confronted with the mechanistic opacity of toxic torts. That
opacity is as intolerable to science and medicine as it is
inconvenient for law. But science has developed tools to attack it.
In just two decades, researchers have sequenced the human
genome, developed information processing capacity to conduct
statistical analysis of very large numbers of genetic variations,
invented techniques to rapidly assay the effects of toxic substance
exposure on highly variable genetic material, and learned new
ways to detect disease-related changes at the sub-cellular or
molecular level.
Observing all this biomedical research from the law school
across campus, legal scholars understandably envision that one
day the molecular impacts of carcinogens, mutagens, and other
toxins will be as easy to detect and attribute as the impacts from
wayward cricket balls, deformed automobile parts, and
misdirected scalpels. If so, “an increasing number of people will
have the tools necessary to prove sine qua non causation in toxic
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tort litigation,”53 making it easier for deserving plaintiffs to
prevail and, by implication, allowing courts accurately to dismiss
claims when those tools are available but do not provide the
desired proof. At last, cause-in-fact in toxic torts will be as certain
as in any other tort. Or will it?
A. A Bit of Genomics
The seed that grew into the Human Genome Project,
interestingly, germinated in the soil of a toxic tort problem. In the
early 1980s, veterans and their families demanded compensation
for injuries allegedly resulting from service members’ deliberate
experimental exposure to radiation by the government during the
Cold War; in response, Congress commissioned a study of the
feasibility of detecting low-level damage to DNA caused by
environmental exposures.54 The researchers given the task
realized that they would have to “scan many genomes’ worth of
DNA to pick up what were sure to be small alterations in the
mutation rate.”55 A scientist at the Department of Energy
conceived “a more manageable goal, that of sequencing the entire
human genome once rather than many times,” and the seed was
planted.56 It would be about a half-decade before the first federal
appropriation for the Human Genome Project sprouted.57
53. Andrew R. Klein, Causation and Uncertainty: Making Connections in a
Time of Change, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 5, 35 (2008); see also Gary E. Marchant,
Genetic Data in Toxic Tort Litigation, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 7, 8 (2006) (“New genetic
methods and data have the potential to fill some of the scientific uncertainties
and data gaps in toxic tort litigation, thus making toxic tort litigation more
accurate and fair.”); Sanders, supra note 20, at 1399 n.132 (“[T]he field of
toxicogenomics offers the long run possibility that we will be able to ascertain
causation at the level of the individual case, radically changing all specific
causation testimony.”).
54. CHRISTOPHER WILLS, EXONS, INTRONS, AND TALKING GENES 72 (1991).
According to Wills, other significant compensation claims of the era, including
those of Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange and of people living near
the damaged Three Mile Island nuclear plant, also contributed to the political
impetus for the study. Id. at 71.
55. Id. at 74.
56. Id. at 75.
57. Id. at 81.
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Remarkably, it took only a bit more than twice that time to
harvest the crop: a highly accurate sequential listing, coordinated
with physical locations on the chromosomes, of about three billion
nucleotide base pairs that constitute human nuclear DNA.58 The
success of the Human Genome Project spawned a slew of other
“omics” projects pursuing comprehensive indices of classes of
human biochemicals.59 Some of this research promises better
understanding of the genetic and environmental components of
disease etiology, and thus may be directly relevant to the
causation issue in toxic torts.60
1. Genes and Disease
A gene is a segment of DNA that encodes information, which
may be translated into a sequence of amino acids. The amino acid
chain can then be formed into all or part of a protein. Biologists
did not need to sequence the entire human genome to understand
that a person’s inherited genotype could affect the phenotype—
58. Press Release, Nat’l Human Genome Research Inst., International
Consortium Completes Human Genome Project (Apr. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.genome.gov/11006929; see also Int’l Human Genome Sequencing
Consortium, Initial Sequencing and Analysis of the Human Genome, 409
NATURE 860, 873, 875 (2001) (estimating the total number of bases in the
genome). A nucleotide or “base” is one of the four different molecules that bond
together to form a strand of DNA. ISRAEL ROSENFIELD ET AL., DNA 73 (2011). In
the double helix of the DNA molecule, each base is “paired” with its
complementary nucleotide. Id.
59. See Mirsolava Janković, Glycans as Biomarkers: Status and
Perspectives, 30 J. MED. BIOCHEMISTRY 213, 213–14, 219 (2011) (describing
glycomics, study of sugar-protein molecules); Paolo Vineis & Frederica Perera,
Molecular Epidemiology and Biomarkers in Etiologic Cancer Research: The New
in Light of the Old, 16 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY, BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1954,
1955 (2007) (“[N]ew technologies/markers, such as proteomics, metabonomics,
and epigenomics, will become highly relevant . . . .”).
60. Two examples are the Environmental Genome Project and HuGENet
(Human Genome Epidemiology Network). See generally Samuel H. Wilson &
Kenneth Olden, The Environmental Genome Project: Phase I and Beyond, 4
MOLECULAR INTERVENTIONS 147 (2004) (describing Environmental Genome
Project); Wei Yu et al., HugeWatch: Tracking Trends and Patterns of Published
Studies of Genetic Association and Human Genome Epidemiology in Near-real
Time, 16 EUR. J. HUMAN GENETICS 1155 (2008) (describing HuGENet and related
projects).
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the person’s observable traits—in important health-related ways.
The most straightforward situations involve an inherited allele, a
specific variation in a given gene, which changes the coded
protein in a way that produces a particular disease or condition.61
The story of a genetic disease can be considerably more
complicated, however, even for diseases caused by changes in a
single protein coded by a single gene. Cystic fibrosis is a case in
point. In 1989, researchers announced the sequencing of “the
cystic fibrosis gene,” which codes for a protein involved in
transporting molecules across cell membranes.62 A person who
inherits from each parent a copy of a variant allele that results in
the omission of one amino acid from the protein will have cystic
fibrosis.63 But since that discovery, researchers have identified
more than 1,600 different mutations that can produce cystic
fibrosis.64 The mutations, located in various parts of the gene,
affect the protein in various ways that produce disease of varying
severity.65
Genes also relate to diseases in even more complex ways. For
example, people with a particular variation of a gene called
APOE are dramatically more likely to develop Alzheimer’s
disease than people without that allele: ten times more likely if
they inherited two copies of the variant gene, four times if they
inherited one copy.66 But other genes also appear to play roles in
61. For example, alteration of one DNA nucleotide in a gene that codes for
hemoglobin yields a substitution of one amino acid in that protein, which
changes the molecule’s shape—producing the sickle-cell phenotype—and
reduces its ability to carry oxygen. Muin J. Khoury & Janice S. Dorman, Genetic
Disease, in MOLECULAR EPIDEMIOLOGY 365, 370 (Paul A. Schulte & Frederica P.
Perera eds., 1993).
62. Sherman Elias et al., Carrier Screening for Cystic Fibrosis: A Case
Study in Setting Standards of Medical Practice, in GENE MAPPING 186, 187
(George J. Annas & Sherman Elias eds., 1992).
63. Id. at 188; Steven M. Rowe et al., A Breath of Fresh Air, SCI. AM., Aug.
2011, at 69, 71.
64. Rowe et al., supra note 63, at 72; see also WILLS, supra note 54, at 210
(stating that in initial experiments fewer than 70% of cystic fibrosis patients’
genes tested displayed the variation that deleted one amino acid).
65. Rowe et al., supra note 63, at 72; see also WILLS, supra note 54, at 212–
13 (“[M]utations are found all over the gene.”).
66. Gina Kolata, Vast Gene Study Yields Insights on Alzheimer’s, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 4, 2011, at A1.
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Alzheimer’s disease, albeit much smaller roles.67 There is no one
“Alzheimer’s disease gene.”
The Alzheimer’s pattern is not unusual. Susceptibility
alleles, rare variants of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes,
significantly increase a woman’s risk of developing breast
cancer.68 But genome-wide association studies—which examine
large numbers of genes in persons with and without a disease to
determine if particular DNA variations are statistically
associated with higher disease incidence—identified half a dozen
new susceptibility alleles; these occur relatively frequently in the
population, but individually confer small increments of risk
ranging from seven to twenty-six percent.69 Thus, the degree to
which disease or other phenotypic change results from variation
in a gene, which biologists call “penetrance,” varies from gene to
gene.70 Sometimes, the risk conferred by a variation in a

67. Pooled data from numerous studies revealed associations between five
genes and the incidence of Alzheimer’s disease; each of these alleles is
associated with an increase in risk of 10 to 15%. Id.
68. See, e.g., Athina Christopoulou & John Spiliotis, The Role of BRCA1
and BRCA2 in Hereditary Breast Cancer, 10 GENE THERAPY & MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY
95,
96
(2006),
http://www.gtmb.org/pages/Vol10A/PDF/09.
Christop&Spiliot,95-100.pdf (noting that women carrying mutations have a 40%
to 85% lifetime risk, versus 12.5% in general population).
69. Paul D.P. Pharoah et al., Polygenes, Risk Prediction, and Targeted
Prevention of Breast Cancer, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2796, 2797–99 (2008).
70. See Eleanor Raffan & Robert K. Semple, Next Generation Sequencing—
Implications for Clinical Practice, 99 BRIT. MED. BULL. 53, 62–63 (2011)
(defining variable penetrance as “the variable tendency of genetic mutations to
translate into clinical disease;” noting that “every genome sequenced” includes
numerous alleles implicated in disease); see also Elisabeth A. Lloyd, Normality
and Variation: The Human Genome Project and the Ideal Human Type, in ARE
GENES US?, supra note 5, at 99, 100 (noting that most identified genetic
differences are risk factors for, or provide a vulnerability to, development of a
specific disease, rather than determinants of disease); Evgeny N. Imyanitov et
al., Searching for Cancer-Associated Gene Polymorphisms: Promises and
Obstacles, 204 CANCER LETTERS 3, 8 (2004) (“[L]ow penetrance is often
exemplified as something like 1.5-fold risk elevation.”); see generally SUZANNE H.
REUBEN, PRESIDENT’S CANCER PANEL, REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL CANCER RISK:
WHAT WE CAN DO NOW 1 (2010) (“Single-gene inherited cancer syndromes are
believed to account for less than 5 percent of malignancies in the United
States.”).
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particular gene may depend on a person’s genotype at other genes
or on the action of other biochemical constituents.71
2. Toxic Exposure and Disease—and Genes
Biologists also did not need to sequence the entire human
genome to understand that different people may respond to the
same dose of the same toxin in different ways. Even for acutely
lethal poisons, although there may be a dose above which no
person (or research animal) can survive, toxicologists typically
determine what dose is lethal for half of the organisms. Because
the toxin and dose are the same for all the exposed organisms,
something—a variation from organism to organism, a variation in
the environment from organism to organism, or pure random
chance—must explain why the toxin is lethal to some but not to
others.72
More extreme variations typify the chronic or latent toxicity
ordinarily involved in toxic tort cases. Consider tobacco smoke,

71. See Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 63 (stating that variable
penetrance “is usually ascribed either to environmental factors or to unspecified
‘genetic modifiers’”); Marc A. Schaub et al., Linking Disease Associations with
Regulatory Information in the Human Genome, 22 GENOME RES. 1748, 1748
(2012) (noting that for the vast majority of DNA variations found to be
associated with disease, “it is likely that the underlying mechanism linking
them to the phenotype is regulatory” rather than a change in coded protein
sequence). The effects of the breast cancer susceptibility alleles, for example, are
modified by other genes that alter the body’s response to environmental insults
such as radiation. Logan C. Walker et al., Use of Expression Data and the
CGEMS Genome-Wide Breast Cancer Association Study to Identify Genes that
May Modify Risk in BRCA1/2 Mutation Carriers, 112 BREAST CANCER RES. &
TREATMENT 229, 229, 233 (2008). Cystic fibrosis is another example: some people
have symptoms worse than would be suggested by the change in the protein
coded by the “cystic fibrosis gene” because a group of several hundred helper
proteins recognize the altered protein as defective and destroy it before it can be
put into position to do its job. Rowe et al., supra note 63, at 72. See generally
James R. Griesemer, Tools for Talking: Human Nature, Weismannism, and the
Interpretation of Genetic Information, in ARE GENES US?, supra note 5, at 69, 82
(observing that genes “cause” inherited somatic characteristics but “[t]he body is
a cause in inheritance . . . . Proteins and other cell components are causally
responsible for the events of cell division and DNA replication”).
72. FRANK C. LU, BASIC TOXICOLOGY 102 (1985).
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which is almost universally acknowledged to cause lung cancer.73
Many people with lung cancer seem to have acquired the disease
by smoking.74 But some people smoke to a ripe old age,75 and only
a small fraction of even the heaviest smokers ever contract lung
cancer.76 On the other hand, though lung cancer was very rare
before smoking became common, some people who never smoked
did—and do—get lung cancer.77 What explains the differences?
The search for explanations commonly distinguishes
extrinsic from intrinsic potential sources of inter-individual
difference: environment versus genetics.78 Perhaps exposure to
something other than tobacco smoke—say, diesel exhaust—
causes lung cancer in some non-smokers, while another factor—
say, a diet rich in just the right antioxidants—inhibits

73. As recently as 2005, however, Britain’s Imperial Tobacco successfully
defended a tort claim by disputing that it had been “scientifically established”
that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer. See McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.,
[2005] C.S.O.H. 69, 5.694–5.695, 6.149–6.17, 9.9 (stating that the burden of
proof on causation was not satisfied); id. 9.10 (finding that epidemiologic data
failed to prove individual causation).
74. See Graham G. Giles & Peter Boyle, Smoking and Lung Cancer, in
TOBACCO AND PUBLIC HEALTH 485, 486 (Peter Boyle et al., eds. 2004) (estimating
that 83% to 92% of lung cancer deaths in five developed countries are
attributable to smoking).
75. See, e.g., George Davey Smith, Epidemiology, Epigenetics and the
“Gloomy Prospect”: Embracing Randomness in Population Health Research and
Practice, 40 INT’L J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 537, 537–38 (2011) (describing a healthy
centenarian believed to have smoked 170,000 cigarettes).
76. See, e.g., Adrian Cassidy et al., Lung Cancer Risk Prediction: A Tool for
Early Detection, 120 INT’L J. CANCER 1, 1 (2006) (noting that eighty-five percent
of heavy smokers will not develop lung cancer).
77. See Asta Scesnaite et al., Similar DNA Methylation Pattern in Lung
Tumours from Smokers and Never-smokers with Second-hand Tobacco Smoke
Exposure, 27 MUTAGENESIS 423, 423 (2012) (acknowledging that 10% to 15% of
lung cancer deaths occur in people who never smoked). Exposure to
environmental tobacco smoke may explain some of those cases. See Giles &
Boyle, supra note 74, at 495.
78. See generally Jennifer E. Below, Factors that Impact Susceptibility to
Fiber-Induced Health Effects, 14 J. TOXICOLOGY ENVTL. HEALTH 246 (2011)
(noting that only five percent of people exposed to asbestos develop
mesothelioma and discussing genetic, nutritional, and other environmental
factors that may affect susceptibility to the disease); Davey Smith, supra note
75, at 539 (describing studies that partition contributions to health outcomes
from genetics, shared environment, and non-shared environment).
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carcinogenesis in the lungs of some smokers.79 Or perhaps a
fortunate genetic endowment protects some lifelong smokers
from lung cancer, while a genetic mischance induces lung cancer
in some non-smokers.80 Both environmental and genetic
differences between individuals appear responsible for at least
some of the variation in individuals’ responses to toxic
exposures.81 For the most part, it has been impossible (or at
least impractical) to identify, quantify, and tease apart these
possibilities using the investigatory tools of toxicology,
environmental epidemiology, conventional biochemistry, and
classical genetics.82
3. The Tools of Toxicogenomics
Technologies developed during and after the Human
Genome Project provide new tools of vast potential power. DNA
microarrays and even more powerful next-generation sequencing
technologies allow assays of many genes at once and make it

79. See, e.g., Cassidy, supra note 76, at 2 (identifying dietary and other
environmental factors that affect lung cancer risk); Giles & Boyle, supra note
74, at 487 (listing other environmental causes of lung cancer); Elizabeth A.
Ward et al., Research Recommendations for Selected IARC-Classified Agents,
118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1355, 1358 (2010) (describing meta-analyses showing
diesel exhaust associated with slightly elevated risk of lung cancer (relative
risks 1.33 (95% confidence interval 1.24–1.44) and 1.47 (1.29–1.67)).
80. See Ping Zhan et al., CYP1A1 MspI and exon7 Gene Polymorphisms
And Lung Cancer Risk: An Updated Meta-Analysis and Review, 30 J.
EXPERIMENTAL CLINICAL CANCER RES. 99, *15 (2011) (explaining that variations
of two genes are associated with increased risk of lung cancer, and some
variations particularly increase risk in smokers).
81. For example, the authors of a study that observed “[m]arked interindividual variation in response to the same level of exposure” to air pollution
concluded “that susceptibility might be due to genetic factors.” Shuang Wang et
al., Methods for Detecting Interactions Between Genetic Polymorphisms and
Prenatal Environment With a Mother-Child Design, 34 GENETIC EPIDEMIOLOGY
125, 131 (2010).
82. See David Altshuler et al., Genetic Mapping in Human Disease, 322 SCI.
881, 881 (2008) (describing limitations of classical genetics); Michael D. Waters
et al., Toxicogenomic Approach for Assessing Toxicant-Related Disease, 544
MUTATION RES. 415, 415 (2003) (describing the potential of toxicogenomics to
address previously “intractable” problems).
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practicable to sequence an individual’s entire genome.83 The
young but rapidly developing science of toxicogenomics marries
the experimental techniques of toxicology to the analytical
techniques of genomics.84 Using laboratory animals or cells or
tissues cultured in vitro, researchers can expose genetic material
containing many variations of many genes to a suspected toxin
and observe any variations in response, or they can compare
exposed and non-exposed genetic material and observe any
differences.85 New technologies allow detection not only of
variations (polymorphisms) in the DNA sequence of particular
genes, but also rearrangements and other variations of the
structure of genes along a chromosome.86
Alternatively, researchers can study the genes of samples of
actual human populations and determine whether observable
genetic differences are associated with differential exposure to
toxins or with differential toxic effects among those exposed.87
83. Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 55; see also, e.g., S. Le Scouarnec &
S.M. Gribble, Characterising Chromosome Rearrangements: Recent Technical
Advances in Molecular Cytogenetics, 108 HEREDITY 75, 79 (2012) (describing how
the Human Genome Project took more than a decade, but a whole human
genome now can be sequenced in a few days); D.A. Wheeler et al., The Complete
Genome of an Individual by Massively Parallel DNA Sequencing, 452 NATURE
872, 872 (2008) (reporting first sequencing of a human’s genome using
“massively parallel” next-generation technology).
84. See generally Gerald T. Ankley et al., Toxicogenomics in Regulatory
Ecotoxicology, 40 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 4055, 4056 (2006) (documenting increasing
numbers of toxicogenomics publications in each of the next five years following
the first such publication, in 2000); Syril Pettit et al., Current and Future
Applications of Toxicogenomics: Results Summary of a Survey from the HESI
Genomics State of Science Subcommittee, 118 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 992, 995
(2010) (reporting that toxicogenomics has improved understanding of biological
mechanisms of toxicity but biological understanding of toxicogenomic data
remains limited).
85. See Jamie A. Grodsky, Genetics and Environmental Law: Redefining
Public Health, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 171, 190 (2005) (“DNA microarrays . . . permit
thousands of genes to be monitored simultaneously to determine whether they
have been activated or deactivated as a result of chemical exposure.”); see also
Le Scouarnec & Gribble, supra note 83, at 76 (explaining how microarrays
work).
86. Le Scouarnec & Gribble, supra note 83, at 75.
87. See e.g., Peter Soderkvist & Olav Axelson, On the Use of Molecular
Biology Data in Occupational and Environmental Epidemiology, 37 J.
OCCUPATIONAL ENVTL. MED. 84, 84–86 (1995) (describing study models); Wang et
al, supra note 81, at 131 (discussing results of study of gene-environment
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This extension of epidemiologic methods marks the field of
molecular epidemiology.88
A goal of toxicogenomic and molecular epidemiologic studies
is to identify biomarkers—biochemical characteristics that reveal
a toxic relation of interest. A biomarker of exposure is an
observable change that occurs with exposure but is otherwise
absent. A biomarker of effect is an observable, medically
significant, harmful change that occurs with exposure but is
otherwise absent. A biomarker of susceptibility, by contrast, is an
observable genetic variation that alters the extent to which an
exposure causes toxic harm.89 Researchers have begun to find
markers of each type.
For example, as stem cells divide and differentiate into
various types of white blood cells, metabolites of benzene interact
with DNA to cause errors during the copying of chromosomes.90
Research has revealed that blood cells of individuals
occupationally exposed to benzene are more likely to have
particular chromosomal aberrations associated with the
development of certain forms of a group of cancers called acute
myelogenous leukemia (AML).91 The observation suggests a
biological mechanism of benzene carcinogenicity, tending to
confirm classical epidemiologic studies that detected an
association between exposure to benzene and incidence of AML.
It also could provide a marker of benzene exposure or effect.92
interaction in variable health effects of air pollution).
88. See Margaret R. Spitz & Melissa L. Bondy, The Evolving Discipline of
Molecular Epidemiology of Cancer, 31 CARCINOGENESIS 127, 127 (2010)
(explaining that molecular epidemiology is an extension of classical
epidemiology using biomarkers); Vineis & Perera, supra note 59, at 1954
(defining molecular epidemiology).
89. See Grodsky, supra note 85, at 181–87.
90. See Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137,
143–46 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2011) (describing testimony
about chromosome aberrations associated with benzene exposure).
91. See Luoping Zhang et al., The Nature of Chromosomal Aberrations
Detected in Humans Exposed to Benzene, 32 CRITICAL REV. TOXICOLOGY 1, 4–12
(2002) (reviewing published research).
92. See id.; see also Luoping Zhang et al., Nonrandom Aneuploidy of
Chromosomes 1, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, and 21 Induced by the Benzene Metabolites
Hydroquinone and Benzenetriol, 45 ENVTL. MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS 388, 394–
95 (2005) (finding that preliminary work in exposed humans shows benzene
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Other studies have found potential biomarkers of
susceptibility. For instance, epidemiologic studies strongly linked
mesothelioma incidence to asbestos exposure, but estimates of
relative risks varied.93 In a region of Turkey with high
environmental exposure to a form of asbestos, researchers found
that mesothelioma was not randomly distributed but rather
clustered in certain families, suggesting that susceptibility to
asbestos-induced mesothelioma has a genetic component.94
Although the full picture is far from clear, one study of asbestosexposed people found higher susceptibility in those with certain
variations in a gene that codes for an enzyme that catalyzes
production of antioxidant molecules.95
Another example involves the suspected link between tobacco
smoke and breast cancer, which eluded conventional
epidemiologic investigation.96 Genomic investigations observed
that variations in a gene that codes a carcinogen-neutralizing
enzyme dramatically influenced the breast cancer danger from
smoking. Women whose genes coded for the most protective form
selectively affects certain chromosomes).
93. See J. Corbett McDonald, Epidemiology of Malignant Mesothelioma—
An Outline, 54 ANN. OCCUP. HYG. 851, 852 (2010) (listing studies).
94. R.M. Rudd, Malignant Mesothelioma, 93 BRIT. MED. BULL. 105, 108
(2010); see also Below, supra note 78, at 254 (suggesting that genome-wide
association studies (GWAS) would likely reveal genetic susceptibility factors).
Other factors, including random sampling error, could account for some of the
variation in relative risk results as well. See Michael D. Green, Second Thoughts
About Apportionment in Asbestos Litigation, 37 SW. L. REV. 531, 538 (2008)
(describing gaps in knowledge of mesothelioma causation); see also McDonald,
supra note 93, at 852–55 (discussing possible differences in forms of asbestos
that study subjects were exposed to).
95. Aki Murakami et al., Heme Oxygenase-1 Promoter Polymorphism is
Associated with Risk of Malignant Mesothelioma, 1 LUNG 333 (2012); see also
Joseph R. Testa et al., Germline BAP1 Mutations Predispose to Malignant
Mesothelioma, 43 NATURE GENETICS 1022, 1022, 1025 (2011) (reporting that
mutations in a gene that codes for a tumor suppressor protein may be associated
with heightened risk of several cancers even without asbestos exposure, but
predominantly mesothelioma if asbestos exposure is present).
96. See David H. Phillips & Seymour Garte, Smoking and Breast Cancer: Is
There Really a Link?, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1, 1
(2008) (explaining that epidemiologic associations are lacking despite evidence
from rodent studies and presence of activating enzymes and DNA adducts in
human breast tissue).
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of the enzyme had no increased risk of breast cancer even if they
smoked, but women smokers with less protective forms of the
gene were eight times more likely to get breast cancer than were
women with the same genotype who did not smoke.97 The gene
variations thus could act as biomarkers of susceptibility.
These examples show the potential of toxicogenomics and
molecular epidemiology but should not obscure the difficulties
facing these sciences. Biologists did not need, or should not have
needed, to sequence the entire human genome to understand that
sequencing the genome alone would not tell the entire story of
disease or of toxicity.98 The links between genes, toxic substances,
and disease form a web far more complex than previously
imagined.
Genome-scale studies test vast numbers of genes and
alleles99—so many that random chance would produce large
numbers of coincidental associations between gene and disease
(or between gene and toxicity). Although genomic researchers
abide by a statistical significance convention orders of magnitude
more stringent than the typical 95% level used in most scientific
97. Rick Weiss, What’s Your Cancer Profile?, Scientists Focus on an
Overlooked Class of Genes that May Determine Your Odds, WASH. POST, Sept.
19, 1995, at Z12. The gene in question is distinct from the so-called “breast
cancer genes” BRCA1 and BRCA2. See Christine B. Ambrosone et al., Cigarette
Smoking, N-Acetyltransferase 2 Genotypes, and Breast Cancer Risk: Pooled
Analysis and Meta-analysis, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS &
PREVENTION 15, 25 (2008) (explaining that “cigarette smoking is associated with
an increase in breast cancer risk among women with NAT2 slow acetylator
genotypes”).
98. RICHARD C. LEWONTIN, THE TRIPLE HELIX 16–17, 80–82 (2000).
99. So far, at least 16 million single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs)—
variations that change one DNA base pair—have been identified. Simon N.
Stacey et al., A Germline Variant in the TP53 Polyadenylation Signal Confers
Cancer Susceptibility, 43 NATURE GENETICS 1098, 1099 (2011). That number is
rapidly increasing. See Altshuler et al., supra note 82, at 833 (discussing how
the number of known SNPs rose from 1.4 million in late 1990s to more than 10
million by 2008). At least two million variations involving small insertions or
deletions of DNA have been found as well. Julienne M. Mullaney et al, Small
Insertions and Deletions (InDels) in Human Genomes, 19 HUM. MOLECULAR
GENETICS R131, R133 (2010). Some researchers suggest that these and other
structural variations in DNA may be even more important than SNPs. Yingrui
Li et al., Structural Variation in Two Human Genomes Mapped at SingleNucleotide Resolution by Whole Genome de Novo Assembly, 29 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 723, 723, 728 (2011).
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investigation, false positive results are easy to obtain and difficult
to exclude.100 Associations must be investigated to assess their
biological reality.101 And the effect of a given allele on toxic
susceptibility may not be a fixed value; it may vary depending on
the alleles found at other genes or on other environmental
factors.102
Furthermore, a gene’s base sequence is not its only
biologically relevant feature. All of a person’s cells have the same
DNA, except for mutations acquired in individual cells during
life,103 but they do many different things.104 Whether a gene is
expressed or not, and to what extent—that is, whether its DNA is
actively being transcribed into RNA and translated into
assembled proteins—is critical to the proper functioning of cells,
tissues, and organs.105 Deviations from normal gene expression
100. See Ian P.M. Tomlinson et al., Investigation of the Effects of DNA
Repair Gene Polymorphisms on the Risk of Colorectal Cancer, 27 MUTAGENESIS
219, 219 (2012) (describing a study that failed to support previously reported
gene-disease associations); Samuel P. Dickson et al., Rare Variants Create
Synthetic Genome-Wide Associations, PLOS BIOLOGY, Jan. 2010, at 1, 5–7.
101. Spitz & Bondy, supra note 88, at 130; see also Inês Barroso, NonCoding but Functional, 489 NATURE 54, 54 (2012) (“[A]ssociation is not
causality, and identifying those variants which are causally linked to a given
disease or trait . . . has been difficult.”).
102. See Camille Limoges, Errare Humanum Est: Do Genetic Errors Have a
Future, in ARE GENES US?, supra note 5, at 113, 121 (noting that even in
Mendelian disorders caused by changes in a single gene, phenotype is often
subject to modification by other genes and environmental factors); Christopher
A. Maxwell et al., Genetic Interactions: The Missing Links for a Better
Understanding of Cancer Susceptibility, Progression and Treatment, 7
MOLECULAR CANCER 4, *8 (2008), http://www.molecular-cancer.com/content/
pdf/1476-4598-7-4.pdf (“The detection of these [gene-gene] interactions will be
invaluable to our understanding of cancer risk.”); Leonardo A. Pinto et al.,
Impact of Genetics in Childhood Asthma, 84 JORNAL DE PEDIATRIA S68, S68, S72
(2008) (noting that asthma involves many genes and results from interaction of
genetic and environmental factors); Christopher P. Wild, Environmental
Exposure Measurement in Cancer Epidemiology, 24 MUTAGENESIS 117, 117
(2009) (“[P]recise contribution of specific risk factors and their interaction, both
with each other and with genotype, continues to be difficult to elucidate.”).
103. See generally WILLS, supra note 54, at 91 (explaining that about one
DNA base per 500,000 is mutated during a lifetime). The gametes (sperm and
egg cells), of course, do not contain the same DNA as other body cells. Id.
104. See ROSENFIELD ET AL., supra note 58, at 108–13.
105. Id. at 95–101, 108–13.
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are important to many disease processes.106 Gene expression is
controlled in part by regulatory genes107 and in part by an
epigenome of other biochemical constituents that provides
instructions that influence gene activity.108 The epigenome is
easily altered by environmental factors, sometimes in ways that
echo long after the exposure and sometimes in ways that (unlike
a change to a gene) cannot be detected later.109
All this complexity has implications for the genetic study of
disease as well as for the study of toxicogenomics. Both the power
and the limits of toxicogenomics will affect proof of specific
causation in toxic torts.
B. The False Promise
A number of commentators have eagerly anticipated the day
when science exposes the presumed deterministic mechanism of
toxic causation for all to see.110 The hope is that biomarkers will
106. See generally Altshuler et al., supra note 82, at 881.
107. Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 14; see also Joseph R. Ecker,
Serving Up a Genome Feast, 489 NATURE 52, 52 (2012) (“[T]he space between
genes is filled with enhancers (regulatory DNA elements), promoters (the sites
at which DNA’s transcription into RNA is initiated) and numerous previously
overlooked regions that encode RNA transcripts that are not translated into
proteins but might have regulatory roles.”).
108. Constituents of the epigenome include methyl groups that may be
attached to DNA bases, histone proteins associated with DNA, non-coding DNA
sequences, RNA sequences that interfere with or otherwise regulate the
translation of DNA into protein, and other aspects of a cell’s biochemistry. See
Mark A. Rothstein et al., The Ghost in Our Genes: Legal and Ethical
Implications of Epigenetics, 19 HEALTH MATRIX 1, 5–8 (2009) (describing
composition and function of epigenome); Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356
(describing epigenetic effects).
109. See Kathryn Z. Guyton et al., Improving Prediction of Chemical
Carcinogenicity by Considering Multiple Mechanisms and Applying
Toxicogenomic Approaches, 681 MUTATION RES. 230, 235 (2009) (noting that
epigenetic effects are important “especially during critical developmental
windows”).
110. E.g., Jamie A. Grodsky, Genomics and Toxic Torts: Dismantling the
Risk-Injury Divide, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1671, 1723 (2007); Klein, supra note 53, at
6–8; Albert C. Lin, Beyond Tort: Compensating Victims of Environmental Toxic
Injury, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1439, 1441–42 (2005); Gary E. Marchant, Genetic
Susceptibility and Biomarkers in Toxic Injury Litigation, 41 JURIMETRICS 67
(2000).
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mark the truth or falsity of an individual plaintiff’s causal
allegation or a defendant’s suggested alternate cause. The image
one gets is of tiny molecular flags waving from damaged DNA or
proteins: red for benzene, green for X-rays, blue and yellow for
polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons in tobacco smoke, etc. At the
dawn of the genomic era, it was easy for both scientists and law
professors to anticipate the discovery of those flags.111 Deeper
knowledge, however, has brought reason for doubt.
Scientists searching for biomarkers are concerned to ensure
that the biomarkers are valid.112 Biomarker validity, from the
scientific perspective, entails a number of technical requirements
related to the marker’s intended use.113 Despite the large amount
of research into potential biomarkers, validation of new markers
remains frustrating.114
To fulfill the hopes of tort scholars seeking relief from the
puzzle of toxic causation, biomarkers must be valid both in a
general sense and in a very particular way. In a general sense,
the markers must be analytically valid so the results of a search
for them can be trusted.115 With respect to the legal system’s
needs, however, markers can only eliminate the indeterminacy of
toxic causation claims if they can reliably distinguish between
“true” and “false” causation claims in ill people. This implies, on
the one hand, that a marker’s presence demonstrates the
111. For an example from medical research literature, see Soderkvist &
Axelson, supra note 87, at 85 (suggesting that different patterns of DNA and
protein adducts may be detected for different carcinogens). For an example from
legal scholarship, by an author who is both a lawyer and a scientist, see
Marchant, supra note 110, at 109 (suggesting that biomarkers will help resolve
“vexing causation issues”).
112. See generally Paul A. Schulte & Frederica P. Perera, Validation, in
MOLECULAR EPIDEMIOLOGY, supra note 61, at 79.
113. See Nada Majkic-Singh, Biomarkers: From Standardization to
Performance, 30 J. MED. BIOCHEM. 183, 183 (2011) (stating that a valid
biomarker must be sufficiently sensitive, accurate, precise, specific, and
reproducible for its intended use).
114. See Patrick M.M. Bossuyt, Defining Biomarker Performance and
Clinical Validity, 30 J. MED. BIOCHEM. 193, 194 (2011) (noting “lack of progress
in the methodology for biomarker evaluation”); Martin Latterich & Jan E.
Schnitzer, Streamlining Biomarker Discovery, 29 NATURE BIOTECH. 600, 600
(2011) (observing that validation has been a “bottleneck”).
115. See Bossuyt, supra note 114, at 194 (discussing analytical validity).
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suspected cause-and-effect mechanism, and on the other, that a
marker’s absence demonstrates that the disease was caused by
something other than the suspected cause.116
For the presence of a marker to establish specific causation
more deterministically than is possible with today’s evidence, the
marker must link the exposure to the plaintiff’s disease and
exclude other causes. A marker might unambiguously show that
a particular disease is present. That won’t prove causation,
however (except for the unusual disease that has been shown by
other means to be a signature of a particular exposure, in which
case the molecular marker would not be needed). A marker might
even be able to distinguish that a particular case of disease was
induced by an environmental toxin such as a carcinogen, instead
of being “endogenous.”117 That might be definitive if human
beings were lab rats living in controlled environments in which
only the exposure of interest varied, but that is decidedly not the
case.118 Given the myriad of potentially harmful environmental
agents to which we are all exposed, a biomarker’s presence alone
will suffice to prove a plaintiff’s case only if the marker is specific
to the exposure–disease combination.119
116. This discussion addresses only the potential of biomarkers to show that
exposure to a particular toxic agent caused disease, as opposed to some other
toxic agent, a genetic or other endogenous cause, or an unknown cause. There
seems to be no particular reason to believe that biomarkers would be at all
helpful in identifying a cause among multiple purveyors of a single
indistinguishable substance, which would add its own layer of causal
indeterminacy.
117. See Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (E.D.
Wash. 2009) (noting a distinction between environmentally-caused cases of
leukemia and “de novo,” “endogenous,” “primary,” or “idiopathic” cases).
118. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, FOURTH NATIONAL
REPORT ON HUMAN EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL CHEMICALS (2009),
http://www.cdc.gov/exposurereport/pdf/FourthReport.pdf (presenting data on
blood and urine levels of 212 chemicals in a sampling of the American
population); David Ewing Duncan, The Pollution Within, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC,
Oct. 2006, at 116, 126 (describing 165 potentially toxic chemicals identified in
samples of author’s body).
119. See Schulte & Perera, supra note 112, at 103 (explaining that a
“specific” marker of exposure “attribut[es] negative results to a high percentage
of unexposed persons”). For an example of the importance of marker specificity
to a finding of causation, albeit in a different factual context, see Precourt v.
Fairbank Reconstruction Corp., 856 F. Supp. 2d 327, 337 (D.N.H. 2012) (denying
beef processor’s motion for summary judgment on crossclaim against beef
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Conversely, for the absence of a marker to disprove causation
definitively, the marker must invariably be associated with
disease caused by the suspect agent. This would imply that
exposure produces the disease in question via a single
biochemical pathway, that the pathway always produces the
marker, and that the marker can always be detected after the
disease has manifested.120 Given the myriad of metabolic and
mutagenic pathways by which some substances can cause illness,
a biomarker’s absence alone will suffice to disprove a plaintiff’s
case only if the marker is perfectly sensitive to the exposure–
disease combination.121
In other words, the dream of certainty depends on the
discovery of “signature” biomarkers that would connect harm to
exposure in the same way that the handful of currently known
“signature” diseases do.122 Biomarker studies ordinarily accept a
trade-off between sensitivity and specificity.123 Biological and
environmental complexity—of the human genome, the
epigenome, metabolic and developmental processes, exposures,
and their numbingly vast numbers of potential interactions—
militate against the possibility that biomarkers of “signature”
supplier because proof that bacteria from decedent was genetically identical to
bacteria in supplier’s meat did not exclude the possibility that plaintiff was
infected by genetically identical bacteria from another source).
120. See generally Carl F. Cranor, The Challenge of Developing Science for
the Law of Torts, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, 261, 262–63 (Richard Goldberg
ed., 2011) (distinguishing induction period from latency period of a disease and
explaining that either or both may be long).
121. See Schulte & Perera, supra note 112, at 103 (noting that “sensitive”
marker of exposure “pick[s] up a high percentage of individuals in the exposed
group”). For an example in which the sensitivity of a marker was questioned,
see Declaration of Martyn T. Smith, Ph.D. ¶¶ 25–26, Milward v. Acuity
Specialty Prods. Grp., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 639 F.3d 11
(1st Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1002 (2012) (No. 07CV11944), 2008 WL
7425049 (asserting that the failure to detect a chromosome abnormality after
benzene exposure did not exclude possibility that benzene caused the same
disease by a different mechanism).
122. See Grodsky, supra note 110, at 1707 (discussing possibility of
signature biomarkers).
123. See, e.g., Sandhya Pruthi et al., Evaluation of Serum Estrogen-DNA
Adducts as Potential Biomarkers for Breast Cancer Risk, 132 J. STEROID
BIOCHEMISTRY & MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 73, 75–76 (2012) (explaining this general
trade-off).
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specificity and sensitivity are prevalent in our cells just waiting
to be found.124
Some types of biochemical damage are thought to be common
to numerous disease pathways or exposures. Oxidative stress is
an example. Oxidation is thought to play a role in the genesis of
cancer and other diseases,125 but finding valid oxidative
biomarkers for particular substance–disease links has proven
difficult.126 Oxidative damage from a given exposure may affect
diverse biochemical components of human tissue;127 conversely,
many different exposures may cause harm through an oxidative
mechanism.128 Moreover, everybody’s DNA is oxidized during life,
so any putative oxidative biomarker must be found against a
background incidence of oxidative damage, which is highly
variable from person to person.129 That background incidence and
variability, whether it results from differences in genotype,
environmental exposure, or both, makes it more difficult to find
the type of specific and sensitive biomarkers needed for
particularistic proof of toxic causation in individual cases.130
Some markers have proven to be less sensitive or specific
than they at first seemed. For example, benzene is thought to
cause certain leukemias by inducing relatively large-scale
aberrations in chromosomes.131 But although studies have found
124. See Latterich & Schnitzer, supra note 114, at 602 (describing how study
bias and genetic and epigenetic variability of patients, including gender,
ethnicity, age, diet, and environmental factors, have contributed “to a level of
biological complexity beyond the scope of what can be typically interrogated”).
125. See Cosetta Minelli et al., Interactive Effects of Antioxidant Genes and
Air Pollution on Respiratory Function and Airway Disease: A HuGE Review, 173
AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 603, 603 (2011) (describing that oxidative stress is
mechanism for air pollutants causing lung disease; Ward et al., supra note 79,
at 1356 (stating that oxidative stress is believed to be carcinogenic mechanism)).
126. See Eileen D. Kuempel et al., Carbon Black: Kuempel et al. Respond,
119 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 333, 333 (2011) (noting that “methodological
challenges to the validation of oxidative stress biomarker assays remain”).
127. Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356.
128. See Minelli et al., supra note 125, at 603 (describing oxidative stress as
a “mechanism of action common to all pollutants”).
129. Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356.
130. Id.
131. See Luoping Zhang et al., Use of OctoChrome Fluorescence in Situ
Hybridization to Detect Specific Aneuploidy Among All 24 Chromosomes in
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some chromosomal aberrations that occur at much higher
frequencies in leukemias of patients with known occupational
benzene exposure, they also occur in the control groups of these
studies.132 A number of different aberrations have been associated
with benzene exposure.133 The metabolism of benzene is
complex;134 several metabolites may be involved in the
carcinogenic effect of benzene exposure, and benzene-caused
carcinogenesis is likely a multi-step process.135 Researchers do
not know exactly how benzene causes chromosomal aberrations
or exactly how those aberrations cause leukemia.136 Despite the
progress in chromosomal and genetic study of leukemia in people
exposed to benzene, the search for a “signature” biomarker
continues.137
Similar issues have dogged the search for smaller toxic
signatures in DNA, such as mutations of individual genes.
Investigators examined the DNA of persons with a type of kidney
cancer called renal cell carcinoma (RCC), which is known to begin
with the mutation of a particular gene. They observed that the
tumors of RCC patients who had been occupationally exposed to
Benzene-exposed Workers, 153–54 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 117, 118
(2005) (explaining that benzene is an “established human leukemogen[,]” and its
metabolites cause aberrant numbers of chromosomes).
132. See Zhang et al., supra note 91, at 6 (describing a study in which
chromosome abnormalities were present in 100% of leukemia patients with
benzene exposure but 54% of non-exposed patients).
133. See Luoping Zhang et al., Chromosome-Wide Aneuploidy Study (CWAS)
in Workers Exposed to an Established Leukemogen, Benzene, 32 CARCINOGENESIS
605, 605 (2011) (finding that benzene-exposed subjects showed statistically
significant increases in frequency of aberrations on eight chromosomes).
134. See Michael G. Bird et al., International Symposium: Recent Advances
in Benzene Toxicity, 153–54 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 1, 4 (2005)
(describing benzene as an example of “metabolic multi-tasking”).
135. Michael G. Bird et al., BENZENE 2009—Health Effects and
Mechanisms of Bone Marrow Toxicity: Implications for t-AML and the Mode of
Action Framework, 184 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 1, 5 (2010); see also
Eric S. Johnson et al., A Critique of Benzene Exposure in the General Population,
375 SCI. TOTAL ENV’T 183, 192–94 (2007) (listing potentially significant benzene
metabolites and sources of exposure).
136. Zhang et al., supra note 133, at 610; see also Bird et al., supra note 134,
at 3 (explaining that it is not known if chromosomal aberrations are random or
which metabolites are responsible).
137. Zhang et al., supra note 133, at 610.
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trichloroethylene (TCE) carried a pattern of mutations not
observed in people who had not been exposed or whose cancer
resulted from inherited alterations in the gene.138 But fewer than
half of the TCE-exposed study subjects showed that mutation
pattern.139 Another group of researchers could not replicate the
finding of the purported signature mutation.140
RCC, moreover, is atypical in being traceable to mutations in a
single gene. Much more commonly, cancer is characterized by
many mutated genes, and sorting out causes from effects is
difficult.141 The recently published genomic atlases of colon and
rectal cancer142 and breast cancer,143 for example, identified a large
number of genetic changes in the studied sample of tumors. In
colon and rectal cancer, some of those changes were found in a
large proportion of the tumors.144 That is good news from the
perspective of treatment, because it suggests that a relatively
138. Hiltrud Brauch et al., Trichloroethylene Exposure and Specific Somatic
Mutations in Patients with Renal Cell Carcinoma, 91 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 854, 854
(1999).
139. Id. at 859.
140. Barbara Charbotel et al., Trichloroethylene Exposure and Somatic
Mutations of the VHL Gene in Patients with Renal Cell Carcinoma, 2 J.
OCCUPATIONAL MED. & TOXICOLOGY 13, at *6 (2007), http://www.occupmed.com/content/pdf/1745-6673-2-13.pdf.
141. WILLS, supra note 54, at 23 (“Genetic mayhem at the gene and chromosome
level can continue even after the cell becomes cancerous. This confuses the picture,
covering up the traces of the original cancer-causing events.”); The Cancer Genome
Atlas Network, Comprehensive Molecular Characterization of Human Colon and
Rectal Cancer, 487 NATURE 330, 330 (2012) [hereinafter Human Colon and Rectal
Cancer] (identifying thirty-two recurrently mutated genes and many other genetic
alterations in colon cancer); Guyton et al., supra note 109, at 233 (noting it is
unlikely that all 1,149 somatic mutations found in a group of breast and colorectal
cancers are key events); Yih-Horng Shiao, Genetic Signature for Human Risk
Assessment: Lessons from Trichloroethylene, 50 ENVTL. & MOLECULAR MUTAGENESIS
68, 70 (2009) (stating that only some genetic alterations found in tumors are
tumorigenic “drivers” while others are “passengers”).
142. Human Colon and Rectal Cancer, supra note 141, at 330 (identifying “32
somatic recurrently mutated genes . . . in the hypermutated and nonhypermutated
cancers”).
143. The Cancer Genome Atlas Network, Comprehensive Molecular
Characterization of Human Breast Tumours, 490 NATURE 61, 61 (2012) [hereinafter
Human Breast Tumours] (identifying “619 mutations across 177 previously reported
cancer genes”).
144. Human Colon and Rectal Cancer, supra note 141, at 333–35.
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small number of pathways drive the development of these
cancers,145 but it also suggests that finding pathways unique to
individual carcinogens seems less likely. For breast cancer, the
research described four major subtypes of the disease
characterized by different sets of genetic and epigenetic changes,
with some changes found frequently within a subtype and a few
relatively common across subtypes.146
Changes in gene expression, a common subject of study by
DNA microarrays, also often are similarly multifarious and may
be mediated both by mutations and by epigenetic effects.147 Their
significance as markers is more limited than biologists first
believed.148
145. See Gina Kolata, In Gene Study, a Map to Fight Colon Cancer, N.Y.
TIMES, July 19, 2012, at A3 (“The hope now is that the genetic alterations
driving those 1,000 different tumors are operating through only a limited
number of genetic pathways that can be targeted by a more manageable number
of drugs.”).
146. Human Breast Tumours, supra note 143, at 61–62 (reporting that
somatic mutations at three genes occurred in more than ten percent of all
tumors studies, but numerous genes were frequently mutated in particular
subtypes of breast cancer).
147. See Paolo Vineis & Miquel Porta, Causal Thinking, Biomarkers, and
Mechanisms of Carcinogenesis, 49 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 951, 955 (1996)
(noting that once people are sick it is hard to distinguish altered expression that
shows they are sick from altered expression that causes sickness); see also, e.g.,
Yoko Hirabayashi, p53-Dependent Gene Profiling for Reactive Oxygen Species
After Benzene Inhalation: Special Reference to Genes Associated with Cell Cycle
Regulation, 153–54 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 165, 165 (2005)
(determining that expression changes after benzene exposure may be masked by
other genes); Sarah X.L. Huang et al., Role of Mutagenicity in Asbestos Fiberinduced Carcinogenicity and Other Diseases, 14 J. TOXICOLOGY ENVTL. HEALTH
PART B 179, 214–19 (2011) (describing many gene expression changes in cancers
of patients who had been exposed to asbestos).
148. Alan Dove, Biomarker Hunters Probe the Proteome, 329 SCI. 1373, 1373
(2010).
[C]hanges in the RNA transcription levels of a gene are mere hints of
what’s actually happening in cells and tissues; the complex
interactions between proteins downstream of the transcripts drive
much of an organism’s physiology. . . . [V]alidating a potential disease
biomarker in the clinic turns out to be a much thornier problem than
most investigators had realized.
Id. Very recently, an international consortium of researchers published findings
showing that the large amount of human DNA that does not contain proteinencoding genes does include large numbers of DNA “switches” that are
responsible for turning other genes on or off, and that may explain variable
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Molecular complexes between possible carcinogens and DNA
or proteins, known as addition products or adducts, are another
potential toxic signature.149 Because of the long latency of many
diseases that result from toxic exposure, an adduct would have to
be long-lasting and detectable after disease has emerged in order
to provide definitive proof in litigation.150 It also would have to be
specific and sensitive: that is, a specific adduct would have to
result only from the exposure at issue rather than from a
metabolic pathway involving exposure to some other substance,
and all metabolic pathways linking the accused exposure to
disease would have to necessarily produce the adduct. Finally,
perhaps most difficult, to satisfy this causal model the presence of
the adduct would have to indicate causation and not merely
exposure.151 The presence or absence of adducts will not
incidence of disease despite identity of genes. Gina Kolata, Study Discovers
Road Map of DNA, a Key to Biology, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A1. The
consortium’s findings are expected to “force a rethink of the definition of a gene
and of the minimum unit of heredity.” Ecker, supra note 107, at 52. Whether
they herald biomarkers that will provide individualized proof in toxic tort cases,
however, is far from clear. Legal use of any biomarkers that may be found in
these genetic switches would face the same hurdles of specificity and sensitivity.
The initial findings suggest that much complexity and interaction exist in the
regulation of gene expression. See id. (describing findings of “poorly understood”
regulation of genes by distant DNA regions); Wendy A. Bickmore, Expression
Control, 489 NATURE 53, 53–54 (2012) (describing findings of more than 200,000
DNA “enhancers” per cell type and pairing of 500,000 enhancers with nearby
target genes, which still “leaves more than 2 million putative enhancers without
known targets”); Benjamin Vernot et al., Personal and Population Genomics of
Human Regulatory Variation, 22 GENOME RES. 1689, 1689 (2012) (“We estimate
that individuals likely harbor many more functionally important variants in
regulatory DNA compared with protein-coding regions, although they are likely
to have, on average, smaller effect sizes.”).
149. See Frederica P. Perera, Molecular Epidemiology: On the Path to
Prevention?, 92 J. NAT’L CANCER INST. 602, 603 (2000) (“[U]sing adducts as
biomarkers has the theoretical advantage that they reflect chemical-specific
genetic damage.”).
150. This may be true for some, but not necessarily all, adducts. In one
study, DNA adducts of the carcinogen acetaldehyde had a half-life of thirty-five
hours. Kimiko Hori et al., Stability of Acetaldehyde-derived DNA Adduct in
Vitro, 423 BIOCHEMICAL BIOPHYSICAL RES. COMM. 642, 644 (2012).
151. See, e.g., Yongquan Lai et al., New Evidence for Toxicity of
Polybrominated Diphenyl Ethers: DNA Adduct Formation from Quinone
Metabolites, 45 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 10,720, 10,726 (2011) (discussing a study that
demonstrated adduct formation in vitro but acknowledged that in vivo
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necessarily sharply distinguish cases of disease caused by a
particular exposure from background cases caused by something
else.152
What about viewing the gene–toxin interaction from the
opposite direction: looking for genetic variations that increase
susceptibility to the toxin, rather than seeking signs of the toxin’s
effect on genetic material? Such research must confront a
staggering amount of variability.153 Because of gene–gene or
gene–environment interactions, individual genetic variants do
not typically determine the occurrence of disease, either alone or
in combination with exposure to toxic substances.154 A review of
studies of genetic susceptibility to health effects of air pollution,
for example, observed that the studies produced conflicting
results. The review examined seven potentially relevant genes
involved in antioxidant activity, but noted that many other
implications of markers are unknown); Menglong Xiang et al., Chromosomal
Damage and Polymorphisms of Metabolic Genes Among 1,3-butadiene-exposed
Workers in a Matched Study in China, 27 MUTAGENESIS 415 (2012)
(characterizing DNA alterations as markers of exposure).
152. See Stephen M. Rappaport et al., Protein Adducts as Biomarkers of
Human Benzene Metabolism, 153–54 CHEMICO-BIOLOGICAL INTERACTIONS 103,
104 (2005) (noting “significant background levels” of adducts in persons in
control group); Vineis & Perera, supra note 59, at 1954 (stating that adduct
studies have shown “overall correlations” between adduct levels and exposures).
153. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (describing the large number
of variations found in human DNA).
154. See Liam R. Brunham & Michael R. Hayden, Response, 337 SCIENCE
911, 911 (2012) (“[R]esults . . . appear to support [Nebert & Zhang’s] view as
regards common diseases, as many studies have reported a large number of loci,
each conferring a small risk of disease.”); D.W. Nebert & G. Zhang, Personalized
Medicine: Temper Expectations, 337 SCIENCE 910, 910 (2012) (“[O]ne can infer
that accurate statistical predictions of a complex trait require identification of
many small-effect variants . . . . For most complex traits, this is an unachievable
goal.”); Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 10 (“[I]t is extremely difficult in an
individual patient confidently to link a disease to only one or two mutations.”);
Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356 (asserting that the magnitude of genetic
associations with toxic susceptibility “may be modest and involve multiple
genes”); see also, e.g., Stacey et al., supra note 99, at 1098 (noting that the gene
with the greatest increased risk of basal cell carcinoma had odds ratio of 2.36);
Olivia Fletcher et al., Association of Genetic Variants at 8q24 with Breast
Cancer Risk, 17 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 702, 705
(2008) (explaining that a study, although statistically equivalent to 12,000
samples, had insufficient statistical power to detect modest gene–gene
interactions).
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potentially important genes exist and concluded that because
antioxidant mechanisms are complex, it is unlikely that any one
polymorphic gene has a large effect on susceptibility. Nongenetic
factors also play a role, so three-way interactions (among a given
gene, pollutants, and other genes or environmental factors other
than pollution) are real possibilities.155
More generally, the Environmental Genome Project has
identified nearly 90,000 variations in more than 600 genes
believed to be involved in response to environmental exposures.156
For
carcinogens,
“[a]ddressing
the
role
of
genetic
susceptibility . . . is . . . important; however, the stable and
reproducible associations are few.”157
In sum, many genes and epigenetic factors may affect toxic
susceptibility, toxins may affect people in many ways, and many
effects may result from more than one toxin.158 It would be foolish
to predict that no signature biomarker will ever be found for any
disease caused by any exposure, but the evidence so far does not
seem to suggest that signature biomarkers are typical.159
155. See Minelli et al., supra note 125, at 603–05, 609–13 (describing studies
of three-way interactions and the difficulties involved).
156. Mark J. Rieder, The Environmental Genome Project: Reference
Polymorphisms for Drug Metabolism Genes and Genome-Wide Association
Studies, 40 DRUG METABOLISM REV. 241, 244 (2008); see Nebert & Zhang, supra
note 154, at 910 (noting that “most examples of pharmacogenomic traits
(adverse drug reactions, as well as drug efficacy) resemble complex diseases and
other multi-factorial traits [that] reflect contributions from innumerable loweffect genes”).
157. Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1356.
158. See Huang et al., supra note 147, at 213 (describing multiple
carcinogenic mechanisms for asbestos); Latterich & Schnitzer, supra note 114,
at 602 (“Many pathologies . . . are complex and have multiple etiologies,
especially at the molecular level.”).
159. See Guyton et al., supra note 109, at 231–32 (describing the necessity of
evaluating multiple modes of action of carcinogens); Latterich & Schnitzer,
supra note 114, at 602 (stating that “very few single biomarkers are likely to
have the high sensitivity and specificity necessary to make diagnosis and
treatment decisions,” although combining multiple markers might improve
sensitivity and specificity); Shiao, supra note 141, at 69 (“Some agents can
produce more than one type of DNA damage.”); Ward et al., supra note 79, at
1360 (noting that genomic advances “are likely to increase the challenges and
complexities of carcinogen testing and evaluation” in part because most
carcinogenic mechanisms are not simple and carcinogens may act through
diverse pathways).
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Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology are unlikely to undo
the Gordian knot of specific causation in toxic torts.160
C. The True Promise and Its Implications
Advancing scientific understanding can assist in legal factfinding even if science will not provide law’s longed-for,
conclusive post hoc answer to the question of what did make a
particular plaintiff sick. But the law must understand how
science can best contribute. That understanding begins with
acceptance of the fact that bringing toxicological understanding
to the molecular level will not bring causation to the individual
level. Even toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology produce
data that ultimately are group-based, statistical, and
probabilistic—much like the data available before genomics.
Thus, finding that a plaintiff does or does not have a genetic
susceptibility to the disease-causing effect of a substance to which
the plaintiff was exposed will provide probabilistic but not
deterministic evidence of causation or its absence.161 Toxic
160. Such research, however, may be extremely probative with respect to
general causation. Mechanistic insights can form part of the weight of the
evidence supporting an inference of general causation. Milward v. Acuity
Specialty Prods. Grp., 639 F.3d 11, 20–23 (1st Cir. 2011). A study of susceptible
genotypes can provide evidence of general causation when classical
epidemiology does not. Tomlinson et al., supra note 100, at 219.
161. As two researchers explained:
Particularly in the case of low-dose toxicants, the interactions
of susceptibility genes with specific environmental factors are
probably the dominant cause of any res
ultant human illness. However, the probability that an
environmental exposure will cause illness is dependent on the
capacity of the genetically-controlled metabolic machinery and
repair mechanisms of the cell. . . . Thus, elucidating the cause
of most chronic diseases will require an understanding of both
the genetic and environmental contributions to their etiologies.
Kenneth Olden & Janet Guthrie, Genomics: Implications for Toxicology, 473
MUTATION RES. 3, 5 (2001); see also Radoje Drmanac, Response, 337 SCIENCE
910, 911 (2012) (predicting that in the long run, limitations on measurement of
gene effects on disease “will be less important than unpredictable environmental
and stochastic effects”); Ebony B. Bookman et al., Gene-Environment Interplay
in Common Complex Diseases: Forging an Integrative Model—Recommendations
From an NIH Workshop, 35 GENETIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 217, 218–19 (2011) (stating
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susceptibility genes do not determine that an individual of a
particular genotype will contract a specified illness if subjected to
a given exposure.162 Rather, “[t]hey modify risk.”163 So, for
example, even though a particular genotype of the NAT2 gene
makes it much more likely that a woman smoker will develop
breast cancer, not all women of that genotype who smoke end up
with breast cancer; some women who smoke develop breast
cancer even though they do not have that genotype; some women
develop breast cancer even though they neither smoke nor have
that genotype.164 And multiple studies of toxic susceptibility
genes are unlikely to give identical results because of the
influence of other factors and of random chance.165
Biomarkers of exposure or effect similarly provide
probabilistic rather than deterministic evidence. For example, it
would be relevant to know if a plaintiff’s kidney cancer had a
mutation pattern that is found more often among patients who
had been exposed to trichloroethylene, but the pattern could
nevertheless be present without causation and vice versa.166 The
same is true of the chromosome aberrations associated with
benzene exposure in leukemia patients.167
that susceptibility to most human diseases “is complex and multifactorial” and
describing difficulty of assessing risk contribution in gene–environment
interactions).
162. See, e.g., Bookman et al., supra note 161, at 218 (giving example of how
variations in the NAT2 gene alter relative risk of smoking-related bladder
cancer).
163. Olden & Guthrie, supra note 161, at 5.
164. See Ambrosone et al., supra note 97, at 23 (providing a table with data
showing that while cigarette smoking increases the risk of breast cancer in
those with the NAT2 gene, possessing that gene is not the sole determining
factor).
165. See, e.g., Xiang et al., supra note 151, at 419 (discussing how a
particular genotype showed a 2.28-fold increase in a specific type of DNA
damage after exposure, and the results differed from earlier studies).
166. See Brauch et al., supra note 138, at 856 (providing data showing that
of kidney cancer patients in the study who had occupational TCE exposure,
fewer than half displayed a putatively characteristic mutation pattern); see also
Scesnaite et al., supra note 77, at 426–27 (noting that various epigenetic
changes were found more frequently in subjects exposed to tobacco smoke, but
still in fewer than half of them).
167. See Vineis & Perera, supra note 59, at 1956 (describing a study that
found “increased . . . frequencies of aberrations . . . frequently seen in . . .
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Biomarkers are thus most useful from a scientific perspective
“at the population level.”168 Their specificity, sensitivity, and
predictive value are population-based rather than individualized
attributes.169
Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology are producing
evidence about suspected exposure-disease links at finer and
finer scales of resolution,170 but they have not altered the
essential nature of that evidence. What these sciences will do,
however, is produce more such evidence. More agents will be
investigated to see if they are associated with molecular
consequences. More genes will be interrogated to see if they affect
susceptibility to agents.171 The data will still be about relative
risk, but risk will be parsed more and more finely. As research
discriminates among genotypes, coexposures, and other variables
that cannot be addressed with classical techniques, new
associations will be detected or known associations will be
disaggregated in new ways. This process has already begun even
for causal connections that were already relatively wellaccepted.172
At the same time, the enormous number of possible
combinations of potentially interacting causal factors—genes,
epigenetics, other individual characteristics, and exposures—
leukemias”).
168. Id.
169. See Bossuyt, supra note 114, at 197 (“Like sensitivity and specificity,
predictive values are essentially group based measures.”).
170. See Ward et al., supra note 79, at 1360 (“Research gaps and
opportunities have been identified that can help to resolve uncertainties. . . . We
hope that this process will lead to well-planned epidemiologic and mechanistic
studies for these agents . . . .”).
171. See id. (“Use of omics techniques will accelerate the understanding of
the cellular and molecular basis for biological responses to environmental and
occupational exposures, and high-throughput technologies will increase the
number of agents that can be tested.”); Minelli et al., supra note 125, at 618
(“The study of genetic susceptibility can greatly improve our understanding of
air pollution pathophysiologic mechanisms of action and allow identification of
those pollution components with the highest potential for harm.”).
172. See, e.g., E. Brigitte Gottschall, Taking a Retrospective Look at
Asbestos-Related Thoracic Disease Produces Interesting Results, 255 RADIOLOGY
681, 682 (2010) (discussing how polymorphisms in the gene for a certain enzyme
appear to affect risk from asbestos).
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makes it extraordinarily unlikely that complete risk
characterization will ever be possible at an individual level.173 In
a scientific research paradigm that depends on ceteris paribus,
there is real doubt over whether every important variable can be
held constant—or even identified—for the foreseeable future, if
ever. Scientists know that there is much they do not know, but
the “unknown unknowns” may be even more important.174
With better data on multiple exposures,175 more frequent
classification of risk by genotype,176 and increasing mechanistic
knowledge, science will likely point toward multiple causal sets of
genetic, epigenetic, and environmental factors that are associated
with disease risk. Even if some of those combinations display
strong associations with a particular toxic outcome, other
combinations will display weaker ones.177 The better the science
gets and the larger the data sets it can assemble, the easier it will
be to identify relatively small incremental contributions to risk.
The reality is that the available proof in the new world of
biomarkers, toxicogenomics, and molecular epidemiology will look
a lot like the proof that has been available until now in the world
of differential diagnosis, toxicology, and classical epidemiology.
These sciences will dramatically increase the quantity of
scientific information available to the legal system but will not
represent a qualitative change in the nature of the information
available to address the question of ex post causal attribution.
173. See Christopher S. Carlson et al., Mapping Complex Disease Loci in
Whole-Genome Association Studies, 429 NATURE 446, 450 (2004) (explaining how
allowing for gene–gene or gene–environment interactions presents “intractable”
problems for studies seeking association of genes and disease).
174. See Raffan & Semple, supra note 70, at 60 (concluding that new, nextgeneration gene sequencing technology “now allows researchers to take an
unbiased approach to gene discovery, and thus to look for ‘unknown
unknowns’”). (Apologies to Donald Rumsfeld).
175. See Lin, supra note 110, at 1470–72 (describing prospects for improved
exposure assessment); Wang et al., supra note 81, at 126 (describing a study
that used personal monitors to measure exposure to air pollutants).
176. See Muin J. Khoury, Genetic Epidemiology and the Future of Disease
Prevention and Public Health, 19 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 175, 176 (1997)
(predicting that genotype information “will routinely be sought in almost every
epidemiologic study”).
177. See, e.g., Pharoah et al., supra note 69, at 2797, 2801 (explaining that
common genetic variations confer small incremental risks).
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For the most part, increased knowledge of toxicity at the genomic
and molecular levels will simply provide an increasingly detailed
description of probabilistic associations—population-based
frequencies rather than deterministic certainties. To seek a
determined causal answer in this world would be like trying to
determine the weather in Seurat’s Sunday Afternoon by looking
very closely at a few points of color in a lady’s parasol.
At a molecular level, many of the processes associated with
toxicity and disease are simply random.178 The “probabilistic
description of the mutation process cannot be replaced by a
deterministic one.”179 Experiments have shown that even
genetically identical cells exposed to the same environmental
conditions can display random variations in gene expression,
leading to significant differences in the chemical and phenotypic
characteristics of the cells.180 Such “random phenotypic noise,
consequent on stochastic epigenetic processes,” could have
substantial effects on biological outcomes.181 “Nowadays it is
commonly stated that disease is either genetic or environmental,
when in reality stochastic events are equally important.”182
In the end, toxic causation questions dwell in a world with a
substantial stochastic component that does not fit well with a
deterministic causal model. It does not matter whether the
connection between exposure and disease is really random or
whether it only looks random because a truly deterministic
pathway is too complex to be fully specified. What matters is that
for the reasonably foreseeable future, science will not be able to

178. See ANATOLY RUVINSKY, GENETICS AND RANDOMNESS 7, 33–35 (2010)
(discussing how quantum uncertainty manifests in random genetic alterations).
179. Id. at 39.
180. See Mads Kaern et al., Stochasticity in Gene Expression: From Theories
to Phenotypes, 6 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 451, 451 (2005) (describing the study,
in which “[s]pecial emphasis is given to stochastic mechanisms that can lead to
the emergence of phenotypically distinct subgroups within isogenic cell
populations”).
181. Davey Smith, supra note 75, at 548; see also Drmanac, supra note 161,
at 911 (noting importance of stochastic effects in attempting to measure genetic
contribution to disease risk).
182. Robin Holliday, DNA Methylation and Epigenotypes, 70 BIOCHEMISTRY
500, 503 (2005).
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give law a deterministic answer. Look closely enough, and
certainty dissolves into probability.
IV. An Alternative Vision: Probabilistic Causal Contribution
Courts’ square-peg–round-hole frustration continues as they
try to make causation judgments by applying an individualbased, deterministic model to population-level, frequency-based
probabilistic evidence.183 The realization that reductionist science
is not likely to discover the legal system’s way out of the toxic
causation problem suggests that courts should be open to a
different mental model of causation—one that treats cause and
effect explicitly as probabilistic—and should reconsider
alternative doctrinal approaches to suit.184 Adapting some ideas
from earlier reform proposals offered by scholars, but largely
ignored by courts,185 I propose that courts adopt an expressly
probabilistic view of causation when the dominating evidence
comprises population-based data of toxic effect. To frame the
standard, an exposure should be considered a cause of disease if
it was a contributing factor to the disease’s occurrence. To be a
contributing factor, an exposure would be shown by a
183. See Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 264 (Tex. 2011) (reiterating
the view that “frequency data . . . cannot indicate the cause of a given
individual’s disease [but the] use of scientifically reliable epidemiological studies
and the requirement of more than a doubling of the risk strikes a balance
between the needs of our legal system and the limits of science”) (quoting
Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 718 (Tex. 1997));
Sienkiewicz v. Greif, [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 170 A.C. 229, [170] (Lady Hale)
(contrasting use of risk data to advise individual patient before getting sick with
use of risk data to infer causation of existing illness); id. [190]–[92] (Lord
Mance) (describing tension between use of statistical evidence and law’s
“concern[ ] with the rights and wrongs of an individual situation” and
expressing preference for use of epidemiology “in conjunction with specific
evidence related to the individual circumstances and parties”).
184. One clarification is essential. Although genomic data will not likely
provide definitive particularistic proof of causation, such data could still be
relevant to specific causation even if courts do not adopt probabilistic causal
contribution, along with other evidence deemed relevant in the absence of
deterministic proof.
185. Many of these are discussed in Michael D. Green, The Future of
Proportional Liability: The Lessons of Toxic Substances Causation, in EXPLORING
TORT LAW 352, 357–70 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005).
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preponderance of the evidence—not limited to any single favored
type of evidence—to have added incremental risk that the
plaintiff would develop a disease that the plaintiff in fact
developed. Damages should be apportioned to that contributing
factor in proportion to its contribution to the plaintiff’s risk.
A. A Metaphor
An illustration from the Third Restatement of Torts allows a
metaphorical comparison of the deterministic causation model
that fits typical cases and the probabilistic model that better fits
most toxic torts. The illustration posits three defendants—Able,
Baker, and Charlie—who negligently, independently, and
simultaneously lean against a car. Collectively they provide
enough force to send the car over a diminutive curb and down the
side of the mountain. Any two of the actors together would have
propelled the car over the edge, yet each actor alone is too weak
to budge the car. Thus, no single actor’s tort is either a sufficient
or a necessary cause of the harm.186
The illustration addresses the problem of multiple sufficient
causal sets, which are analogous only to a particular subset of
toxic tort claims.187 For present purposes, what matters is that
186. The hypothetical is given in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27 cmt. f, illus. 3 (2010). See id. § 27 cmt. f (“In
some cases, tortious conduct by one actor is insufficient . . . to cause the
plaintiff’s harm. Nevertheless, when combined with conduct by other persons,
the conduct overdetermines the harm, i.e., is more than sufficient to cause the
harm.”).
187. The analogy is to several actors who contribute subthreshold doses of a
toxin that exerts toxic effects only after a threshold dose is reached. See id. cmt. g
(“Assuming that there is some threshold dose sufficient to cause the disease, the
person may have been exposed to doses in excess of the threshold before
contracting the disease. Thus, some or all of the person’s exposures may not have
been but-for causes of the disease.”). The Restatement’s quite proper rule, in both
cases, is that at least until the threshold is reached, each contributor is a cause of
the harm, even though causal sets that did not include that contributor would
also have been sufficient to produce the harm. See id. cmt. f (“When an actor's
tortious conduct is not a factual cause of physical harm under the [but-for]
standard . . . only because one or more other causal sets exist that are also
sufficient to cause the harm at the same time, the actor's tortious conduct is a
factual cause of the harm.”); id. cmt. g (“Nevertheless, each of the exposures prior
to the person’s contracting the disease . . . is a factual cause of the person’s
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the illustration works only because it fits an implicitly assumed
mechanistic model of causation. Simple Newtonian physics
describes the situation: we can compute the force required to
overcome the car’s inertia and the static friction of its tires on the
parking surface. If we could reconstruct the accident, we might
find that 300 pounds of force were required to move the car and
that Able, Baker, and Charlie each provided 200 pounds. This
knowledge, at least in qualitative terms, is implicit in the
illustration’s assumptions.
Suppose, however, that Able, Baker, and Charlie could not be
described by Newtonian physics but only by quantum mechanics.
On a mountaintop ringed with cars, the three charge around
blindfolded. What is more, they are joined by undetectable sprites
that also impart momentum to any object they strike. Sometimes
Able, Baker, and Charlie hit a car, and sometimes the impact is
powerful enough to tip the car down the hill. But this is a
quantum world: if we know what they hit, we cannot tell how
hard they hit it.188 And we can’t detect the sprite strikes at all.
Every once in a while a car rolls down the hill. But the most
science can tell us—if we can say whether Able, Baker, Charlie,
or any combination of the three hit the car at some point before
its descent—is the probability that they hit the car hard enough
to make it move.
If Able, Baker, and Charlie represent independent risk
factors for a disease, and the invisible sprites represent unknown
causes, then the probabilistic metaphor fits a wide range of toxic
tort cases. In fact, toxic tort plaintiffs with this much
information—those who find some epidemiologic data that,
despite being inherently group-based and probabilistic, connect
their exposure with their disease—have been the lucky ones.
Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will make that type
of information available in more cases and in a more tailored

disease under the rule in this Section.”); see also Jane Stapleton, Two Causal
Fictions at the Heart of U.S. Asbestos Doctrine, 122 L.Q. REV. 189, 191 (2006)
(discussing threshold toxic mechanisms).
188. This of course is a metaphorical modification of the uncertainty
principle. See RUVINSKY, supra note 178, at 4 (explaining Heisenberg’s
uncertainty principle).
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way, but they will not change the nature of the appropriate
model.
B. Contributing Factor Causation
The first step toward a different model of causation is to
acknowledge frankly the irreducible indeterminism of post hoc
causal assessments. A few courts that decided relatively early
toxic tort cases, recognizing that the traditional “logical model . . .
does not suit the toxic tort explanandum,” seemed to move toward
such an alternative model.189 These courts used “substantial
factor” as their anchor.190 Allen v. United States191 remains a
leading example and stands in analytical counterpoint to the
Tenth Circuit’s decisions in June and Wilcox.192

189. Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988).
190. The Third Restatement explained Elam as an instance in which
“substantial factor” was invoked to deal with multiple sufficient causes.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: LIAB. PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 26 cmt. c,
reporters’ note (2010). Elam discussed multiple-sufficient-cause situations, but
the issue on appeal was whether plaintiffs’ evidence proved that defendant’s
chemical releases caused injury to plaintiffs at all. Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 174,
183. The court invoked “substantial factor,” but never suggested that it believed
the evidence showed more than one sufficient cause had operated to produce
plaintiffs’ conditions. See id. at 174 (determining that the substantial factor test
suited toxic exposure cases where harm may result from a “confluence of
causes”); id. at 187 n.63 (“[T]he substantial factor rule of causation . . . applies to
[toxic tort] cases.”); id. at 195 (referring to many different possible causes).
191. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev’d on other
grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987).
192. Compare id. at 429–43 (applying the substantial factor rule to the
plaintiffs), and Elam, 765 S.W.2d at 174–77 (distinguishing but-for from
substantial factor), with June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1241 (10th
Cir. 2009) (determining that but-for causation was appropriate), and Wilcox v.
Homestake Mining Co., 619 F.3d 1165, 1168 (10th Cir. 2010) (agreeing with
June). See also James v. Bessemer Processing Co., 714 A.2d 898, 908–09 (N.J.
1998) (“To prove medical causation, a plaintiff must show ‘that the exposure [to
each defendant’s product] was a substantial factor in causing or exacerbating
the disease.’”) (citation omitted); id. at 913 (holding, without ever referring to
“but-for” causation, that plaintiff, who worked at a drum reconditioning facility,
had produced sufficient evidence of causation to withstand motion for summary
judgment despite inability to prove the number or specific contents of drums
from various defendants).
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In Allen, twenty-four plaintiffs contended that radiation from
above-ground nuclear weapons tests caused their cancers. As in
June and Wilcox, general causation was indisputable, but specific
causation was another matter. The plaintiffs’ various “nonspecific” cancers193 might have been caused by the accused bombtest radiation, by radiation from other sources, or by something
other than radiation. The impossibility of proof led the court to
eschew but-for causation. Instead, Allen concluded that
[w]here it appears from a preponderance of the evidence that
the conduct of the defendant significantly increased or
augmented the risk of somatic injury to a plaintiff and that the
risk has taken effect in the form of a biologically and
statistically consistent somatic injury, i.e., cancer or leukemia,
the inference may rationally be drawn that defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor contributing to plaintiff’s
injury.194

Allen’s creative move was the deft elision of risk
augmentation with injury causation. The court’s inference from
one to the other was “rationally drawn” because the scientific
evidence needed to prove causation was, and could be, framed
only in risk terms. Nevertheless, Allen broke new ground.195 Its
statement of the standard for proof of causation followed a
lengthy discussion of creative common law solutions to other
problems of causal indeterminacy, but none of those re-envisioned
causation in probabilistic terms based on risk augmentation.196
The closest parallel is a sixteen-year-old opinion by the
California Supreme Court in a worker’s compensation case,
McAllister v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board.197 In
193. Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 406. Presumably, by “non-specific” the court
meant that the cancers were not uniquely associated with a particular exposure,
i.e., they were not “signature” diseases. Id.
194. Id. at 428. The court allowed the defendant to defeat the inference if
“the facts [were] proven otherwise by sufficient evidence.” Id.
195. See id. at 415 (“A remedial framework can certainly be fashioned to
meet the circumstances and requirements of the parties and issues now before
this court in this action.”).
196. Id. at 406–10. Allen cited alternative liability cases, multiple sufficient
cause cases, and idiosyncratic cases in which absence of evidence makes the post
hoc counterfactual inference especially difficult. Id.
197. McAllister v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 445 P.2d 313 (Cal. 1968).
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McAllister, a firefighter’s widow claimed that her husband’s onthe-job exposure to smoke caused his fatal lung cancer, although
he had also smoked cigarettes for decades.198 The opinion
prefigured the factual causation issues that would come to
bedevil toxic tort litigation:
Given the present state of medical knowledge, we cannot say
whether it was the employment or the cigarettes which
“actually” caused the disease; we can only recognize that both
contributed substantially to the likelihood of his contracting
lung cancer. . . . Future scientific developments will tell us
more about lung cancer. Ultimately it may be possible to
pinpoint with certainty the cause of each case of the disease.
But the Legislature did not contemplate years of damnum
absque injuria pending such scientific certainty.199

To avoid that result, McAllister invoked precedent holding
that a worker could obtain benefits if the employment was a
“contributing cause” of an injury.200 How could one tell whether
exposure to smoke while firefighting was a “contributing cause” of
lung cancer in a long-term tobacco smoker? By considering
whether “the likelihood of contracting lung cancer from the
smoking was so great that the danger could not have been
materially increased by exposure to the smoke produced by
burning buildings.”201
Thus, in different contexts and with dramatically different
amounts of evidence to work with, both McAllister and Allen
recognized that scientific indeterminacy of specific causation
justifies a risk-based, probabilistic reconceptualization of cause-

198. Id. at 314.
199. Id. at 319.
200. Id. McAllister went far beyond the precedent it relied on, which simply
recognized that an event could have more than one cause. Emp’rs Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 263 P.2d 4, 6 (Cal. 1953) (holding
that injury could arise out of employment even if employment was not “the sole
cause” but only “a contributory cause”).
201. McAllister, 445 P.2d at 319 (emphasis added). McAllister also held that
there was sufficient evidence to establish what is now known as general
causation, even though there was no proof of exactly how smoke from building
fires caused cancer. Id.
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in-fact. But McAllister remained obscure and Allen’s causation
analysis garnered little attention.202
To address a different but related problem of inherent causal
indeterminacy, however, courts in both the United States and the
United Kingdom have much more prominently linked evidence of
risk creation to inferences of causation. In Rutherford v. OwensIllinois, Inc.,203 the California Supreme Court confronted the
“indeterminate defendant” problem typical of many asbestos
cases.204 Mr. Rutherford had died of lung cancer after being
tortiously exposed to asbestos fibers by numerous defendants,
including his former employer and the manufacturers of asbestoscontaining products that he had used at work.205 Science could
not interrogate the cancer to determine the source of the asbestos
fiber or fibers that caused the malignancy.206 The trial court
instructed the jury on alternative liability, shifting the burden of
proof on causation to the defendants.207 The California Supreme
Court held that doctrine inapplicable, but not because the
202. Just a handful of California worker’s compensation cases and two
dissenting opinions outside of California have cited McAllister. Only Elam v.
Alcolac, Inc. cited Allen in the course of adopting a causation standard anything
like Allen’s. See Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988)
(“The substantial factor standard . . . is particularly suited to injury from
chronic exposure to toxic chemicals where the sequent manifestation of
biological disease may be the result of a confluence of causes.”).
203. Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203 (Cal. 1997).
204. See id. at 1218 (“[A]sbestos-related cancer would, under the single-fiber
theory of carcinogenesis, be an example of alternative causation, i.e., a result
produced by a single but interminable member of a group of possible causes.”).
205. Id. at 1207.
206. See id. at 1206 (implying that plaintiff could not “prove with medical
exactitude that fibers from a particular defendant’s asbestos-containing
products were those, or among those, that actually began the cellular process of
malignancy”).
207. See id. at 1206–08. (“This instruction shifts the burden of proof to
defendants in asbestos cases tried on a products liability theory to prove that
their products were not a legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries , provided the
plaintiff first establishes certain predicate facts . . . .”). Mr. Rutherford also had
been a smoker, adding the possibility that the cancer had really been caused by
tobacco smoke rather than asbestos. See id. at 1209 (“Undisputed evidence
indicated that smoking sharply increases the risk of lung disease, including lung
cancer, and works ‘synergistically’ with asbestos exposure to enhance the
severity of resulting damage to the lungs.”); infra notes 268–69 and
accompanying text.

288

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013)

plaintiff could (and therefore must) establish which of the
tortfeasors had delivered the fiber that actually caused his
cancer.208 Rather, the court held, “no insuperable barriers”
prevented the plaintiff from proving causation without relying on
the alternative causation doctrine—if causation were
appropriately understood in the circumstances of the case.209
The most important of those circumstances was the
“irreducible uncertainty” of determining which defendants’
asbestos fibers actually contributed to the cellular development of
cancer.210 Despite that uncertainty, the court observed, every
exposure to asbestos increased plaintiff’s risk of disease.211 The
court therefore conceived all of the exposures as concurrent
rather than alternative causes.212 Left implicit in this conceptual
shift was rejection of the deterministic model of causation as
inappropriate.213 Implementing that rejection, the court held that
a particular product would be a “substantial factor in causing or
bringing about the disease” if “it was a substantial factor

208. See Rutherford, 941 P.2d at 1223 (“In an asbestos-related cancer case,
the plaintiff need not prove that fibers from the defendant’s product were the
ones, or among the ones, that actually began the process of malignant cellular
growth.”).
209. Id. at 1206.
210. Id. at 1218.
211. See id. at 1209 (“[The defendant’s] own medical expert . . . testified . . .
that if a worker had occupational exposure to many different asbestoscontaining products, each such exposure would contribute to the risk of
contracting asbestos-related lung cancer . . . .”). As Michael Green pointed out to
me, if any exposure occurred after the malignant transformation, that exposure
did not in fact contribute to the risk of developing the tumor that plaintiff
actually developed. Determining which exposures occurred before and after the
malignancy began, however, is also impossible. Moreover, it is at least possible
that continued exposure presents an additional carcinogenic risk even after a
particular tumor has begun to grow.
212. Id. at 1220–21, 1223.
213. Cf. id. at 1218 (stating that the mechanism of cancer causation by
asbestos remained a debated scientific issue, the resolution of which could affect
legal conclusions regarding causation in cases of exposures from multiple
sources). But cf. Jane Stapleton, The Two Explosive Proof-of-Causation
Doctrines Central to Asbestos Claims, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 1011, 1029 (2009)
(stating that Rutherford’s concurrent causation approach is based on “a fiction[]
that every asbestos fiber was involved in the cancer mechanism”).
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contributing to plaintiff’s or decedent’s risk of developing
cancer.”214
A year after Rutherford, the New Jersey Supreme Court
issued an opinion that was consistent with Rutherford’s
reasoning, although it did not explicitly equate risk augmentation
and causation.215 Mr. James worked in a drum reprocessing
facility where he was exposed to different types of chemical and
petroleum residues in drums from many companies. His widow
alleged that these residues caused Mr. James’s fatal stomach and
liver cancer.216 Witnesses testified about which companies’ drums
were processed during Mr. James’s employment, and expert
witnesses testified that residues these companies shipped were
carcinogenic.217 But a lack of records made it impossible to prove
how much of which residues from which companies Mr. James
had come in contact with.218 The court nevertheless decided that
the evidence of causation against some defendants was adequate
to survive summary judgment.219 To establish “medical
causation,” the New Jersey Supreme Court held, a plaintiff like
Mr. James must prove two things: (1) sufficient exposure to
defendant’s products and (2) “medical and/or scientific proof of a
nexus between the exposure and the plaintiff’s condition.”220 This
is another way of saying that the defendant augmented the
plaintiff’s risk of disease.221
214. Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1220 (Cal. 1997).
215. James v. Bessemer Processing Co., Inc., 714 A.2d 898 (N.J. 1998).
216. Id. at 901.
217. Id. at 904–06.
218. Id. at 903, 913.
219. Id. at 913–14.
220. Id. at 911. To test sufficiency of exposure the court adopted the
criterion of “frequent, regular and proximate exposure” borrowed from many
asbestos cases. Id.
221. The close relation of risk augmentation to the James description of
medical causation is evident in the court’s description of the way a defendant
might avoid joint and several liability under New Jersey’s Comparative
Negligence Act. Once “deemed [a] substantial factor[] in causing James’s
cancer,” the court held, a defendant would bear the burden of proving a basis for
apportioning fault. Id. at 916. “[E]ach defendant may seek to reduce its
individual percentage of fault by submitting proof that its products . . . were less
carcinogenic . . . or that James’s exposure to its products was more limited . . . .”
Id.
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Courts in the United Kingdom reached a similar result by a
path that began with a decision in a somewhat odd case, McGhee
v. National Coal Board.222 Mr. McGhee became covered in dust
and sweat while cleaning out brick kilns and had to bicycle home
in that condition because his employer did not provide washing
facilities.223 He developed dermatitis and sued his employer.224
The medical experts agreed that the presence of the irritating
dust on skin made vulnerable by perspiration caused Mr.
McGhee’s dermatitis.225 The rub was that only the lack of a
shower that extended the exposure to the dust, and not the
working conditions that first deposited the dust on Mr. McGhee’s
skin, was held negligent.226 Longer exposure increased the risk,
but no expert could say whether Mr. McGhee would have avoided
dermatitis had he showered at his workplace.227 Therefore, the
trial and intermediate appellate courts concluded, Mr. McGhee
could not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer’s negligence had caused his dermatitis.228 The losing
plaintiff229 appealed to, and prevailed in, the House of Lords.230
Four of the five members of the panel reasoned that in the
circumstances of the case, to establish causation, it was sufficient
that Mr. McGhee had shown that his employer’s negligence had

222. McGhee v. Nat’l Coal Bd. [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008, [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1
(H.L.).
223. Id. at 3–4 (Lord Reid).
224. Id. at 3.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See id. at 5 (Lord Wilburforce) (“The experts could [determine the cause
of dermatitis], but had to admit that they knew little of the quantity of dust or
the time of exposure necessary to cause a critical change.”).
228. See McGhee, 1 W.L.R. at 3–4 (Lord Reid) (“It was held in the Court of
Session that the appellant had to prove that his additional exposure to
injury . . . caused the disease in the sense that it was more probable than not
that this additional exposure to injury was the cause of it.”).
229. The British cases refer to the party seeking relief as the pursuer or
claimant, and to the party from whom relief is sought as the defender. For
simplicity and ease of reading, I use the familiar American terms plaintiff and
defendant (including survivors of decedents).
230. See id. at 13 (“Appeal allowed.”).
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materially increased his risk of disease. Lord Salmon’s speech
was representative:
[W]hen it is proved, on a balance of probabilities, that an
employer has been negligent and that his negligence has
materially increased the risk of his employee contracting an
industrial disease, then he is liable in damages to that
employee if he contracts the disease notwithstanding that the
employer is not responsible for other factors which have
materially contributed to the disease . . . . In the circumstances
of the present case, the possibility of a distinction existing
between (a) having materially increased the risk of contracting
the disease, and (b) having materially contributed to causing
the disease may no doubt be a fruitful source of interesting
academic discussions between students of philosophy. Such a
distinction is, however, far too unreal to be recognised by the
common law.231

The House of Lords revived McGhee’s reformulation of the
concept of causation when it confronted a case similar to
Rutherford, in which each claimant or decedent had developed
mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos by multiple
defendants.232 In Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.,233
the Lords allowed the appeals of three claimants who had lost
below for failure to establish but-for causation.234 The committee
members differed in their analyses and in the limits they would
impose on the doctrine being announced.235 They were
231. Id. at 12–13 (Lord Salmon); see also id. at 5 (Lord Reid) (“From a broad
and practical viewpoint I can see no substantial difference between saying that
what the respondents did materially increased the risk of injury to the appellant
and saying that what the respondents did made a material contribution to his
injury.”); id. at 8 (Lord Simon of Glaisdale) (“‘[M]aterial reduction of the risk’
and ‘substantial contribution to the injury’ are mirror concepts in this type of
case.”).
232. McGhee’s formulation needed to be revived because intervening cases
had cast doubt on the interpretation of McGhee. See Sanders, supra note 1, at
23–28 (tracing the discussion of the relation between risk contribution and
causation in United Kingdom cases).
233. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, [2002] 1
A.C. 32.
234. See id. [1] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill) (“[I]t was announced that these
three appeals would be allowed.”).
235. See id. [35]; [45] (Lord Nicholls); [118] (Lord Hutton); [170] (Lord
Rodger).
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unanimous, however, on the implication of the “rock of
uncertainty”236 that made it impossible for each claimant to prove
which asbestos fiber(s) had invaded the cell from which the fatal
mesothelioma grew.237 In light of that scientific indeterminacy, a
material contribution to risk should be considered a “sufficient
degree of causal connection” to support a finding of causation.238
The panel members noted the parallels with Rutherford,239 and
all but one openly acknowledged that Fairchild embraced a legal
standard of causation different from the deterministic but-for
model.240
These cases, from McAllister to Allen to Rutherford to James
to Fairchild, groped toward a redefinition of specific causation in
cases in which scientific indeterminacy rendered it impossible to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that a particular
exposure was a but-for cause of a plaintiff’s harm. Treating risk
creation as causal contribution is appropriate when a plaintiff
can prove that tortious conduct “materially increased the risk of
him contracting a particular disease and the disease occurred,
but where in the state of existing medical knowledge he is unable
to prove by medical evidence that the [conduct] was a [but-for]
cause of the disease.”241
236. Id. [7] (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).
237. See id. [7] (Lord Bingham), [49] (Lord Hoffmann), [77] (Lord Hutton),
[120] (Lord Rodger) (acknowledging that current medical knowledge is
insufficient to determine which asbestos fiber caused the cancer).
238. Id. [42] (Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead); accord id. [34] (Lord Bingham);
id. [47] (Lord Hoffmann); id. [108]–[09] (Lord Hutton); id. [168] (Lord Rodger of
Earlsferry).
239. See id. [31] (Lord Bingham), [73] (Lord Hoffmann), [105] (Lord Hutton),
[161] (Lord Rodger) (noting that the court was asked to apply the rule from
Rutherford that “the causal requirements of the tort were satisfied by proving
that exposure to a particular product”).
240. See id. [9] (Lord Bingham), [41], [43] (Lord Nicholls), [56], [63] (Lord
Hoffmann), [168] (Lord Rodger) (variously characterizing the Fairchild holding
as a variation, relaxation, or policy-based deviation from traditional rules of
factual causation); but see id. [109] (Lord Hutton) (taking the view that in
McGhee and Fairchild the plaintiffs succeeded based on judicial inference that
but-for causation had been established more likely than not, though
acknowledging that this interpretation makes “little practical difference”).
241. Id. [108] (Lord Hutton). This formulation, by the one member of the
Appellate Panel who declined to deviate expressly from traditional but-for
causation, is almost indistinguishable from the way the other members of the
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It is immediately apparent that this general statement of
principle need not be restricted to asbestos cases or even to
indeterminate-defendant cases,242 despite the courts’ tendency to
do so.243 The same type of indeterminacy afflicts a wide range of
toxic tort claims that have two salient characteristics: (1) general
causation is reasonably well-established (for example, by
appropriately confirmed epidemiologic data showing increased
risk associated with exposure); and (2) science cannot specify the
cause of an individual case of disease. As explained above,
molecular science is likely to increase the prevalence of the first
characteristic without greatly decreasing the prevalence of the
second. Thus, increasingly, a probabilistic conception of causation
based on risk contribution will be needed to conform legal
doctrine to the realistically available evidence.
Two asserted bases for limiting this view of causation to
asbestos indeterminate-defendant cases merit discussion. The
first argues that this concept of causation should apply only if the
competing possible causes of plaintiff’s illness all contributed to
risk in the same way, e.g., by exposing a plaintiff to the same
substance (i.e., asbestos).244 The second argues that this concept
panel expressed the rule. See also Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20,
[2006] 2 A.C. 572, [77] (Lord Rodger) (noting that McGhee held “that, in the
particular circumstances, by proving that the defenders had materially
increased the risk of injury, the pursuer had proved that they had materially
contributed to his injury”).
242. See Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs. Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22,
[2003] 1 A.C. 32, [163] (Lord Rodger) (noting that although Rutherford limited
its holding to asbestos cases, “the reasoning itself develops from the
impossibility of proof inherent in those cases”).
243. Sanders, supra note 1, at 32–33 (describing reticence of courts,
including California courts, to extend the Rutherford “risk rule” to contexts
beyond asbestos); but cf. Green v. Alpharma, Inc., 284 S.W.3d 29, 35–40 (Ark.
2008) (using “substantial factor” formulation, frequency-regularity-proximity
test from asbestos cases, and testimony about leukemogenic risks of arsenic, to
reverse summary judgment for poultry producers, each of which contributed an
unknown amount of plaintiff’s exposure to arsenic-laced chicken litter).
244. See Fairchild, [2002] UKHL 22, [115], [118] (Lord Hutton) (arguing
that risk contribution model is inappropriate if multiple possible causal agents
exist); Green, supra note 94, at 546 (“[A]ny risk contribution scheme should be
limited to a single toxic substance whose risk profile is established (asbestos is
surely that) and in which multiple defendants contributed to the risk but
plaintiff is unable to prove which one(s) is the actual cause of her harm.”).
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of causation should apply only if all of the sources of plaintiff’s
exposure to enhanced risk are tortious.245 From a theoretical
perspective, neither argument is persuasive.
The first argument seems rooted in a concern for being
reasonably certain of the substance that caused the disease and
for being able to compare various risk contributions. It fails
because exposure to an additional risk factor, and not only
exposure to more of a single risk factor to which the plaintiff was
already exposed, may increase a plaintiff’s risk. As Lord
Hoffmann noted in Fairchild, “what if [a plaintiff] had been
exposed to two different agents—asbestos dust and some other
dust—both of which created a material risk of the same cancer
and it was equally impossible to say which had caused the fatal
cell mutation? I cannot see why this should make a difference.”246
Lord Hoffmann later tweaked this view, explaining that the
substance to which a plaintiff was exposed need not be the same,
but the mechanism of disease causation must be the same for all
of the exposures at issue.247 The latter distinction, however, is
equally untenable. The justification for the “risk rule”248—the
inability to tell which of multiple exposures caused a given case of
illness—is just as strong when the exposures increase the risk of
a disease in different ways, if after the plaintiff is sick it is
impossible to tell which mechanism operated to cause the illness.
Further, if identity of mechanism were crucial, then defining
mechanism would become critical. That definition would depend
on both the state of scientific knowledge and on judicial line245. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [14]–[16] (Lord Hoffmann)
(acknowledging though disagreeing with the argument that a risk-based
conception of causation should not apply if one of the sources of exposure was
not tortious); id. [128] (Baroness Hale) (opining that rationale for imposing
liability on those responsible for all asbestos exposures is absent or weakened if
not all exposures were tortious).
246. Fairchild, [2002] UKHL 22, [72] (Lord Hoffmann).
247. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [24] (Lord Rodger) (“It may have been
different in some causally irrelevant respect, as in Lord Rodger’s example of the
different kinds of dust, but the mechanism by which it caused the damage,
whatever it was, must have been the same.”) Cf. id. [17] (referring ambiguously
to exposure to “the same risk”); see also Sanders, supra note 1, at 29 (calling
Lord Hoffmann’s revision “a delightful piece of self-reinterpretation”).
248. The nomenclature is Joseph Sanders’s. Sanders, supra note 1, at 11.
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drawing.249 For Lord Hoffmann, asbestos and some other
hypothesized “dust” were similar enough, but asbestos and
tobacco smoke were not.250 For the California Supreme Court in
1968 (when the mechanism of lung carcinogenesis was completely
mysterious) smoke was smoke, whether it came from cigarettes or
burning buildings.251 If two substances are shown to cause the
same histological form of cancer, should the law treat them as
acting by the same mechanism? What if it can be shown that both
are capable of altering DNA? Or must each be shown to increase
cancer risk by turning off a tumor suppressor gene? Must it be
the same tumor suppressor gene? What if both of them are shown
sometimes to turn off the same tumor suppressor gene, and other
times to turn off another tumor suppressor gene, and both genes
are turned off in the patient’s cancer? If the mechanisms by
which two or more substances cause a disease were distinct,
specific, and determinable after the fact—the false promise—then
specific causation would be scientifically knowable, and there
would be no need to conceptualize causation in probabilistic
terms. In any other situation, however, mechanistic
understanding at smaller scales will make it harder for two
exposures to look the “same” but will not solve the indeterminacy
problem that led to the Fairchild solution.252
The second argument, that a probabilistic, risk-augmentation
view of causation should be limited to cases in which all the
contributors of increased risk are tortious, seems rooted in the
view that the only justification for modifying causation rules in
249. See id. at 36 (noting that such limits are both arbitrary and subject to
change as science learns more).
250. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [24] (Lord Rodger) (“I do not think that
the exception applies when the claimant suffers lung cancer which may have
been caused by exposure to asbestos or some other carcinogenic matter but may
also have been caused by smoking . . . .”).
251. See McAllister v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., 445 P.2d 313, 318–19
(Cal. 1968) (“We cannot doubt that the more smoke decedent inhaled—from
whatever source—the greater the danger of his contracting lung cancer. . . .
Given the present state of medical knowledge, we cannot say whether it was the
employment or the cigarettes which ‘actually caused the disease . . . .’”).
252. It is true, however, that exposure to multiple risk factors may present
formidable factual complexities. See infra notes 274–75 and accompanying text
(discussing the possibility of the same solvent in materials produced by two
different manufacturers).
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the face of indeterminacy is the relative moral position of an
“innocent” plaintiff and multiple “wrongdoers.”253 It also fails, as
can be seen even in the context of asbestos mesothelioma cases.
The fact that each claimant in Fairchild had been exposed to
asbestos by multiple employers distinguished each claim from
what would have been an easy case if only one entity had been
responsible for the exposure. But what distinguished these
claimants from the general population of the United Kingdom
was the fact that they were exposed to asbestos on the job. The
source of the other exposure did not logically affect the
determination of whether the tortious exposure contributed
materially to the risk. The House of Lords recognized this in
Barker v. Corus UK Ltd.,254 which applied Fairchild to hold
defendant employers liable to a claimant even though one of the
claimant’s material exposures to asbestos was entirely his own
fault.255
The same reasoning would apply regardless of the competing
source of exposure or risk. Thus, the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom reaffirmed this aspect of the logic of Barker in
Sienkiewicz v. Greif (UK), Ltd.,256 which involved two women with
mesothelioma who had been exposed to relatively small amounts
of asbestos at their respective workplaces.257 The defendants
253. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [128] (Baroness Hale) (making this
argument).
254. Barker v. Corus UK Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572.
255. See id. at [17] (Lord Hoffmann) (“These distinctions may be relevant to
whether and to whom responsibility can also be attributed, but from the point of
view of satisfying the requirement of a sufficient causal link between the
defendant’s conduct and the claimant’s injury, they should not matter.”); id.
[58]–[59] (Lord Scott) (asking how the Fairchild principle would apply to a case
involving a claimant’s exposure to multiple sources and determining that this
would make no difference); id. [97] (Lord Rodger) (“Having reserved my opinion
on the point in Fairchild, I would now hold that the rule should apply in that
situation.”); id. [117] (Lord Walker) (agreeing, except still believing that
“the Fairchild principle [should apply] to cases where less than 100% of the risk
has been caused by employers or occupiers guilty of breaches of duty”); id. [128]
(Baroness Hale) (explaining that because Barker imposed only several liability
based on risk contribution, “[t]he victim’s own behaviour is only relevant if he
fails to take reasonable care for his own safety during a period of tortious
exposure by a defendant.”).
256. Sienkiewicz v. Greif, [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 A.C. 229.
257. See id. [2]–[4], [59]–[60], [115], [117]–[19], [124]–[25] (describing the
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argued that each woman’s exposure to asbestos in the ambient
air exceeded her incremental exposure at work, and therefore it
was more likely than not that the ambient exposure, rather than
the workplace exposure, had caused her disease.258 The Supreme
Court unanimously rejected the argument, holding that so long as
the negligent employer’s contribution to the risk of mesothelioma
had been “material,” that negligence would be considered a cause
of the claimant’s mesothelioma.259 Similarly, it should not matter
if the competing exposure was not created by human agency at
all, such as exposure to radiation by naturally occurring
radioisotopes as in Allen, June, and Wilcox.260
Allen shows that the traditional “substantial contributing
factor” formulation of the causal connection opens the possibility
of reformulating causation in risk-creation terms to address
specific causation in toxic torts. The treatment of asbestos
indeterminate-defendant cases in California and the United
Kingdom shows that the reformulation can be credibly applied.
“At the very least,” it proves “that it is not necessarily the
hallmark of a civilised and sophisticated legal system that it
treats cases where strict proof of causation is impossible in
exactly the same way as cases where such proof is possible.”261
C. Risk as Cause, Not as Harm
A probabilistic model of specific causation in toxic torts, as
opposed to deterministic but-for causation, is best supported by
facts).
258. See id. [60]–[61] (Lord Phillips) (“[T]he judge . . . heard expert evidence
which quantified this exposure and compared it to the environmental exposure
that would be experienced by everyone. . . . It was on the basis of this finding
that the judge held that the claimant’s case on causation had not been made
out.”).
259. See id. [107]–[09] (Lord Phillips) (determining what constitutes a
“material risk” and applying that determination to this case).
260. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 40 (“[A]ll of the distinctions designed to
rein in the reach of the risk rule feel arbitrary.”).
261. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs., Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, 168,
[2002] 1 A.C. 32, [168] (Lord Rodger). The appropriate scope of liability in such
cases is discussed infra Part IV.E.
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existing and developing scientific evidence—but not in the sense
that some particularistic trait of an individual’s disease allows a
direct estimate of the likelihood that his or her case was caused
by a particular exposure.262 Rather, an individual’s combination
of genetic makeup and exposure increases the likelihood of the
disease relative to genetically similar individuals not exposed.263
The exposure, accordingly, is considered a risk factor for the
disease. The courts that decided Allen, Rutherford, McGhee, and
Fairchild all recognized that in light of causal indeterminacy, it is
appropriate to treat proof of contribution to risk as proof of
contribution to cause.
In Barker, however, the House of Lords adopted a different
conceptual framework to explain its Fairchild holding. According
to the Barker majority, the Fairchild defendants were held liable
not because the tortious augmentation of a plaintiff’s risk was a
contributing factor to the plaintiff’s harm of mesothelioma, but
because the tortious exposure of a plaintiff to asbestos caused the
plaintiff’s harm of increased risk of developing mesothelioma.264
This reformulation extended Fairchild considerably with respect
to the harm element of a tort.265 With respect to causation
262. The reasoning process known as differential etiology (usually—though
inaccurately—called differential diagnosis) may seem to approach a direct
estimate of a probability of causation in an individual case. Differential etiology
attempts to prove that but-for causation is more likely than not, by ruling out
other possible causes of the plaintiff’s disease. It could be fully determinative if
a set of deterministic causes of plaintiff’s disease were fully characterized (e.g.,
if an infection were caused only by a known virus or a known bacterium, and
exposure to one were ruled out). More often, however, the disease in question is
characterized by several risk factors and a residuum of disease incidence
unaccounted for by any known risk factor. Ruling out some risk factors may
allow a more refined estimate of risk, but that estimate still would be derived
ultimately from population-based studies.
263. Other traits besides genetics and exposure may be pertinent, such as
exposures to additional toxins, environmental factors (e.g., nutrition or
weather), or personal factors (e.g., age).
264. See Barker v. Corus U.K. Ltd., [2006] UKHL 20, [2006] 2 A.C. 572,
[35]–[36] (Lord Hoffmann), [59]–[62] (Lord Scott), [126] (Baroness Hale) (noting
that the defendants in Fairchild were not found to have ultimately caused the
harm but that they were liable for creating the risk).
265. As Lord Rodger noted in dissent, the majority took pains to limit the
extension, without convincing rationale, to the context of multiple asbestos
exposures and mesothelioma. Id. [85] (Lord Rodger).
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doctrine, however, it implicitly retreated to the comfortable
confines of but-for: each material exposure to asbestos,
tautologically, was a but-for cause of the increment of risk
associated with that exposure.
Although the increased risk caused by a tortious toxic
exposure could be considered sufficient harm to support a cause
of action,266 reconceptualization of causation-in-fact as proposed
here has advantages over recognizing liability for a new tort
based on creation of risk alone. The latter would invite the
objection that many negligent or otherwise wrongful acts create
risk of harm, but tort law ordinarily does not, and practicably

266. See id. [71] (Lord Rodger) (“[T]he majority of the House proceeded on
the simple basis that the creation of a material risk of mesothelioma was
sufficient for liability.”). The Barker majority’s attempt to reframe Fairchild was
unconvincing. The majority labeled the equation of risk creation with
contribution to injury a “fiction” and cited passages from Fairchild rejecting
reliance on legal fictions, but those passages rejected a different fiction—that
proof of material contribution to risk permitted an inference of but-for
causation. Compare id. [31]–[34] (Lord Hoffmann) (arguing that the Fairchild
Court did not rely on the fiction that creation of a material risk constitutes
material contribution to contraction of disease), with id. [80]–[83] (Lord Rodger)
(countering that Lord Hoffmann’s view that Fairchild “did not proceed on the
basis that a defendant who had created a material risk of mesothelioma was
deemed to have caused . . . the disease” was true only of Lord Hoffmann’s own
speech in Fairchild but not true of the Fairchild majority). This reframing was
used to justify the conclusion that each defendant should be liable only severally
for its proportionate share of risk contribution, rather than for the plaintiff’s full
damages as United Kingdom law would otherwise have required. See id. [2], [31]
(Lord Hoffmann), [60]–[62] (Lord Scott), [112]–[13] (Lord Walker) (concluding
that if tort consisted of exposure to risk then several liability proportionate to
risk would be appropriate). Barker held that fairness demanded that result. See
id. [127] (Baroness Hale) (“It seems to me most fair that the contribution [that
defendants in a Fairchild-type situation] should make [to plaintiff’s
compensation] is in proportion to the contribution they have made to the risk of
that harm occurring.”). Parliament promptly reversed that policy judgment.
Compensation Act, 2006, c. 29, § 3(1)(a), (c), (2) (U.K.). The Supreme Court, with
some justices holding their noses, later adhered to the precedent that material
contribution to risk was sufficient causal connection despite the statutory
requirement of joint and several liability. E.g., Sienkiewicz v. Greif, [2011]
UKSC 10, [2011] 2 A.C. 229 [167]–[68] (Baroness Hale). In the United States,
risk contribution as a tort is the premise underlying some claims for medical
monitoring. E.g., Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891 (Mass.
2009). This Article takes no position on whether claims for medical monitoring
should be permitted upon proof of toxic exposure even absent manifest illness.
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could not, compensate every person exposed to such risks.267 The
Barker majority answered this objection, despite holding that the
harm caused by tortious asbestos exposure was creation of a risk
of mesothelioma, by holding that tortfeasors would be liable only
if the harm of mesothelioma had materialized. It imposed this
limit by assertion rather than by reasoning, however.268
By contrast, if risk augmentation is recognized as a cause of
injury within a model of probabilistic causal contribution, a
267. Another problem soon led the United Kingdom’s Supreme Court to
repudiate the risk-as-harm formulation. A group of employers’ liability insurers
balked at covering liabilities owed to employees who developed disease long
after their workplace exposures to asbestos. Cf. Jeffrey W. Stempel, The
Insurance Policy as Statute, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 203, 209–10 (2010)
(recounting history of similar litigation in United States). The insurers argued
that their policies covered only liability for disease that became manifest during
the policy period, not for disease that became manifest after the policy period
even if it had been caused by exposure during the policy period. BAI (Run Off)
Ltd. v. Durham, [2012] UKSC 14, 3 (Lord Mance). The justices unanimously
rejected this argument. Id. 76 (Lord Clarke) (“Like other members of the Court,
I agree . . . [that] for the purposes of the . . . policies, mesothelioma is ‘sustained’
or ‘contracted’ when the process that leads to the disease is initiated” by
exposure to asbestos). Lord Phillips, however, would have held nevertheless that
the insurance was not triggered. He argued that Barker correctly interpreted
Fairchild as imposing liability for risk creation alone, and that because no one
could tell which employer’s fiber actually caused a plaintiff’s mesothelioma,
liability based on risk creation did not satisfy the insurance policies’
requirements of causation and injury. Id. 124, 134–35. The majority, however,
disagreed. Id. 65 (Lord Mance) (“[I[t is impossible, or at least inaccurate, to
speak of the cause of action recognized in Fairchild and Barker as being simply
‘for the risk created by exposing’ someone to asbestos.”); id. 82 (Lord Clarke)
(Barker “cannot have intended to hold, without more, that the basis of liability
was the wrongful creation of the risk . . . because there would be no liability at
all but for the subsequent existence of the mesothelioma.”) I am indebted to
Sandy Steel for calling my attention to the insurance trigger litigation.
268. See Barker, [2006] UKHL 20, [48] (Lord Hoffmann) (“Although the
Fairchild exception treats the risk of contracting mesothelioma as the damage,
it applies only when the disease has actually been contracted.”); id. [61] (Lord
Scott) (“If, in the event, the victim does not contract the disease, no claim can be
made for the trauma of being subjected to the risk.”); Chris Miller, Liability for
Negligently Increased Risk: The Repercussions of Barker v. Corus UK (PLC), 8
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 39, 42 (2009) (emphasizing distinction between
liability for creating risk of harm and liability for creating risk that eventuates
in actual harm). Courts that accept “lost chance” doctrines similarly limit their
application by pronouncement. See generally David A. Fischer, Tort Recovery for
Loss of a Chance, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 605 (2001) (discussing possible
limiting principles for application of lost chance doctrine).
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plaintiff would still need to establish an injury.269 The
mechanistic view of causation deems a cause-in-fact of that injury
to be any necessary element of a sufficient causal set. A stochastic
model of causation would imply that in any particular toxic tort
case it is impossible to tell whether even a known risk factor fits
that description. The causal set that matters, instead, is a set of
factors that increased the probability of the plaintiff’s injurious
result. Each element of this set should be considered a cause-infact of the harm the plaintiff experienced.
Jane Stapleton has called such reasoning a “fiction” in
asbestos cancer cases because, so far as is known, asbestosrelated lung cancer or mesothelioma does not result only if
aggregate asbestos exposure exceeds some threshold and is not
made more severe by additional exposure. Thus, she reasoned, a
tortfeasor who contributed part of the plaintiff’s total exposure
can in no factual way be said to have “caused” just a “part” of the
plaintiff’s disease.270
Professor Stapleton’s careful distinctions among cumulative,
threshold, and non-threshold mechanisms of toxic injury are
valuable and informative. But probabilistic causal contribution is
a fiction only in relation to assumed scientific271 and legal models
269. Jamie Grodsky argued that injury itself could be reconceptualized to
include detectable sub-clinical cellular or biochemical changes. Grodsky, supra
note 110, at 1671–74. Although this Article takes no position on that suggestion,
there is nothing about Professor Grodsky’s suggestion that is inconsistent with
this Article’s proposal.
270. Stapleton, supra note 187, at 191. See generally Wagner v. Bondex Int’l,
Inc., 368 S.W.3d 340, 349, 353 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012) (attempting to harmonize
requirement of but-for causation with reality of indeterminacy by ruling that
based on testimony of “cumulative nature of mesothelioma,” a reasonable juror
could conclude that asbestos in defendant’s product “contributed to cause”
plaintiff’s mesothelioma and death).
271. I do not mean to suggest that mesothelioma may be a cumulative
disease like asbestosis or that asbestos can only cause mesothelioma after a
threshold exposure is achieved. At bottom, however, the assertion that
contributing-factor causation is a legal fiction depends on the scientific model
that assumes that the interaction of one asbestos fiber with one cell causes
mesothelioma. This may well be true, although, curiously, the Supreme Court of
the United Kingdom asserted, without citation, that “[t]he single fibre theory
has . . . been discredited.” Sienkiewicz, [2011] UKSC 10, 102 (Lord Phillips). It is
clear, at least, that more than one molecular change is necessary for a
mesothelium cell to become malignant. Huang, et al., supra note 147, at 180–81.
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of causation. The deterministic legal model assumes that one and
only one source of asbestos exposure should be treated as “the”
cause of the plaintiff’s entire illness: that as a matter of historical
fact, the physical tumor in the plaintiff’s body originated with a
cellular alteration initiated by a particular defendant’s fiber,272
which could be identified if only science were omniscient. Even if
reality matches this assumption, the counterfactual inference
required by the but-for test does not necessarily follow. We
cannot say that if only plaintiff had been protected from inhaling
this one fiber, plaintiff would not have mesothelioma today,
because it is quite plausible that if this fiber had not turned this
cell malignant, some other fiber would have—or would have
enabled another cell, already mutated multiple times, to evade
the body’s defenses and take the last step to cancer.273 A
probabilistic view of causation acknowledges this uncertainty.
Moreover, the lack of omniscience alters the balance between
historical fact and legal fiction. We can know as a fact that a
particular defendant’s tortious exposure of the plaintiff to
asbestos increased the risk that the plaintiff would develop
cancer. We can make some type of estimate of that risk
contribution as compared to other risk contributions. We cannot
know, as a fact, which fiber is the one without which plaintiff’s
Even the possibility that more than one fiber may be involved (which could,
indistinguishably, come from more than one source) would weaken the scientific
basis for the legal assumption that one and only one source of asbestos was the
cause of a plaintiff’s mesothelioma. More fundamentally, even if the model of
how a fiber causes a mesothelioma is accurate, the best scientific model of which
source the fatal fiber came from is, at present, a stochastic one.
272. I say “defendant’s fiber” for ease of reference. The party responsible for
the exposure in a given case might not be a defendant for any of a variety of
reasons (insolvency, worker’s compensation bar, inapplicability of any theory of
tort liability, inability to identify the source of an ambient exposure).
273. See Noel F.C.C. de Miranda et al., Role of the Microenvironment in the
Tumourigenesis of Microsatellite Unstable and MUTYH-associated Polyposis
Colorectal Cancers, 27 MUTAGENESIS 247, 247 (2012) (explaining that after
accumulating genetic alterations, various clones of tumor cells compete against
one another for growth and space). In theory, a similar argument could be made
about any tort: how can we say that, if the pedestrian plaintiff’s leg had not been
broken by impact with the negligently driven car, it would not have been broken
by something else? The difference is that in the ordinary case no reason exists to
suppose that at the time of plaintiff’s injury some other cause created a material
risk of the same injury.
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disease would not have developed. To preclude recovery as a
result would embrace a legal fiction that the defendant did no
harm.
To think of causation in risk-creation terms requires a shift
in the legal mindset, despite the centrality of risk creation to
many parts of tort theory. Lawyers customarily think of risk as “a
forward-looking concept” while “[c]ausation usually looks
backwards.”274 But even in traditional counterfactual causal
inference, the causal generalizations that support the inference
derive from experience that associates the event we call a cause
with the occurrence that is the result of interest. We do not
speculate that the pedestrian plaintiff’s broken leg might have
resulted from something other than impact with the negligently
driven car because common experience tells us that such impacts
break legs that otherwise normally remain intact. In other words,
impact with vehicles is an extremely powerful risk factor for
broken legs.275 The difference in toxic torts is that scientific
indeterminacy makes the reasoning from ex ante risk creation to
ex post injury causation both more explicit and more necessary.
Despite the doubts some courts have expressed about causal proof
based on population-based estimates of relative risk,276 such
measures are relevant to individual cases—even though they do
not directly measure the probability of causation in an individual
case.277 Because such measures will continue to be the type of
274. Sienkiewicz, [2011] UKSC 10, [170] (Lady Hale).
275. The inference is strengthened because of the typical absence of
competing strong risk factors that might have caused the broken leg. Yet I
strongly suspect that even a plaintiff with a diseased leg that might
spontaneously fracture at any time would be able to obtain a factual finding of
causation, and certainly would be able to reach a jury.
276. This skepticism has manifested in various ways. In Sienkiewicz, some
members of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom questioned whether
population-based relative risk data were at all useful to causal judgments about
an individual case. Id. The Texas Supreme Court, by contrast, acknowledged
that epidemiologic data could be relevant, but its skepticism led it to impose the
doubling+ rule and other unrealistic requirements. See Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 719 (Tex. 1997) (justifying doubling+ rule and
other requirements as “strik[ing] a balance” allowing acceptance of
epidemiologic proof).
277. See Sander Greenland & James M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and
the Probability of Causation, 40 JURIMETRICS 321, 322 (2000) (noting that
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evidence that science can provide, it is time for a corresponding
probabilistic contributing-factor model of causation.
D. The Question of Substantiality
Probabilistic causal contribution begins with the idea that
when causal evidence is population-based, the law should treat
risk factors as contributing causal factors despite the inability to
infer but-for causation. In the United States, however, the
prevailing verbal formulation of causation in tort has been the
“substantial factor” test of the Second Restatement.278 In light of
the Third Restatement’s decisive rejection of “substantial factor”
as vague and analytically inchoate, it may seem contrarian to
propose a “contributing factor” concept of causation. Probabilistic
causal contribution can avoid the biggest problems of “substantial
factor” simply by jettisoning the requirement of substantiality.
That Allen v. United States relied on the then-current Second
Restatement’s “substantial factor” formulation is hardly
surprising, but this reliance exemplified some of the confusion
that led to the next Restatement’s rejection of “substantial
factor.”279 Allen held that to be deemed a “substantial factor” in
causing a plaintiff’s illness, the defendant must have
“significantly” increased that plaintiff’s risk.280 The court’s
interpretation of “significance,” therefore, had a dispositive effect.
In that regard, Allen considered but rejected adopting the
doubling+ rule.281 Yet, apparently because of a heuristic view of
“significant” risk contribution, the outcome of each plaintiff’s case
“equating the probability of causation to the attributable fraction [derived from
relative risk] leads to systematic underestimation” of probability of causation);
see also Steve C. Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof,
Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 379–82
(1986) (distinguishing population-based from individually applicable probability
concepts).
278. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431(a) (1965).
279. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 26 cmt. j (“The substantial-factor test has not, however, withstood the
test of time, as it has proved confusing and been misused.”).
280. Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 428 (D. Utah 1984).
281. Id. at 416–18.
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closely mirrored what might have been expected with a doubling+
requirement.282
Thus, Allen’s use of “substantial factor” served two purposes.
First, the court treated “substantial factor” as an alternative test
of factual causation that better fit the nature of the available
evidence. Second, the court used “substantial factor” to narrow
the alternative test it had created. The latter use, more policy
judgment than factual determination, is problematic because it so
closely tracks the doubling+ version of but-for causation, when
doubling+ always was an inappropriate test of cause-in-fact and
will become more so as risk characterization improves.
Rutherford, too, used the word “substantial” to describe the
risk contribution that would be required for an exposure to be
considered a cause of a plaintiff’s illness.283 Rutherford cautioned,
however, that the “substantial factor standard . . . requir[es] only
that the contribution of the individual cause be more than
negligible or theoretical.”284 Similarly, throughout the
development of the mesothelioma case law in the United
Kingdom, only exposures creating “material” increases in risk
have been considered causative,285 but in that context “material”
simply means “not de minimis.”286
In an analogously difficult situation requiring proof of
causation, a federal district court287 applied a “contributing
factor” standard to a claim for damages arising under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA).288 The government plaintiffs alleged that
282. See id. at 429–40 (describing the specific details and outcome of each
plaintiff’s case).
283. See Rutherford v. Owens-Ill., Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1223 (Cal. 1997)
(holding that “a substantial factor contributing to plaintiff’s . . . risk” would be
deemed a “substantial factor in causing or bringing about the disease”).
284. Id. at 1219.
285. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Servs., Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, 64,
[2002] 3 All E.R. 305 (Lord Hoffmann).
286. See Sienkiewicz, [2011] UKSC 10, 107–12 (Lord Phillips) (holding
“material” an asbestos exposure increasing mesothelioma risk by 18% above
background).
287. In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 722 F. Supp. 893 (D.
Mass. 1989).
288. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006).
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defendants were liable for damages for “injury to, destruction of,
or loss of natural resources” caused by defendants’ releases of
PCBs to New Bedford Harbor.289 The defendants claimed,
however, that some releases had been “federally permitted” and
were therefore exempt from liability.290 Commingled in the
harbor, the PCBs from allegedly exempt and non-exempt releases
could not be distinguished in situ.291 The court considered the
question: what would the government need to prove to establish
that the non-exempt releases caused injury?292
The court held that the non-exempt releases would result in
liability if shown to be “a contributing factor to an injury to
natural resources.”293 The court specifically considered and
rejected requiring a showing of a “substantial contributing
factor,” noting appellate precedent holding that defendants could
be liable—even jointly and severally liable—for CERCLA
response costs despite a lack of proof that their contribution to
hazardous substance releases had been “substantial.”294
An injury to natural resources provides a useful analogy: it is
essentially a toxic tort committed on an ecosystem.295 In that
289. Acushnet, 722 F. Supp. at 900; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(D) (2006)
(creating a cause of action for such damages).
290. Acushnet, 722 F. Supp. at 897; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9607(j) (2006)
(“Recovery . . . for response costs or damages resulting from a federally
permitted release shall be pursuant to existing law in lieu of this section.”).
291. Acushnet, 722 F. Supp. at 897.
292. Id. at 897–98.
293. Id. at 897.
294. Id. at 897 n.8 (citing O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 179 n.4 (1st Cir.
1989)). In O’Neil, the trial judge held that defendants, who asserted they had
arranged for disposal of only a relatively small portion of the hazardous
substances at a dump, were jointly and severally liable for the full cleanup costs.
O’Neil v. Picillo, 682 F. Supp. 706, 730–31 (D.R.I. 1988); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(A) (creating a cause of action for recovery of government response
costs). On appeal, defendants contended that Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 433B required the government to prove that each defendant was “a
‘substantial’ cause of the harm.” O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 179 n.4. The court of
appeals rejected that contention, observing that to require proof of substantial
contribution would impose an “almost impossible task” on the government, in
conflict with statutory objectives. Id.
295. The Acushnet court announced a legal standard for proof of causation
but did not have to determine whether the evidence satisfied the standard. The
particular harm allegedly inflicted on New Bedford Harbor—the concentration
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context and in indeterminate-defendant toxic tort cases, courts
have successfully eliminated the substantiality requirement for
contributing factors. With only a sensible exclusion for de
minimis contributions,296 “contributing factor” defined by
increases in risk fits well with the causal world that
toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology are in the process of
revealing.
E. Discounted Recoveries
The preceding discussion showed that a “contributing factor”
standard of causation, based on risk contribution, can be used to
implement a stochastic, probabilistic model of causation that
better fits the realities of proof of specific causation in many toxic
tort cases—even, perhaps especially, in light of the anticipated
results of continued research at the genomic and molecular
scales. This proposed standard will face an easily anticipated
objection: that tortfeasors will overpay if held liable for full
damages for all harms of which they created incremental risk, no
of PCBs in water, fish and shellfish above the maximum allowed for
consumption, Acushnet, 722 F. Supp. at 898 n.12, is similar to a disease that
appears if a threshold dose of toxin is administered but that does not get worse
with larger doses. Nevertheless, Acushnet’s discussion is not limited by a
particular fact-bound causal model. For example, the court considered the
possibility that the non-exempt releases alone might not have been a
contributing factor to any harm, id. at 897 n.11, which would seem impossible if
the harm inhered solely in exceeding a threshold quantity of PCBs. Cf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 27
cmt. g.
296. Rejecting causal attribution for de minimis risk contributions would
reduce some of the complexity that a probabilistic causal contribution model
could introduce to toxic tort litigation. It would take some care, however, to
apply this sensible limit sensibly. A common scenario in CERCLA cases involves
many contributors of small fractions of a hazardous substance release that, as a
whole, requires response action. An analogous situation in toxic torts—many
exposures, each of which adds a small increment of risk—is plausible and may
become increasingly apparent with improved ability to characterize both risk
and exposures. Eliminating liability for each contributor as de minimis would
allocate the loss entirely to the victim. Thus, de minimis ultimately must be a
matter of relative contribution rather than an arbitrarily fixed absolute
proportion of risk contribution. See also infra notes 319–20 and accompanying
text.

308

70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 237 (2013)

matter how small their (non-de minimis) risk contribution. The
objection impinges, in different ways, on both corrective justice
and efficiency rationales for tort liability. And, in different ways,
the objection may be overcome by a carefully designed system of
discounted recoveries in proportion to the degree of risk created
by the tortious exposure, a suggestion that has recurred in the
literature in various forms since the early 1980s.297
The corrective justice or fairness argument is that
contributing factor causation would unjustly hold some
defendants liable for illnesses they did not cause. That criticism
tautologically depends on the deterministic model of causation
and the assumption that specific causation is knowable. If specific
causation is not deterministically knowable, but population-based
data are available, the deterministic all-or-nothing model would
allow two outcomes that are different from contributing factor
causation. The first possible outcome would be to deny recovery
in every case because measures of relative risk are insufficient to
establish specific causation. That would offend corrective justice
and fairness just as much as contributing factor causation, but in
the opposite direction. The second possible outcome would be to
take specific causation as true only if the relative risk exceeded
some threshold (e.g., doubling+). That, however, is internally
inconsistent with the deterministic model’s insistence that each
affirmative finding of causation represents a belief about what
would probably have happened to the particular plaintiff had the
plaintiff not been exposed. The doubling+ rule simply glosses over
the fact that each group of exposed and sick plaintiffs—whether
they prevail or not—necessarily includes some whose litigation
outcomes would have been different but for the irreducible
scientific indeterminacy.
The efficiency argument takes a population perspective from
the outset, contending that contributing factor causation would
make tortfeasors overpay—and thus be over-deterred—by holding
defendants liable for an aggregate amount in excess of the total
amount of harm the defendants could have prevented.
Discounting recoveries to reflect risk contribution is, at least
297. For a thorough survey of prior proportional liability proposals, see
Green, supra note 185, at 357–70.
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theoretically, a complete response to that objection. The claim
that such discounting would produce optimum deterrence has
figured prominently in arguments for proportional liability
schemes.298
From the perspective of a probabilistic model of causation,
discounted recoveries would be a form of causal apportionment
that would cohere conceptually with the available evidence on
specific causation in many toxic torts. Consider a relatively
simple yet paradigmatic hypothetical case. The plaintiff worked
for many years at a job that entailed daily inhaling vapors of
some solvent. After the appropriate latency period, the plaintiff’s
doctors diagnosed a particular cancer. Undisputed, peer-reviewed
scientific research shows that: (1) cells of this cancer almost
always have mutations in a particular set of genes; (2) DNA
treated with the solvent in vitro is statistically significantly more
likely than untreated DNA to contain mutations in at least some
of those genes; (3) the frequency of this cancer among exposed
individuals with a specific susceptible genotype is slightly, but
statistically significantly, greater than among unexposed
individuals of similar genotype; and (4) no other specific risk
factors for this cancer have yet been identified, so the vast
majority of cases are considered unexplained or idiopathic. This
hypothetical evidence of both biological mechanism and
statistical association should suffice to support a reasonable
factual finding of general causation.
Assume that genetic testing showed that the plaintiff’s tumor
has mutations in the usual genes and the plaintiff has the
susceptible genotype. Under the contributing factor standard of
probabilistic causal contribution, the evidence of specific
causation would be sufficient for submission to a fact-finder. The
fact-finder would be asked to determine by a preponderance of
the evidence whether the exposure caused the cancer; cause
would be defined as a non-trivial increase in plaintiff’s risk of
developing cancer. Upon an affirmative answer, the fact-finder
298. See, e.g., David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A “Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 868
(1984); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of
Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587, 589 (1985).
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would estimate, as a percentage, the extent to which the solvent
exposure contributed to the plaintiff’s risk of the cancer. The factfinder would also determine the plaintiff’s total damages under
the jurisdiction’s damages rules. The court would enter judgment
for the determined percentage of the total damages.
The preceding hypothetical deliberately did not specify a
value for the relative risk estimated by molecular epidemiologic
investigation, in order to avoid the suggestion of automatic
equivalence between observed relative risk and causal
apportionment in a particular case (i.e., relative risk of 2 equates
to 50% risk contribution, relative risk of 1.5 equates to 33.33%
risk contribution, etc.). A fact-finder might rationally apply such
reasoning, but also might, for various reasons, reach a different
result. The biological assumptions implicit in such reasoning
might be disputed.299 The significance and weight to be assigned
multiple studies that reported different relative risk values might
be disputed. The fact-finder might understand the reported
relative risk(s) not as point values but as estimates of a
parametric value as indicated by a statistical confidence interval,
and might find a central tendency in overlapping confidence
intervals of multiple studies. Or facts particular to the case at
hand—characteristics of the plaintiff, the exposure, or both, as
compared to the study subjects—might prompt the fact-finder to
make a causal apportionment greater or less than implied by the
study’s relative risk. Adjustments for these reasons are
appropriate and are, or should be, part of the fact-finding process
under the but-for mechanistic model of causation as well.
The hypothetical can be made more complicated by assuming
that two or more parties contributed to the solvent exposure. The
analysis would depend on the nature of the multiple
contributions and on what is known about the effect on risk of
increasing amounts of exposure. A solvent manufacturer that
failed to warn that its product should not be inhaled and a
company that used the product without taking reasonable
precautions to prevent inhalation, for example, would both be
299. See Greenland & Robins, supra note 277, at 325 (discussing, as an
example, the independence-of-background assumption and explaining that
many plausible disease mechanisms do not satisfy this assumption).
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but-for causes of the same exposure under traditional causation
analysis; therefore each should be treated as fully causally
responsible for the share of damages attributed to the solvent
exposure.300 By contrast, if the plaintiff was exposed to the same
solvent in products made by two different manufacturers, the
question of causal attribution between the manufacturers would
resemble the mesothelioma indeterminate-defendant cases, with
the important difference that the causal link between plaintiff’s
cancer and the overall solvent exposure would be treated
probabilistically.301 Assuming that the amount of risk created by
the solvent exposure was somehow proportional to the amount of
exposure,302 the logic of probabilistic causal contribution implies
division of the solvent’s causal contribution in proportion to each
source’s contribution of solvent exposure. In some cases this rule
would invite fine parsing of whether multiple exposures truly
involved the same agent; that assessment would best be tailored
to the available evidence in particular circumstances.
The next complication adds other proven, non-de minimis
contributing risk factors. As noted above, conceptually it does not
matter whether the plaintiff’s exposure to additional risk factors
required human agency or not, whether it was tortious, or
whether it was created by a defendant or the plaintiff or a third
party. If multiple risk factors apply to a plaintiff, a court’s first
300. This illustration assumes that all other requisites of liability are
satisfied for both these parties. Applicable comparative fault and scope-ofliability rules would determine whether judgment would be entered against
each tortfeasor for the full amount of this apportioned share.
301. In the mesothelioma cases, by contrast, it was not in dispute that
asbestos, rather than something else, caused the disease.
302. This critical biological assumption might be well established in some
cases (e.g., asbestos-mesothelioma) and in other cases might reasonably be
treated as an acceptable approximation. It should be subject to factual dispute,
however. For example, the available data might show any of the following:
increased risk only after exposure exceeded a threshold amount; increased risk
relatively insensitive to dose (perhaps after dose exceeded a threshold);
increased risk in some way proportional to dose up to a limit beyond which
increasing dose adds no increment of risk. Perhaps the most likely scenario,
even in molecular epidemiology studies, would be insufficient data to assess the
assumption, i.e. studies that simply compared relative risk among “exposed” and
“unexposed” groups. In that scenario the reasonableness of the proportionality
assumption could be a subject for expert debate.
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instinct might be to ask the fact-finder to assign percentages to
all of them, but strictly speaking it would not be necessary to
quantify the proportion assigned to any individual non-defendant
risk factor. The crucial assessment would be what causal share to
attribute to each of the exposures for which any defendant was
liable. The non-defendant risk factors could be treated,
collectively, as part of that plaintiff’s “background” risk, although
of course they could elevate that plaintiff’s background risk value
above the background risk faced by somebody not affected by any
known risk factors.
Proof that the plaintiff had been exposed to multiple risk
factors would present significant factual complications, however.
If each risk factor independently added incremental risk, a factfinder could relatively easily assign causal contributions by
comparing the risk increments to one another. But risk
contributions from diverse factors might not be independent of
one another, and if they were not, they could interact in a variety
of ways.303 The best-known example is the synergistic effect of
tobacco smoking and occupational asbestos exposure on the risk
of lung cancer.304 Exposure to both carcinogens increases lung
cancer risk far more than the sum of the risk contributions of
each acting alone.305 Although some courts have tried to divide
the additional risk resulting from the synergy between the two
contributing factors, there is no entirely satisfying way to do so.306
An alternative would be to assign the additional risk resulting
from a synergistic interaction to each of the interacting risk
factors. The latter approach would mean that, as compared to a
303. Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution
to the Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 233–34 (1992).
304. Huang et al., supra note 147, at 203.
305. Sanders, supra note 1, at 35.
306. See, e.g., Dafler v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 611 A.2d 136, 145–56 (N.J.
Super. 1992), aff’d, 622 A.2d 1305 (N.J. 1993) (affirming a jury verdict that
appeared to apportion the synergistic risk in proportion to the amount of risk
added by exposure to each carcinogen separately and independently); see also V.
McCormack et al., Estimating the Asbestos-Related Lung Cancer Burden from
Mesothelioma Mortality, 106 BRIT. J. CANCER 575, 575 (2012) (“Quantifying the
asbestos-related lung cancer burden is difficult in the presence of this disease’s
multiple causes.”). But see Green, supra note 94, at 545 (“[V]arious plausible, yet
complicated, methods for determining risk contribution exist . . . .”).
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case of independent and additive risk factors, in a case of synergy
the proof of plaintiff’s exposure to an additional risk factor would
have less effect on the causal share assigned to the risk factor
contributed by defendant(s).307
The quality of evidence concerning potential interaction of
multiple risk factors will likely vary from case to case. In some
cases the effect of combined exposure will itself have been the
subject of scientific study designed to assess the independence or
interaction of risk contributions. Even then, factual issues such
as the extent of exposure to the various risk factors might affect
the causal attribution. In other cases each risk factor might have
been studied independently, with the attendant possibility of
confounding by the other risk factor(s), leaving the experts to
battle over whether an assumption of independence or of synergy
best fit the available data. Toxicogenomic and molecular evidence
about the mechanism of toxicity for the various risk factors could
inform that debate.
In a probabilistic causal contribution model, a plaintiff
seeking to prove a risk contribution need not exclude other risk
factors, unlike a plaintiff using differential diagnosis in a
deterministic causation model. Thus, defendants should be
assigned the initial burden of production of evidence that plaintiff
was exposed to additional risk factors and of general causation
with respect to those risk factors. There would be no justification,
however, for shifting the ultimate burden of persuasion: plaintiff
must persuade the fact-finder by a preponderance of the evidence
307. Susan Poulter used the asbestos-tobacco-lung cancer example to show
how under this approach, if the relative risk jointly created by two exposures is
the product rather than the sum of the relative risks of each acting individually,
the fraction of cases attributed to each exposure in the population exposed to
both is exactly the same as the fraction attributed to each in the population
exposed only to it. See Poulter, supra note 303, at 233–34, n.215. (This handy
result obtains only if the synergistic risk exactly equals the product of the
individual risks, but applying this approach to any synergistic interaction will
result in attributable shares closer to the individual shares than would be the
case if the risks were additive.) Because this approach assigns overlapping parts
of the synergistic risk to both exposures, the sum of the assigned risk fractions
would exceed one. See also Susan R. Poulter, Genetic Testing in Toxic Injury
Litigation: The Path to Scientific Certainty or Blind Alley?, 41 JURIMETRICS 211,
223–31 (2001) (describing possible interactions among genetic and
environmental causes of disease).
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that defendant increased plaintiff’s risk of disease with evidence
that will permit the fact-finder to make some estimate of a
percentage causal contribution (even if, as will usually be true,
the scientific evidence does not produce a single point value for
that contribution).
Undeniably, in these cases the proof, and the fact-finders’
task, will be complicated. One can imagine cases as complex as
one cares to: exposures to many different risk factors, from
tortious, non-tortious human, plaintiff, and natural sources, with
each tortious exposure including contributions of multiple
tortfeasors. A premise of this Article is that toxicogenomics and
molecular epidemiology will make these cases more, rather than
less, complex. Nonetheless, it is possible to exaggerate the
concern about complexity. The adversary system, the human
decision-making process, the reduced importance of additional
risk factors in cases of synergy, and the de minimis limitation on
risk factors that “count,” all will tend to focus litigation on the
most salient tortious conduct and alternative causes. In any
event, complexity of the facts is not a good excuse for
oversimplification of the law.
Here, too, an analogy from CERCLA is instructive,
demonstrating that causal apportionment is feasible even if
factually difficult. A defendant liable for the government’s
response costs incurred under CERCLA is jointly and severally
liable, unless the defendant shows, on a purely causal and not
equitable basis, that the environmental harm to which it
contributed is reasonably capable of apportionment.308 The
statute makes liable several qualitatively different classes of
actors.309 Information about their relative contributions is often
308. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 613–
14 (2009) (following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)). The
decision expresses what is required to justify apportionment in at least three
ways: whether the harm is “capable of apportionment,” whether “a reasonable
basis for apportionment exists,” and whether the harm is “a single, indivisible
harm.” Id. at 1881. The Court emphasized that the analysis is purely causal,
invoking none of the equitable factors courts use to allocate responsibility
among jointly and severally liable parties. See id. at 1882 n.9; United States v.
Hercules, Inc., 247 F.3d 706, 718–19 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Twp. of
Brighton, 153 F.3d 307, 318–19 (6th Cir. 1998).
309. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)–(4) (2012) (listing “covered persons” as
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scant. Apportionment may require substantial amounts of
assumption and inference. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
upheld a trial court’s use of data that were extremely limited—in
type, in clarity of causal significance, and in precision—to
apportion liability.310
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals required causal
apportionment in another different yet analogous context. The
plaintiffs in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Bickerstaff311 sued their
employer railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act
(FELA).312 They alleged that they suffered osteoarthritis of the
including the owner and operator of a vessel or facility, any person who owned
or operated a facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance, any
person who arranged for disposal, treatment, or transport for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances at a facility owned by another person, and
any person who accepted substances for transport to a disposal or treatment
facility selected by that person).
310. See Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 619 (concluding that “the District
Court reasonably apportioned the Railroads’ share of the site remediation costs
at 9%”). The trial court apportioned liability among three parties that owned or
operated a facility when hazardous substances were disposed of there: an
agricultural chemical distributor that spilled toxic chemicals during its
operations and two railroads that jointly owned a piece of property that the
distributor leased. Id. at 1874–76. By the time the United States sued to recover
more than eight million dollars in response costs, the distributor was defunct.
Id. at 1876. The railroads’ parcel was only a portion of the land the distributor
used, was used for only a portion of the time during which the distributor
operated, and was used to handle only two of the three chemicals that were the
subject of the cleanup. Id. The district court concluded that the product of these
three fractions represented a reasonable apportionment of the harm, and then
increased the computed share by a 50% fudge factor to account for uncertainty.
Id. at 1882. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the district court had
received little evidence on the apportionment issue, that one could question the
assumption that the harm was proportional to geographic area and years of
operation, and that little record evidence supported the conclusion that the two
chemicals handled on the railroads’ parcel were responsible for two-thirds of the
harm. Id. at 1882–83. Nonetheless, the Court upheld the apportionment as
reasonable with only one justice dissenting. Id.; see also United States v. Bell
Petrol. Servs., 3 F.3d 889, 903 (5th Cir. 1993) (reversing judgment of joint and
several liability because, although it was “not possible to determine with
absolute certainty the exact amount of chromium each defendant introduced,”
the evidence sufficed for “reasonable and rational approximation of each
defendant’s individual contribution to the contamination”).
311. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Bickerstaff, 978 A.2d 760 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2009), cert. denied, 984 A.2d 244 (2009).
312. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60 (2012).
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knee because CSX negligently used mainline ballast—relatively
large rocks—as a walking surface in the rail yards where they
worked.313 The trial court instructed the jury on comparative
negligence, and the jury returned verdicts assigning some fault to
the plaintiffs but larger shares to the defendant.314 The defendant
contended that in addition to the parties’ negligence, “other
significant causes such as obesity, smoking, other pre-existing
medical conditions, and age,”315 as well as genetics,316 had
contributed to causing the plaintiffs’ injuries. The appellate court
agreed that the trial court should have treated such alleged
causes separately from the plaintiffs’ own negligence.317
On appeal, the defendant did not argue that any of these
other factors was a but-for cause of plaintiffs’ injuries and the
ballast was not.318 Rather, CSX relied on evidence that
osteoarthritis is “multifactorial, meaning that there are many
factors involved in contributing to it.”319 A defense expert had
defined a “risk factor” as “something that would cause or lend
someone to have a certain problem or condition.”320 The appellate
court treated these risk factors as concurrent causes and held
that the trial court should have instructed the jury to apportion
any fraction of damages the jury found “attributable” to these
“other causes and factors.”321
So, in addition to the House of Lords’s application of causal
apportionment to asbestos indeterminate-defendant cases in
Barker,322 American courts have held that causal apportionment
313. Bickerstaff, 978 A.2d at 770.
314. Id. at 770–71, 793.
315. Id. at 793.
316. A defense expert testified that a “small percentage of osteoarthritis” is
hereditary, and argued (without presenting genomic evidence) that one
plaintiff’s inherited bowleggedness was a significant cause of that plaintiff’s
injury. Id. at 797, 799.
317. Id. at 799.
318. The trial judge seemed to think this the only proper use of evidence of
such non-negligent causes. See id. at 794–95 (summarizing the transcript of the
trial judge’s ruling).
319. Id. at 798 (quoting plaintiffs’ expert witness).
320. Id. at 797 (quoting defendant’s expert witness).
321. Id. at 799 n.22.
322. Some American courts have used comparative fault to achieve results
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can work in a CERCLA case in which multiple defendants were
liable in different ways and in a FELA case in which plaintiffs
bore non-negligent risk factors for their injuries.323 These
examples show that causal apportionment is a practicable
approach that has received judicial imprimatur, even when facts
are complex and data limited.324 Causal apportionment, via a
probabilistic causal contribution model as described here, can
work in toxic tort cases more generally. Although imperfect, it is
the best available solution to the problem of liability
disproportionate to the contribution to risk.
To apply probabilistic causal contribution correctly, however,
courts will need to take care to avoid duplicate reductions of
plaintiff’s damages through comparative responsibility regimes.
similar to Barker’s. See, e.g., Barnes v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 201 F.3d
815, 822–23 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying Kentucky comparative fault statute);
Green, supra note 185, at 353 (distinguishing apportionment based on relative
culpability from determining and apportioning liability based on probabilistic
assessments).
323. Each of these holdings may be criticized for undermining a joint and
several liability scheme that fosters core objectives of the statute involved. See
Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 165–66 (2003) (holding that under
FELA, “an employee who suffers an ‘injury’ caused ‘in whole or in part’ by a
railroad’s negligence may recover his or her full damages from the railroad”);
United States v. NCR Corp., No. 12-2069, 2012 WL 3140191, at *8 (7th Cir. Aug.
3, 2012) (agreeing with defendants that under Burlington Northern,
“apportionment calculations need not be precise. To the contrary, the [Supreme]
Court upheld a district court’s rather rough, sua sponte calculation of
apportionment. . . . But we do not agree that . . . lower courts must always take
such an approach”). This Article takes no position on whether Burlington
Northern and Bickerstaff correctly applied CERCLA and FELA, respectively.
324. See, e.g., Loui v. Oakley, 438 P.2d 393, 396–97 (Haw. 1968) (requiring
instruction that if the jury “is unable to determine by a preponderance of the
evidence how much of the plaintiff’s damages can be attributed to the
defendant’s negligence” in causing one of two entirely separate auto accidents
that injured plaintiff, the jury “may make a rough apportionment”); Campione v.
Soden, 695 A.2d 1364, 1375 (N.J. 1997) (holding that a comparative negligence
statute required apportionment of damages for injuries caused in part by each of
two auto accidents occurring in rapid succession, although the “absence of
conclusive evidence concerning allocation . . . will necessarily result in a less
precise allocation”). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 cmt. h (discussing the difficulty of apportioning
harm on causal grounds). The Restatement endorsed placing the burden of proof
on a party seeking to avoid responsibility for an entire injury, but relaxing such
a party’s burden of production of evidence. Id.
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Consider three hypothetical workers with lung cancer, each of
whom was exposed to an asbestos product made by a
manufacturer that negligently failed to warn of the product’s
dangers. Each worker contributed to his or her elevated risk of
lung cancer in a different way. Worker #1 negligently failed to
use a protective respirator provided by the worker’s employer.
Worker #2 negligently inhaled fibers from a similar product
(made by an unidentifiable manufacturer) during a home
renovation project. Worker #3 negligently smoked cigarettes.
Worker #1 would be causally responsible for the same increment
of lung cancer risk as the manufacturer; the only apportionment
between them would be based on comparative fault. Worker #2
would be causally responsible for an apportioned share of the
fraction of lung cancer risk causally attributed to asbestos
exposure; after the causal apportionment, further reduction in
the plaintiff’s damages based on a share of fault would be
inappropriate, as the plaintiff bore no fault for the portion of risk
attributed to the manufacturer. Worker #3, for the same reason,
would recover damages subject to causal apportionment (with
appropriate treatment of the asbestos/tobacco synergy), but not
further reduced by comparative fault.
Critics of apportionment (whether causal or fault-based)
argue that joint and several liability appropriately places the risk
that some tortfeasors will be insolvent on other tortfeasors rather
than on injured plaintiffs.325 There is much to this argument,
particularly as applied to situations like asbestos, where the total
harm caused was so great that many liable parties entered
bankruptcy.326 In the controversy over specific causation in toxic
torts, however, the real choice frequently will not be between
joint and several liability for full damages or only several liability
for apportioned damages—it will be between liability based on
probabilistic causal contribution and no liability at all based on
deterministic models of but-for causation. Moreover, as the
325. E.g., Mark M. Hager, What’s (Not!) in a Restatement? ALI IssueDodging on Liability Apportionment, 33 CONN. L. REV. 77, 95–96 (2000); Richard
W. Wright, Allocating Liability Among Multiple Responsible Causes: A
Principled Defense of Joint and Several Liability for Actual Harm and Risk
Exposure, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1141, 1185–86 (1988).
326. Sanders, supra note 1, at 13.
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variety of state comparative fault regimes demonstrates,
acceptance of apportionment need not dictate the allocation of the
risk of insolvency.327 Courts or legislatures could, despite the
tension with the theoretical rationale for probabilistic causal
contribution, make the policy choice that a tortious risk
contributor should bear all or part of the portion of risk
contributed by another tortfeasor that is insolvent. That choice
would make a party liable for a risk the person did not cause, but
not necessarily for a harm the person did not cause (which cannot
be determined).
F. Boundaries
Commentators on the components of probabilistic causal
contribution—treating risk contribution as causation and
discounting recoveries in proportion to relative contribution of
risk—often question whether, once accepted in one class of cases,
these doctrines can sensibly be restricted to that class.328
Limiting doctrinal reform to asbestos mesothelioma cases, for
example, has been criticized as arbitrary.329
I propose probabilistic causal contribution as a response to a
particular problem of causal indeterminacy that will be
exacerbated rather than solved by scientific advances. Although
it is tempting to say that if the concept is appropriate in some
cases it could be applied in every case, the boundaries of the
solution need not extend beyond the boundaries of the problem.330
327. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 10 cmt.
a (describing five variously adopted “tracks”).
328. See Jonathan Morgan, Causation, Politics and Law: The English—and
Scottish—Asbestos Saga, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION, supra note 1, at 57,
64–65 (despairing that judicially-imposed limits can withstand “common law’s
ineluctable method of reasoning by analogy”); see also Sanders, supra note 1, at
39 (expressing concern that the scope of risk rule could be difficult to limit).
329. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 36 (expressing concern that the scope of
the risk rule could be difficult to limit).
330. See generally BIC Pen Corp. v. Carter, 346 S.W.3d 533, 545 (Tex. 2011)
(distinguishing toxic tort cases and refusing to allow plaintiff to apply doubling+
rule and statistical evidence of increased risk to support claim that defect in
cigarette lighter caused injury).
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And the boundaries of the problem can be defined, if not
precisely, then reasonably well.331
Once again a metaphor from the physical sciences is helpful.
At a quantum scale, the behavior of elementary particles is
inherently random and unpredictable.332 But the behavior of
millions of particles in a beam is not.333 Quantum mechanics did
not render Newtonian physics useless for describing the motion of
billiard balls. But a probabilistic view is required to describe the
motion of the electrons of the atoms of which those balls are
made.334
Causation is always an inference, and all evidence of
causation can be conceived as probabilistic.335 But in most cases a
fact-finder can comfortably fit that evidence to an inferential
process grounded in the deterministic model, deciding whether
the proof leads it to a level of belief in but-for causation that
satisfies the standard of persuasion.336 The mechanistic model
fails when proof of causation rests on evidence derived from
331. Probabilistic causal contribution would hardly be the first doctrinal
adjustment to recognized difficulties of proof. Professor Green gave as examples
res ipsa loquitur, market share liability, the rationale for strict products
liability, see Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 461–63
(Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (citing plaintiff’s inability to refute evidence
of due care as grounds for strict liability), and the sufficiency standard for the
magnitude of damages caused by a defendant’s wrongdoing. Michael D. Green,
Pessimism About Milward, 3 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL’Y (forthcoming 2013) (on
file with author).
332. RUVINSKY, supra note 178, at 4–6.
333. Id. at 6.
334. See id. at 4 (explaining that Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle means
that position and speed of elementary particles “is always characterized by a
probability distribution”).
335. See Rosenberg, supra note 298, at 870 (suggesting that particularistic
evidence is no different than statistical evidence in that it “offers nothing more
than a basis for conclusions about a perceived balance of probabilities”); see also
Gold, supra note 277, at 384 n.42 (agreeing with Rosenberg that “all
evidence . . . involves inference from observed probability patterns,” but
acknowledging the “power of particularistic proof to generate belief probabilities
regardless of known fact probabilities”).
336. In a civil case “preponderance of the evidence” is routinely described as
proof leading the fact-finder to believe that the fact is more likely than not, but
Professor Wright has argued that to find a fact proven, legal fact-finders
actually require a degree of belief much higher than belief that the fact and its
negative are equally likely. Wright, supra note 19, at 201–02.
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population-based data on the association of disease and exposure,
or of disease and genotype and exposure, or of exposure and
disease-related biomarkers. In such cases the fact-finder must
test its belief in a frequentist-probability value supported by
evidence of risk contribution. Probabilistic causal contribution is
therefore the appropriate model to apply. Advances in
toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will make such
evidence available more often than it has been in the past.
Sometimes, of course, such evidence will not be available
although other evidence exists that might support an inference of
general causation. To require relative risk data as proof of
specific causation in every case is to ask too much. Compelling
cases may exist in which such data are unavailable for perfectly
good reasons. Zuchowicz v. United States,337 in which
epidemiologic study was implausible because both the disease
and the exposure were exceptionally rare, is an example.338 Or a
plaintiff may have adequate mechanistic evidence of general
causation, as in Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group,
Inc.339 Most likely the best that can be done in such cases is to
muddle through under the all-or-nothing, but-for causation rule,
as courts have been doing.340 It is ironic that a plaintiff who
succeeds without relative risk data would receive a full recovery
while a plaintiff with “better” evidence would recover only a
discounted award, but then again, the absence of relative risk
data would in most cases make success substantially more
difficult for the plaintiff.

337. Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381 (2d Cir. 1998).
338. Id. at 384–85, 391 (affirming a verdict that negligent prescription of
endometriosis drug at a dose that “very, very few women” had ever received had
caused plaintiff’s “very rare” disease).
339. See Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11 (1st Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1002 (2012) (reversing summary judgment for
defendant because the trial court abused its discretion in excluding plaintiff’s
expert testimony on general causation). Because general causation was
addressed before other issues in the case, id. at 13, the decision does not address
how plaintiffs intended to prove specific causation.
340. See generally Sanders, supra note 20, at 1375–80 (discussing
admissibility standards for specific causation testimony in toxic tort cases in
which the plaintiff presents adequate evidence of general causation).
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V. Probabilistic Causal Contribution and Tort Goals

Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will strengthen
the argument for reenvisioning specific causation in toxic tort
cases, but the indeterminacy at the core of that argument was
understood even in the pre-genomic era. Nevertheless, American
courts, as in June and Wilcox, have generally continued to insist
on rules that assign all-or-nothing liability depending on whether
there is more-likely-than-not proof of but-for causation.341
Michael Green has noted that this insistence seems to buck two
tides: a general trend away from an all-or-nothing rule in tort law
and a “striking consensus” among academic writers (from which
Professor Green dissented) in support of proportional liability.342
Although courts have not typically explained their resistance by
reference to the goals of tort law recognized by scholars, it is
worth assessing probabilistic causal contribution against those
goals.
A. Deterrence Goals: Is Probabilistic Precision Probable?
Legal economists have argued that using probabilities to
discount recoveries, across a population of exposed and sick
claimants, would produce an economically efficient deterrence
signal in which the aggregate amount of awarded damages
matched the value of the harm actually caused.343 Professor
341. The view in other countries is less monolithic. See Ken Oliphant,
Uncertain Factual Causation in the Third Restatement: Some Comparative
Notes, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1599, 1624–30 (2011) (comparing the tort
principles of several European nations).
342. Green, supra note 185, at 352 (noting that modern tort law is “more
receptive” to apportioning liability); id. at 357 (scholarly consensus); id. at 397
(“[T]here is good reason for the courts’ unwillingness.”); see also Michael D.
Green, Introduction: The Third Restatement of Torts in a Crystal Ball, 37 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 993, 995 (2011) (saying he has been “critical of the proproportional liability literature”).
343. See, e.g., Green, supra note 185, at 354–55 (noting that proportional
liability to acknowledge probabilistic uncertainty in fact-finding, “the argument
goes, would, through more accurate outcomes, provide more fine-tuned
deterrence incentives”); Mario J. Rizzo & Frank S. Arnold, Causal
Apportionment in the Law of Torts: An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV.
1399, 1427–28 (1980); Rosenberg, supra note 298, at 867.
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Green questioned how well epidemiologic reality would match
economic theory. He pointed out that when epidemiologists
repeatedly investigate a suspected association between exposure
and disease, the resulting relative risk values generally vary
considerably. This real-world variability derives in part from
random sampling error but also from the inherent difficulty of
epidemiologic study design. With the possible exception of very
large and expensive studies, any two epidemiologic investigations
are likely to be conducted in ways that create different biases and
confounding factors that can affect the results. Because the
notion of a single, knowable quantitative measure of risk
contribution is illusory, Professor Green noted, so too is the
notion of an accurately modulated optimum deterrence signal
based on risk contribution.344
The improbability of probabilistic precision is indisputable.
Significant variation in measured relative risk characterizes even
some of the strongest and most accepted substance-disease links
uncovered by classical epidemiology.345 Even if repeated studies
could be designed to be perfectly comparable in avoiding bias and
confounding, sampling error would frustrate any hope of
replicating relative risk values. For claims involving rare
diseases, uncommon exposures, or small toxic effects, an
epidemiologic study’s a priori statistical power will be relatively
low, and the statistically computed sampling error relatively
high.346
344. Green, supra note 185, at 371–84, 395–96.
345. See, e.g., W.C. HUEPER, OCCUPATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL CANCERS OF
THE URINARY SYSTEM 118–19, 156 tbl.48 (1969) (describing studies reporting
relative risk of bladder cancer ranging from 8.7 to 17 in aniline dye industry
workers). Estimates of the fraction of mesothelioma cases that occur absent
known exposure to asbestos range from less than ten percent to upward of thirty
percent. Compare Mark A. Behrens, What’s New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV.
LITIG. 501, 527 (2009) (asserting that “there is wide agreement that a significant
number (by some estimates, twenty to thirty percent) of mesotheliomas are not
asbestos-induced”), with Troyen A. Brennan, Environmental Torts, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1993) (noting that “well over ninety-percent” of mesothelioma deaths
are attributable to asbestos exposure). See also Becker v. Baron Bros., Coliseum
Auto Parts, Inc., 649 A.2d 613, 618 (N.J. 1994) (reporting that plaintiff’s witness
testified that fifteen percent of cases “have no known cause,” and defendant’s
witness testified that twenty to forty percent of cases have “unknown causes”).
346. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in
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Shifting epidemiologic analysis to the molecular level will
improve this situation. In past epidemiologic studies, undetected
genetic differences contributed to the variability of results
(because the research subjects were not all equally susceptible to
the toxic effect under study or not equally at risk for the disease
even without exposure).347 Assessing relative risk by genotype
will reduce that variability. Biomarkers of exposure will enable
finer calibration of the very rough distinctions between “exposed”
and “unexposed” samples to which epidemiologists have
previously been limited. Biomarkers of effect or pre-clinical
biomarkers of disease (even if not associated with toxic exposure)
will similarly allow more precise delineations.348
Nonetheless, toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will
not produce quantitative precision for the legal system’s
convenience. Their results will inherently be probabilistic,
statistical, and variable. Molecular epidemiologists will be able to
account for more causes of variation than classical
epidemiologists could, but they will not be able to control for all
sources of bias and confounding.349 The legal system must
understand that neither classical nor molecular epidemiology is
likely to satisfy a norm of mathematical precision.
But where does that norm come from? Why should it be the
norm? And why does it apply to causal findings but not to other
elements of a tort claim?
To a large extent, the precision norm arises directly from the
economic efficiency rationale. Critics ask: If optimal deterrence is
the sole rationale for abandoning all-or-nothing causation rules,
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 211, 253–54 (Fed. Judicial Ctr. ed.,
3d ed. 2011); see also Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology,
in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 549, 582–83 (2011) (describing
application of statistical power concept in epidemiology).
347. See Marchant, supra note 53, at 7–8 (“[E]ach person is unique in his or
her susceptibility to toxic agents, further complicating the inquiry into what
caused illness in that individual.”).
348. See id. at 18–27 (discussing potential use of biomarkers to prove or
disprove exposure, as well as general and specific causation); Grodsky, supra
note 85, at 181–87 (defining biomarkers of exposure, susceptibility, and effect).
349. Paolo Boffetta, Biomarkers in Cancer Epidemiology: An Integrative
Approach, 31 CARCINOGENESIS 121, 125 (2010) (asserting that molecular
epidemiology studies “fit into the same framework” as classical epidemiology).
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but optimization is impossible because of inadequate data, why
forgo the perceived accountability advantages of traditional sine
qua non causation?350
The argument that probabilistic precision is illusory,
however, applies also to factual determinations under the but-for
test. This is especially true in jurisdictions that apply bright-line
doubling+ relative risk standards for specific causation.351 Even
absent bright line rules, the all-or-nothing but-for causation
model forces a fractional statistical probability to either 1 or 0. As
Professor Green acknowledged, no one can say that those errors
balance each other out.352 Probabilistic causal contribution may
not be able to discriminate finely between, say, a 40% risk
contribution versus 35% or 45%. But even with limited accuracy,
its results would more closely match the available risk evidence
than the all-or-nothing test of but-for causation. It would avoid
the under-deterrence problem that results when claims against
tortious exposures to known risk factors fail because the but-for
test cannot be satisfied, and it would provide some compensation
and accountability in such cases.353 At the same time, it would
350. See Green, supra note 185, at 395–96 (doubting that proportional
liability would enable “tort law to provide a liability signal precisely calibrated
to the costs of accidents worth avoiding”); Klein, supra note 53, at 44 (asserting
that although class-based, proportional liability schemes theoretically might
provide optimal deterrence, Agent Orange experience suggests otherwise).
351. The arbitrary effects of the doubling+ rule have been felt in real cases.
See, e.g., Merck & Co. v. Garza, 347 S.W.3d 256, 267 (Tex. 2011) (rejecting
plaintiff’s expert’s reliance on epidemiologic study with reported relative risk of
1.92); Estate of George v. Vt. League of Cities & Towns, 993 A.2d 367, 382 (Vt.
2010) (affirming the exclusion of plaintiff’s expert testimony when epidemiologic
results varied, some relative risks exceeded 2.0, and plaintiff’s expert testified to
“summary risk estimate” of 1.51).
352. Green, supra note 185, at 396. The net effect of all-or-nothing causation
in toxic tort cases is a subject of debate. Compare Estate of George, 993 A.2d at
396 (“[T]here is reason to believe that the current system does not
systematically underdeter.”), with Lin, supra note 110, at 1442 (stating that
causation proof problems and litigation costs cause “systematic
undercompensation of environmental tort victims and the systematic
underdeterrence of polluters”).
353. Professor Green also argued that epidemiology cannot detect relatively
small increases in risk as accurately as needed for proportional liability, and
questioned the legal system’s ability to assess the causal significance of a weak
association between exposure and disease. Green, supra note 185, at 375–87,
392–95. Molecular epidemiology and toxicogenomics are likely to alleviate
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reduce the over-deterrence of the “all” part of all-or-nothing
rules.354
Large swaths of tort law are, to put it charitably, highly
approximate. It is somewhat ironic to criticize causal
apportionment of damages as imprecise when the amount of
damages itself contains a large heuristic component and when
significant components even of seemingly objectively calculable
economic damages are computed by informed probabilistic
estimates. Furthermore, comparative fault regimes that divide up
liability and thus affect deterrence signals have become nearly
universal. Of course, apportioning among liable parties “on the
basis of a normative judgment about relative culpability or
responsibility is different from employing probabilistic
assessments of the existence of an element of a prima facie case
to determine the liability of a party and the damages for which
the party is liable.”355 But both processes ask fact-finders to
divide liability for a harm into pieces. Probabilistic causal
contribution, although an imprecise fraction based on imprecise
data, would at least be based to some degree on quantitative
evidence. It is incongruous to let fact-finders hear all the evidence
about the parties’ conduct and then carve up the liability based
(though not completely eliminate) the problem of weak associations by
disaggregating them into relatively strong associations for susceptible
individuals and very weak or nonexistent associations for resistant individuals.
Ofer Shpilberg et al., The Next Stage: Molecular Epidemiology, 50 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 633, 637 (1997); see also Perera, supra note 149, at 608 (noting
that “new molecular epidemiologic and other data invalidate the assumption of
population homogeneity” with respect to toxic susceptibility). The need to decide
whether an epidemiologic association is causal, which addresses general rather
than specific causation, arises in every case in which a plaintiff relies on
epidemiologic evidence, even under but-for causation. The decision requires
consideration of the “aspects” of an association that epidemiologists use to
assess the causal significance of an association, only one of which is the
association’s strength. See Hill, supra note 18, at 295. Probabilistic causal
contribution would be applied to specific causation only if the evidence were
sufficient to support an inference of general causation.
354. Because of incomplete claiming, over-deterrence may in many cases be
more theoretical than real. See Dan Markel, Reply: Punitive Damages and
Private Ordering Fetishism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 283, 284 & n.4 (2010),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/05-2010/Markel.pdf (noting “widely known
problems of tort underenforcement”).
355. Green, supra note 185, at 353.
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on a normative judgment,356 but prevent them from using relative
risk as an apportionment tool because epidemiology is imprecise.
In the CERCLA context, the Supreme Court accepted the
division of millions of dollars of liability based on very indirect
measures of causal contribution.357 Tort law tolerates the
imposition of full liability based on a belief that each element of
the claim is “more likely than not.” It tolerates the extremely
rough justice of comparative fault. Why should it demand a
higher level of accuracy for causal apportionment? Getting it
right is important, but the presence of scientific evidence should
not fool us into thinking the law can or must get it exactly right—
especially when the alternative is acknowledged over-deterrence
in some cases and under-deterrence in many others.358 Detailed
toxicogenomic and molecular information, to the extent available,
will improve a fact finder’s ability to assign a causal share to a
defendant’s toxic substance as opposed to all other contributors to
the risk of a plaintiff’s disease. We should recognize this as an
improvement—without feeling a need to pretend that such
information will allow courts to impose theoretically perfect
amounts of liability.

356. See Wright, supra note 325, at 1144–45 (stating that comparative
responsibility is assessed “not according to any detailed formula but rather
through rational commonsense judgment”).
357. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 556 U.S. 599, 612
(2009) (affirming liability allocation under CERCLA even though “the evidence
adduced by the parties did not allow the court to calculate precisely the amount
of hazardous chemicals contributed by the Railroad parcel to the total site
contamination or the exact percentage of harm caused by each chemical.”).
358. Martin v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 528 A.2d 947 (Pa. 1987),
illustrates the tensions inherent in all-or-nothing rules. The court rejected a
jury verdict apportioning a plaintiff’s disability between his asbestos exposure
and his tobacco smoke exposure. Id. at 950–51. Two dissents argued that
apportionment should have been permitted using “rough approximation,” id. at
951 (Nix, J., dissenting) without requiring “[m]athematical exactitude,” id. at
954 (Hutchinson, J., dissenting). The first complained that apportionment was
essential to avoid the “unconscionable” result of no recovery (presumably
because the plaintiff’s own actions vitiated but-for causation by the defendant).
Id. at 951 (Nix, J., dissenting). The second complained that apportionment was
essential to avoid the “unjust” result of full liability (presumably because
plaintiff’s and defendants’ acts would be treated as multiple sufficient causes).
Id. at 954 (Hutchison, J., dissenting).
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Another deterrence-based critique argues that causally-based
apportionment of damages will provide inadequate deterrence
because defendants will have incentives to hunt for extra risk
factors to blame—and finding them would, perversely, reduce the
liability of each wrongdoer as more wrongdoers (or at least risk
factors) are found.359 Yet defendants have every incentive to
conduct this hunt under an all-or-nothing but-for model of
causation as well. The difference is that under the current regime
a defendant that successfully posits additional risk factors as
independent alternate causes has a good chance of avoiding
liability altogether, while under probabilistic causal contribution
the defendant would bear at least some liability even if many
cases of the plaintiff’s disease have no known cause.360
Probabilistic causal contribution would also shift the onus with
respect to alternative risk factors. Under current law, plaintiffs
often must attempt to “rule out” other possible causes to leap the
“more likely than not” hurdle and obtain a finding of but-for
causation. Under probabilistic causal contribution, if a plaintiff
proves that the exposure for which a defendant is responsible
increased the plaintiff’s risk, a defendant seeking to use another
risk factor to reduce its own liability would have to justify that
reduction by showing that the plaintiff was exposed to the other
risk factor and consequently faced a greater risk than would have
been the case with only the exposure for which the defendant was
responsible.
Moreover, the premise of the under-deterrence argument,
that the tortfeasor caused the whole injury but is being held
liable for only part of it, fits poorly with the reality of
359. See, e.g., David A. Fischer, Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence
and the Probability Paradox, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1201, 1211–14 (1993) (arguing
that the “probability paradox” means that “probabilistic causation requires
people to use the least care when the world is the most dangerous”).
360. If the evidence shows that the risk factors interact to create risk, the
defendant is less likely to prevail under an all-or-nothing regime but also likely
to pay a larger share under probabilistic causal contribution. See supra note 273
and accompanying text. And in an all-or-nothing regime, even in the case of a
synergistic interaction, a defendant might be able to convince a fact-finder that
only the other risk factor was a “more likely than not” cause, depending on the
strength of the interaction and the risk characteristics of the individual
exposures.
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indeterminate specific causation. Because that indeterminacy is
the rationale for probabilistic causal contribution, exposure to
multiple independent risk-contributing factors should matter: the
additional risk factors reduce the relative role of a defendant’s
risk factor. The deterrence signal of a discounted recovery, even if
less than that of a full recovery, would still be higher—and
therefore theoretically would produce greater investment in
safety—than the signal that would result if but-for causation
rules precluded any recovery.361 And if the hunt for alternative
risk factors leads to legitimate scientific research, it will help
society learn the truth and perhaps make better decisions about
what products create risks that are not worth their benefits and
vice versa.362

361. David Fischer’s contrary argument misapprehended the nature of
epidemiologic data. Professor Fischer hypothesized seven known carcinogens,
exposure to each of which posed a thirty percent risk of developing lung cancer.
Fischer, supra note 359, at 1213. He argued that under proportional liability a
plaintiff tortiously exposed to just one of them would probably receive a 90%
recovery because there would be no other plausible cause, while if each of seven
equally culpable defendants exposed the plaintiff to a different carcinogen, each
defendant would be liable only for one-seventh of the damages. Id. The premise
of a 90% recovery from the single tortfeasor, however, assumed that the seven
known carcinogens are the only possible causes, so if the plaintiff was exposed to
only one, that exposure must have been the cause—which is inconsistent with
the hypothesized fact that ceteris paribus, exposure to that one carcinogen only
explained 30% of the incidence of the disease. A court applying all-or-nothing
but-for causation and the doubling+ rule would not let the hypothesized singletortfeasor case be tried. Under probabilistic causal contribution, the single
tortfeasor would appropriately be liable for 30% of the damages. The sevendefendant case would be more complicated, because the hypothetical treated the
carcinogens independently but the hypothesized facts ruled out the possibility of
independent additive risk contributions: the seven carcinogens could not
together account for 210% of the risk of lung cancer. Based on equal relative risk
values for each carcinogen, a fact-finder might attribute a one-seventh share to
each, but evidence of the degree of confounding in the various studies, the
similarity or differences of the carcinogens’ biological mechanisms, or studies of
the interactions of multiple exposures might alter that result.
362. See MICHAEL D. GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS 332 (1996)
(noting that Bendectin litigation spurred scientific research into the drug’s
effects).
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B. Corrective Justice Goals: Is Causation Different?

The Third Restatement of Torts acknowledged widespread
adoption of comparative responsibility and apportionment
principles. It embraced a theoretical distinction, however,
between apportionment based on cause and apportionment based
on fault or other norm-based conceptions of responsibility.363
Apportionment based on cause, according to the Third
Restatement, may be appropriate in limited circumstances when
“legally culpable conduct . . . was a legal cause of less than the
entire damages for which the plaintiff seeks recovery” and a factfinder can determine “the amount of damages separately caused
by that conduct.”364 Other than straightforward enhanced-injury
cases, however (as where a defendant negligently causes an
accident that injures a plaintiff who is then further injured by
medical malpractice), the Third Restatement did little to
illustrate when such a situation might arise, noting that very
little case law provides clear analysis of the problem.365
The Third Restatement thus took a clear position that but-for
causation is a prerequisite for any fault-based apportionment.
The basis for this choice was the principle that “[n]o party should
be liable for harm it did not cause.”366

363.
364.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 (2010).
Id. § 26(b); see also, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR
PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28 cmt. d (2010) (discussing circumstances
under which harm is “causally divisible”); id. cmt. l (distinguishing circumstance
when each one of multiple actors causes all of a plaintiff’s harm from
circumstances in which each actor causes part of a plaintiff’s harm). Under the
Third Restatement, liability for what the Second Restatement called distinct
“harms,” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1)(a) (1965), would be
assigned to each defendant whose conduct was a but-for cause of the separate
harms, with any apportionment to be determined by the jurisdiction’s scope of
liability rules. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26(b)
(2010). The Third Restatement appeared to abandon the Second Restatement’s
concept of single harms for which there is a reasonable basis for apportionment,
or “divisible” harm. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1)(b) &
cmt. d (1965), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB.
§ 26 cmt. a, c (2010).
365. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. § 26 cmt. a
(2010) (“[F]ew if any cases provide much analysis.”).
366. Id.
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Andrew Klein relied heavily on the same principle in his
argument for a strong requirement of sine qua non causation
even in toxic torts. Professor Klein argued that requiring but-for
causation is compelled by corrective justice principles.367 He also
noted that to hold defendants liable for damages they did not
“cause” undermines confidence in the legal system and bolsters
calls for replacing tort law altogether.368 The powerful intuitive
notion that cause is a yes-or-no phenomenon that cannot be
divided up369 thus fits tightly with corrective justice theories of
tort.370
The principle that persons should be liable only for damages
they cause, depends, however, on the meaning of “cause.” In the
uncertain molecular world of toxic causation, if a substance is a
risk factor for disease then that substance is causing injury to
someone, but science does not let us identify that person in the
routine, familiar way.371 Reliably attributing a particular
plaintiff’s harm to a particular defendant’s conduct—were it
possible—would be more satisfying than basing causation on
contribution to risk, realized injury, and discounted recovery. But
in the face of irreducible uncertainty, a discounted recovery
provides at least some redress and is a better measure of
corrective justice than no recovery at all.372 Probabilistic causal
contribution thus can restore some degree of accountability that
has been eroded by narrow judicial interpretations of the
367. See Klein, supra note 53, at 9–13 (discussing the value of sine qua non
causation in terms of corrective justice principles).
368. Id. at 30.
369. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 26 (noting that mesothelioma is an
indivisible injury not susceptible to apportionment, “[a]t least not
apportionment based on causation”).
370. MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2009).
371. Richard Delgado described this as the problem of the “indeterminate
plaintiff.” See generally Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Causein-Fact Rules for Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 881 (1982).
372. See John Makdisi, Proportional Liability: A Comprehensive Rule to
Apportion Tort Damages Based on Probability, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1063, 1073–74
(1989) (“While it is true that those who are actually injured by the tortious
conduct do not receive their compensation in full and the others receive
compensation to which they are not entitled under traditional tort theory, a
fairer distribution of the damages is not possible given the uncertainty of
causation.”).
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admissibility and sufficiency of causation evidence.373 It is also
better than allowing full recovery, which in the aggregate
(assuming sufficient claiming) would force a defendant to pay for
more harm than its actions created.
The theoretical purity of but-for causation has already been
diluted to some extent by comparative responsibility regimes.
Fact-finders must, and do, weigh the incommensurate all the
time in comparative responsibility cases, which may entail a
quantitative comparison of behavior found blameworthy (i.e.,
negligent) to behavior that is fault-free but nevertheless gives
rise to liability.374 Who is more responsible for the truck that
backed up into its driver: the strictly liable auto manufacturer
that designed the defective transmission that mis-shifted, or the
negligent driver who exited the car without disengaging the
ignition?375 It is fanciful to think jurors view such questions
through polarized lenses that transmit no light on relative causal
contribution. Judgments of blameworthiness incorporate causal
judgments too. When a drunk driver runs a stop sign and injures
another driver who could not avoid the crash because a mechanic
erred when repairing her brakes, the drunk driver gets a greater
share of liability not just because the conduct is worse, but also
because of the sense that the brakes would not have been needed
absent the drunk driving, even though the bad brakes were a butfor cause of the accident.

373. See Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice and Liability for
Increasing Risks, 37 UCLA L. REV. 439, 444–45 (1990) (arguing that liability for
imposing risks is consistent with corrective justice). See generally Thomas O.
McGarity, Proposal for Linking Culpability and Causation to Ensure Corporate
Accountability for Toxic Risks, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 5–14,
38–41 (arguing that toxic tort causation doctrine has contributed to an
“accountability crisis”).
374. New Jersey’s statute is exemplary: “In all negligence and strict liability
actions[,]” the fact-finder must determine the “extent, in the form of a
percentage, of each party’s negligence or fault.” N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.2.a
(West 2002). The statute provides for only several liability for any party less
than 60% “responsible” for the damages, subject to a partial exception for
environmental tort actions. Id. §§ 2A:15-5.3.b, 5.3.d.
375. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Sanchez, 997 S.W.2d 584, 598 (Tex. 1999)
(holding that the plaintiff’s actual recovery would be reduced by the “jury’s
finding of fifty percent comparative responsibility”).

WHEN CERTAINTY DISSOLVES INTO PROBABILITY

333

Current doctrine requires fact-finders to engage in sub
silentio causal attribution in some toxic tort cases as well. As
noted above, data show that exposure to both tobacco smoke and
asbestos synergistically increases the risk of lung cancer above
the sum of each product’s independent risk enhancement.376 Yet
manufacturers of tobacco and asbestos products routinely name
each other as the cause of lung cancer in plaintiffs exposed to
both products. Even if fault dominates fact-finders’ thinking in
such cases, it seems extraordinarily unlikely that they pay no
attention to the risk data and other causal issues, such as the
relative amounts of exposure, when they assign comparative
responsibility.377
A related view, prominently espoused by Richard Wright,
relies on a sharp distinction between ex ante risk and ex post
causation. The argument holds that statistical data derived from
studies of populations provide insufficient information to satisfy
corrective justice norms for a causal finding in an individual case;
instead, particularistic evidence should be required to support a
specific causal inference.378 If, however, particularistic evidence
means evidence of some characteristic that distinguishes an
exposure-caused case of disease from any other, this would imply
that no plaintiff relying on epidemiologic or similarly populationbased evidence could ever prevail, even in the post-genomic era.
Professor
Wright
has
acknowledged
the
normative
appropriateness of forms of proportional liability to avoid this
harsh result, at least in some circumstances in which it is
impossible to prove “who actually caused the plaintiff’s injury.”379

376. See supra Part III.A.2.
377. See Sanders, supra note 1, at 38 (noting blending of causal and
normative concepts in comparative responsibility instructions).
378. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 19, at 196, 206–08 (“Legal fact-finders are
not told that they merely need to place a bet on the existence of some fact, but
rather are instructed that they must determine whether the fact actually
existed.”); Wright, supra note 24, at 1312–14; Wright, supra note 5, at 1049–50.
379. Wright, supra note 5, at 1072; see also Green, supra note 185, at 362–63
(discussing Professor Wright’s views on proportional liability); Wright, supra
note 19, at 214 (approving of market-share liability in DES cases and the
proportional liability imposed in Barker, though disagreeing with Barker’s risk
contribution theory).
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When the causation evidence inherently must be statistical,
however, probabilistic causal contribution is not just a secondbest approach; it is the approach that best fits knowable truth.380
The indeterminacy of toxic tort causation is different from the
familiar example in which the knowledge that one company
operates a large majority of buses on a route will not suffice to
hold that company liable when an unidentified bus runs a car off
the road.381 The intuitive discomfort with holding the bus
company liable arises not because of the statistical nature of the
evidence that it was the most probable owner of the errant bus.
Rather, we do not really believe that the statistic accurately
reflects the probability. To say that the bus company probably
caused the accident is to say that one of its drivers was probably
at fault and we are loath to do that without more information.382
Despite reductionist neurobiology, we don’t treat momentary
lapses of attention as the result of random molecular movements
in the driver’s brain. The statistical frequency of motor vehicle
accidents per vehicle mile traveled is well known, yet most people
think they can avoid accidents—indeed most people think they
are above-average drivers.383 Instinctively we believe that road
accidents, especially accidents caused by bad driving, are not

380. See Makdisi, supra note 372, at 1100–01 (when a causal link “is
believed by a factfinder to be probable rather than actual, the willingness to
consider this probability and allocate proportional relief reflects a more
complete and accurate notion of cause”). But cf. Wright, supra note 19, at 214
(describing the market-share scheme as a “second best liability doctrine”).
381. Sargent v. Mass. Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Mass. 1940) (quoted
in Wright, supra note 19, at 201); see also Smith v. Rapid Transit, 58 N.E.2d
754, 754–55 (Mass. 1945).
382. See Makdisi, supra note 372, at 1079 (arguing that Smith v. Rapid
Transit is partly explained because it is normatively “more offensive to attribute
to a potentially innocent defendant a wrongdoing harm that he may not have
caused”).
383. See generally, e.g., Leilani Greening & Carla C. Chandler, Why It Can’t
Happen to Me: The Base Rate Matters, But Overestimating Skill Leads to
Underestimating Risk, 27 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 760 (1997); Mark S. Horswill
et al., Drivers’ Ratings of Different Components of Their Own Driving Skill: A
Greater Illusion of Superiority for Skills That Relate to Accident Involvement, 34
J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 177 (2004).
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randomly distributed, and that bad drivers may not be randomly
distributed across bus companies either.384
There is no morality to the molecule. In toxic torts, once a
fact-finder concludes that general causation has been established
by the available evidence,385 no reason exists to suspect anything
other than randomness for specific causation.386 Or, at least,
science usually won’t be able to distinguish the “actual” cause in a
given case from the probability distribution of causes.387 In such
cases, insisting upon particularistic evidence to protect
384. When causation turns on statistical data but issues of fault are resolved
without statistical evidence, as in alternative and market-share liability cases,
courts have been less likely to require particularistic evidence of causation. But
cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 28
cmt. j (2010) (noting that courts are less willing to apply alternative causation
when evidence connecting particular defendants to even the possibility of harm
is absent, perhaps because exculpation is too difficult or plaintiffs are
insufficiently diligent).
385. Professor Wright agrees that evidence of statistical associations may
bear on general causation. Wright, supra note 19, at 206, 215.
386. See RUVINSKY, supra note 178, at 153 (“[Q]uestions such as what is the
cause for this mutation . . . do not have answers.”).
387. Michael Green pointed out that the distinction between particularistic
ex post proof of causation and population-based ex ante proof of risk collapses if
an epidemiologic study is the only evidence available. He wondered how
Professor Wright would respond to a hypothetical in which a plaintiff proved
exposure to an agent presenting a very high statistical risk of disease but a
witness “claims to have observed the plaintiff contract the disease from an alien
bite.” Green, supra note 185, at 362 n.38, 363. Professor Wright responded that
the hypothetical was fallacious because it did not really involve competing
causes but instead depended on an implicit assumption that the alien bite could
not cause disease: “If . . . there is no proven or accepted alien-bite causal
generalisation and no other possibly applicable causal generalisation, then” the
toxic agent is “the only possibly applicable causal generalisation [the known
statistical risk] with at least some particularistic instantiation [the known
exposure] . . . which fact could support the formation of a belief that it was the
causal process actually at work in the particular situation.” Wright, supra note
19, at 210 n.67. If proof of exposure could satisfy the demand for particularistic
proof, that demand would present only a small obstacle to reliance on
population-based data (even though proving exposure is sometimes difficult).
But if exposure constitutes sufficient particularistic proof only when “no other
possibly applicable causal generalisation” exists, then it will never be sufficient.
No one can ever exclude every possible alternative cause, see Stubbs v. City of
Rochester, 124 N.E. 137, 140 (N.Y. 1919), and frequently the competing cause is
not a specific risk factor but rather “unknown causes.” See, e.g., Henricksen v.
ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 (E.D. Wash. 2009).
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defendants from paying for harm they did not cause rings hollow;
probabilistic causal contribution requires them to pay for the
harm that they did cause.388
Toxicogenomics and molecular epidemiology will continue to
undermine the appropriateness of the deterministic model of butfor cause in toxic tort cases. Corrective justice would be better
served by using a more appropriate causation model. With but-for
and toxic torts, if it doesn’t fit, abandon it.
C. Truth-Seeking Goals: Wrong All the Time?
In their helpful catalogue of “vices” of proportional recovery,
Ariel Porat and Alex Stein include an epistemological problem:
although all-or-nothing rules may produce erroneous results in
some cases (either wrongly attributing causation where it did not
actually exist or wrongly failing to attribute causation where it
did actually exist), a rule that assigns a fractional recovery will
produce a result at variance with historical truth in each
individual case, because it will never be true that a tortious
exposure caused x% of a plaintiff’s harm but not the remainder.389
This is indisputable for a non-cumulative disease in a
deterministic causal model when only population-based evidence
is available.390 Any all-or-nothing rule, however, also accepts the
existence of some erroneous adjudications, and further accepts
that the aggregate result across a population of cases will be

388. See Makdisi, supra note 372, at 1073–74.
389. Ariel Porat & Alex Stein, Liability for Future Harm, in PERSPECTIVES
ON CAUSATION, supra note 1, at 221, 227–28. Porat and Stein, who are generally
sympathetic to probability-based compensation, argued that probabilistic
recovery for the chance of future harm avoids this and some of the other “vices”
of probability-discounted recovery for past harms. See generally id. at 226–33
(describing how different characteristics of the causal indeterminacy problem for
past and future harms affect the strengths and weaknesses of using
proportional liability to address the indeterminacy).
390. To say that there is an x% probability that a randomly-selected exposed
individual with a disease will be a “true” causation case, is not the same as
saying that the individual’s case is x% probable of having “true” causation, even
though many courts equate the two statements. See Gold, supra note 277, at 390
n.72.
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wrong.391 It is not clear why having a lower count of errors is
epistemologically superior to reducing the overall magnitude of
the consequences of the errors.392 More fundamentally, if we
adopt a probabilistic view of causation at the individual level—
even if that model is only a concession to the limits of scientific
understanding—then probabilistic causal contribution gets it
roughly right in every case, and the epistemological problem that
Porat and Stein identified disappears.
D. Administration of Justice Concerns: Too Much Information?
In a thoughtful essay, Joseph Sanders emphasized a number
of “practical, administration-of-justice” problems that he
concluded outweighed the “persuasive substantive arguments” in
favor of the “risk rule” of Rutherford and Barker.393 Professor
Sanders expressed concern about the level of complexity that
risk-based causal attribution would bring to toxic tort
litigation,394 although he acknowledged that toxicogenomics could
actually alleviate some of that concern by providing a more finelygrained understanding of causal mechanisms.395

391. Not everybody who has experienced both illness and exposure will sue,
which adds a further element of unpredictability to the fact-finding accuracy of
all-or-nothing rules. If the probability of claiming were strongly positively
correlated with the probability of “true” causation (e.g., because only people with
obvious exposures or known genetic susceptibility are likely to sue), but the
applicable all-or-nothing rule bars recovery, the frequency of false negative
errors among cases actually brought could approach 100%.
392. See Makdisi, supra note 382, at 1065, 1074 (arguing that proportional
liability is more accurate and fair).
393. Sanders, supra note 1, at 34, 36.
394. See id. at 34 (doubting feasibility of identifying risk proportions in
multi-agent cases); id. at 40 (“[R]isk rule introduces a substantial degree of
conceptual complexity and uncertainty.”). Michael Green expressed similar
concerns but suggested that apportionment based on risk contribution would be
less of a “litigative quagmire” than apportionment based on comparative
responsibility. Green, supra note 94, at 540–41. Andrew Klein has argued that
administrative concerns justify the doubling+ rule with proportional recovery.
Andrew R. Klein, A Model for Enhanced Risk Recovery in Tort, 56 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1173, 1195–96 (1999).
395. Sanders, supra note 1, at 36.
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The concern is well-founded. Probabilistic causal contribution
does not have the virtue of simplicity. Courts will be challenged
to administer cases in reasonable time, at reasonable cost, and
with appropriate levels of scrutiny of expert testimony, which will
be offered by all parties. But even if courts adhere to a
deterministic “more-likely-than-not but-for” causation model,
they will still be confronted with toxicogenomic and molecular
epidemiologic data and all of the complexity such evidence will
entail. As I’ve said elsewhere, that train is coming, and courts
cannot get off the tracks.396
The complexity courts will face will reflect the complex world
that science reveals. If toxicogenomics, molecular epidemiology,
and related sciences fulfill their potential, they will show us an
elaborate landscape of toxic risks and variable genetic
susceptibility to those risks, many of them relatively small but
still significant. If, in the name of simplicity and reduced
administrative expense, courts impose on that landscape the
same all-or-nothing rules now in effect, the law will willfully
blind itself to the truth, will too frequently fail to redress harm
truly caused, and will impose too much liability for the harm it
does redress. Such outcomes would be neither efficient nor just.
VI. Conclusion
Paradoxically, the emergence of toxicogenomics and
molecular epidemiology promises to increase our understanding
of the effects of toxic exposures while simultaneously highlighting
the fundamental uncertainty of any individual claim. These
scientific advances strengthen, rather than weaken, the case for
reform of causation doctrine.
The deterministic model of but-for causation does not fit toxic
tort cases that depend on population-based data—even if the data
come from studies at a molecular scale. Worse, it produces results
that are inefficient and unjust. Commentators have recognized
this for a quarter-century, but with few exceptions the courts
have not responded. In the post-genomic era, it is time for the
396.

Gold, supra note 3, at 397.
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courts to adapt,397 and to adopt a probabilistic causal contribution
model in toxic tort cases.

397. See Donovan v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 914 N.E.2d 891, 901 (Mass.
2009) (recognizing a medical monitoring claim for increased risk resulting from
toxic exposure).

